to achieve specific interdiction objectives cannot be preordained but must be the result of careful analysis.

Almost all OAF missions in Kosovo were AI, or in support of AI, since enemy ground forces were never engaged against friendly ground forces. As we will see, a wide range of aircraft—A-10s, AV-8Bs, F-15Es, B-52s, and numerous other NATO aircraft—successfully attacked mobile and fixed Serb targets in and around Kosovo.

Airborne Forward Air Control

Forward air control is the generic term for the direction of offensive-air-support missions in close proximity to friendly ground troops. The term forward control is opposed to rear control, which refers to the coordination of air strikes by either a ground-based air support operations center or an EC-130E airborne battlefield command and control center (ABCCC). The person directing the air strikes, the FAC, can be deployed with the ground forces or in an aircraft as an AFAC or FAC[A]. Joint documents have adopted the acronym FAC(A), although many Air Force unit instruction manuals have used and still use AFAC. No matter what they are called or where they are located, the FAC is the final clearance authority for an attacking pilot to expend weapons near friendly forces.

Controlling OAF air strikes in the absence of friendly ground forces did not meet the current definition of CAS by either joint or Air Force (AF) doctrine. The latter defines killer scouts as attack aircraft used for AI in an armed reconnaissance role to validate and mark targets for dedicated attack missions against lucrative targets in a specified geographic zone—pretty much the role we had in OAF. The A-10 community, however, has for years used air strike control (ASC) to describe directing aircraft strikes under any circumstance. I will avoid any further discussion of these definitions because I believe that what we did in OAF was FACing in the classical sense. An inaccurate bomb dropped on targets in Kosovo would have had such a severe, negative impact on the coalition’s unity and commitment that FACs in the classical role were required to ensure positive target identification, control attacking aircraft, and prevent inadvertent attacks on innocent civilians. In Kosovo, innocent civilians were in close proximity to the enemy, and for all practical considerations, these missions took on the same urgency and significance as CAS. The airmen who directed and flew these sorties kept their doctrinal terms simple and consistently referred to the control of any air strike as FACing and the pilots as FACs or AFACs. The authors will follow that convention throughout this book.

Traditionally, flying an AFAC mission is like being a traffic cop in the sky. The first duty of the AFAC is to know the ground situation in detail, including the ground commander’s intended scheme of maneuver and objectives throughout the day’s battle. Prior to takeoff, AFACs study the target areas, the types of fighter aircraft they will control on those targets, and the munitions those aircraft will bring to the fight. Once airborne, the AFAC checks in with E-3 airborne warning and control system (AWACS) and ABCCC controllers to get updates on the air and ground situation and starts adjusting the game plan. Nearing the target area—if appropriate—he contacts the ground FAC and organizes the list of targets with the strike aircraft on the way. If armed with appropriate ordnance, the AFAC can begin attacking targets while waiting for the strikers. The AFAC authenticates the strikers when they arrive, using a challenge-and-response code to confirm their identity and preclude the enemy’s use of tactical deception. He then updates the strikers on the target area and passes a standardized target-attack briefing. That briefing includes target type, coordinates, timing factors, weapons to employ, threats relative to the target location, and restrictions on the attack heading (to ensure that no friendly forces, noncombatants, sensitive areas, or structures are damaged by the fighter’s ordnance).

After all this preparation and coordination, the attack finally begins with the AFAC getting the strikers’ “eyes on target” by using visual descriptions, “marking” the target with ordnance, or both. The AFAC usually fires rockets with a white phosphorous charge, known as a “Willy Pete,” that blooms on impact to mark the target. However, he can use anything, such as an exploding bomb or a burning vehicle that had been previously attacked, that will help focus the fight lead’s eyes on the target. After the flight lead confirms the target location, the AFAC clears the flight to expend ordnance on the target, repeating any heading or other attack restrictions. The AFAC watches the fighters and the target area throughout the attack to provide visual warning for enemy surface-to-air fire and to ensure that the fighters really are following the attack heading required and are aiming at the right target. If in doubt, the AFAC can terminate the fighters’ attack by using the abort code passed in the formatted brief.

After the leader drops on the target, the AFAC adjusts the aim point for each of the successive wingman’s deliveries, based on the results of the previous attacks. The AFAC continues to control the formation’s attack until the strikers run out of weapons, fuel, or time on station—whichever comes first. The AFAC then directs the fighters’ egress direction and altitude to deconflict with inbound fighters.

In addition to the A-10s, two F-16CG squadrons from Aviano Air Base (AB), Italy, and the F-14s from the USS Theodore Roosevelt, in the Adriatic, also flew as AFACs. Naturally, these three very different aircraft performed the AFAC mission quite differently. For target acquisition, F-16s and F-14s used targeting pods that provided a magnified in-the-cockpit picture of the target area while A-10 pilots flew with gyrostabilized 12- or 15-power binoculars, which they often called “binos.” In much of the weather conditions during OAF, binos had much better visual resolution than targeting pods.

A-10s flew more than 1,000 AFAC missions during the 78 days of the OAF air campaign. Thousands of allied aircraft, representing practically every attack aircraft in the NATO inventory, were controlled by A-10s. The specifics of how A-10s performed the OAF AFAC mission are discussed in chapter 2.

Combat Search and Rescue

CSAR—possibly the most audacious Air Force mission—is made possible by airmen who dare to penetrate bad-guy land and recover recently shot down aviators from under the very nose of the enemy—an enemy who has many reasons for wanting to capture hapless aviators and is all too eager to do so. Those aviators are usually downed in combat and in the course of expending ordnance on the enemy’s troops. The enemy knows that the potential prize can be exploited for intelligence (intel), propaganda, and other political ends—not to mention the pleasure of retribution. For example, during the Gulf War, Saddam Hussein tried to use photos and videos of captured aviators to negatively affect allied public support for the air campaign.

With the increased use of airpower as the first instrument for coercion and peacemaking, the capture of an airman becomes more likely and could provide an enemy with a method of influencing public opinions, especially within allied democracies. An enemy may try to force “confessions” and intel disclosures from captured aviators. Dictators have demonstrated a willingness to subject helpless and, perhaps, wounded air warriors to public ridicule for political advantage without regard to the prisoner-of-war protections afforded by the Geneva convention. With the desire to support and maintain the high morale of allied airmen—and deny the enemy any opportunity for a propaganda advantage—the United States and its NATO allies place CSAR at the top of their “must have” capabilities in their combat planning.

During the preparations for OAF, NATO commanders ensured the availability of adequate CSAR forces. The size and nature of those forces reflected the specific combat circumstances. There are two crucial elements to CSAR success: a recovery vehicle to pick up the survivors and an on-scene commander (OSC) who locates the survivor, protects him or her if necessary, and directs the recovery vehicle to come forward when the area is safe. The recovery vehicle is usually a rescue or special forces helicopter, and the OSC is usually a specially trained A-10 pilot. However, other vehicles and pilots are capable of performing these functions, and there may be many other CSAR actors when the enemy threat is medium to high. These other elements could include the air-refueling tankers; a C-130 ABCCC to provide overall mission coordination and tracking of airborne assets; air-to-air fighters to provide air defense; F-16CJs and other similarly equipped aircraft to provide suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) and protection against enemy radar-guided surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems; jamming aircraft such as EA-6Bs; and any type of strike aircraft to provide air-to-ground firepower against enemy ground forces attempting to capture the survivors. These aircraft are often already in the target area performing their primary combat missions when the need arises, and they are then retasked to support the CSAR effort.

Another important element of the CSAR forces is the NATO airborne early warning (NAEW) aircraft, which

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