the KLA. In response to KLA ambushes of Serbian police in early 1998, Serbian forces conducted brutal retaliatory attacks against suspected KLA positions.[31] KLA support swelled within Kosovo and led to an escalation of KLA activity. In July of 1998, Serbian forces conducted a village-by-village search for KLA members, displacing over 200,000 Kosovars in the process.[32] The magnitude of the humanitarian crisis captured the attention of the international community.
In response to the KLA and Serbian exchanges, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1160 in March 1998 and Resolution 1199 in September 1998. The resolutions condemned Serbia’s excessive use of force, established an arms embargo, and called for an immediate cease-fire and the introduction of international monitors.[33] The latter demand was met in the cease-fire negotiated between US envoys and Belgrade in October 1998.[34]
However, the massacre of 45 Kosovar Albanians at Racak on 19 January 1999 quickly brought the cease-fire to an end.[35] Under threat of NATO air strikes, Serbian and Kosovar representatives were summoned to Rambouillet, France, to negotiate a peace agreement.[36] The compromise included the key items of a NATO-led implementation force; the recognition of the international borders of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia, made up of Serbia, Montenegro, and Kosovo; and an interim three-year agreement, after which a final settlement of Kosovo could be arranged.[37] The Kosovar delegation initially refused to agree unless reference was made to a future referendum to decide the fate of Kosovo. Under the threat of the withdrawal of international support, including financial and military aid to the KLA, the Kosovar delegates reluctantly signed on 18 March 1999.[38] The Serbs, unwilling to accept a NATO-led military force within Kosovo, remained recalcitrant. In the face of diplomatic impasse, NATO air strikes were ordered to commence on 24 March.
Initial planning for NATO air strikes against Serbia began as early as June of 1998.[39] Targeting for the strikes focused on fixed command and control and military facilities in Kosovo, Montenegro, and Serbia. These targets were selected for a variety of reasons, one being the low risk of collateral damage.[40] The strikes were intended as the punishment portion of NATO’s coercive carrot-and-stick strategy. The air plan in no way resembled a decisive air campaign, with the initial target list including only 100 targets.[41] Of these, only 50 were eventually approved, sufficient for only two or three nights of strikes.[42] Additionally, the desire to maintain consensus among the 19 NATO countries was reflected in the constrained nature of the strikes.
In February 1999, in the midst of the Rambouillet talks, Gen Wesley Clark, SACEUR, became concerned over the prospect of increased ethnic-cleansing operations by the Serbian army within Kosovo once NATO air operations commenced. Two of NATO’s stated military objectives involved dealing directly with the Serbian fielded forces: to deter further Serbian action against the Kosovars and to reduce the ability of the Serbian military to continue offensive operations against them.[43] Gen Wesley Clark ordered Lt Gen Mike Short, his CFACC, to increase the scope of air planning to include direct attacks on the Serbian fielded forces in Kosovo.
Concealed within the verdant, cloud-covered valley of Kosovo were 40,000 soldiers of the Serbian Third Army equipped with hundreds of tanks, APCs, and artillery pieces interspersed among over a million Kosovars. In addition, a wall of mobile, radar-guided SAMs, MANPADS, and AAA (as well as a squadron of MiG-21 fighters) protected the Third Army against NATO air forces.[44]
In developing air plans against the Serbian Third Army, US planners assumed air superiority and relied on SEAD and electronic jamming assets to confuse and degrade the Serbian IADS. Assuming strike aircraft could safely enter Kosovo, two tactical problems still remained: how to locate and identify the targets and how to attack them successfully while limiting collateral damage. A-10 AFACs trained in visual reconnaissance and ASC were selected for the task.[45] A-10 AFACs would search out targets identified by either JSTARS (in real-time) or by intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets during premission planning. Once targets were identified, the A-10 AFACs would control strikes using available NATO aircraft.
Beginning at 1900 Zulu on 24 March 1999, NATO air forces struck Serbian targets.[46] These attacks focused on the Serbian IADS, military command and control nodes, and airfields and aircraft.[47] NATO commenced the war with 214 dedicated combat aircraft, 112 of which were from the United States.[48] Initial NATO strikes were met with minimal resistance from Serbian SAMs and fighters. Rather, the primary response took place within Kosovo and was directed at the Kosovar population.
With the breakdown of the Rambouillet peace talks and subsequent withdrawal of international observers on 19 March 1999, Serb ground forces commenced the systematic expulsion of Kosovo’s ethnic Albanians, code- named Operation Horseshoe.[49] Ethnic-cleansing operations were stepped up once NATO bombing began, leaving several hundred thousand displaced refugees seeking safety in Albania and Macedonia or fleeing to the foothills within Kosovo.
Responding to the rapidly deteriorating situation within Kosovo, General Clark ordered General Short to commence attacks on Serbian fielded forces on 30 March. Poor weather delayed the first successful A-10 strikes until 6 April.[50] During OAF, A-10 AFACs flew over 1,000 missions and controlled many other strikers in the attacks on Serb forces in the KEZ. Their attacks ended on 9 June 1999, when a peace agreement was reached.
History of A-10s in Kosovo
A-10s first flew over the Balkans in 1993 when NATO aircraft began conducting air operations over Bosnia. Except for occasional relief provided by other Air Force, Reserve, and Guard A-10 units, the 81st FS maintained a continual presence at Aviano until 1997. The A-10s were the only NVG fighter aircraft capable of providing both day and night CAS and AFAC coverage for UN and NATO ground forces. F-16CG squadrons of the 31st Fighter Wing at Aviano were eventually trained to use NVGs and assumed most of the AFAC duties over Bosnia. With the continual presence of A-10s in the Balkans no longer required, the 81st needed only to conduct yearly deployments to Aviano to remain familiar with Balkan operations and provide AFAC coverage when the 31st FW was deployed elsewhere.
In January 1999, the 81st deployed six A-10s to replace an Aviano F-16CG squadron that had departed on a stateside deployment. The number of A-10s committed to Balkan operations continued to increase throughout OAF. With tensions rising in Kosovo following the Racak massacre, A-10s were ordered to remain at Aviano, and the squadron increased the number of aircraft to 15 by the commencement of NATO air strikes on 24 March. As the 81st deployed to Gioia del Colle AB in southern Italy, it reached 23 aircraft and leveled at that number. On 21 May, an additional 18 Air Force Reserve aircraft became operational at Trapani, Sicily, to bring the total to 41 A-10s supporting OAF.
A-10s were initially tasked with providing CSAR for NATO aircrews; A-10 pilots from the 81st FS, using Sandy call signs, were the mission commanders for the dramatic rescue of an F-117 pilot shot down near Belgrade on the fourth night of strikes. A-10s provided on-scene command, tracked the survivor’s location, coordinated the rescue effort, and provided cover for rescue helicopters during the ingress, survivor pickup, and egress of enemy territory.
Sandy was the call sign for A-1E Skyraiders that performed on-scene command of CSARs during Vietnam. A-10s have continued to use the Sandy call sign to signify the type of mission being conducted. A-10 Sandys provided CSAR coverage for all NATO aircraft flying over Kosovo and Serbia, both day and night, throughout OAF.
On 26 March, the CAOC notified the 81st to commence AFAC missions on 30 March. Although all NATO air strikes to this point had taken place at night, a shortage of EA-6B jammers and F-16CJ SEAD aircraft prevented adding any AFAC day missions since all conventional fighter and bomber aircraft operating in Serbia or Kosovo were required to have jamming and SEAD support. NATO’s limiting factor was EA-6B and F-16CJ airframes—not aircrews; the solution was to doubleturn SEAD aircraft to support AFAC missions during the day and strike missions at night. Launching from Aviano, A-10s flew sorties of six to seven hours down the Adriatic, across Albania and up
