The Mammoth Book of Conspiracies

According to Terziski, the occult Thule Society (and the Vril Society, too) established clear lines of communication with the “Thulians” in the inter-war period, who then generously passed on their superior technical knowledge to SS Military Technical Branch E-IV. In turn SS Military Branch E-IV was not only able to build jets and rockets, but flying saucers which reached the Moon in 1942. And Mars a little later.

A more mundane use for the saucers came in 1945, when they whisked Adolf Hitler from his Berlin bunker to a secret underground base in Antarctica. Terziski has the film footage of the base, known as “New Schwabia”.

If all this was not extraordinary enough, it turns out that the beings from Thule were not actually humans— but aliens.

What proto-Nazis like Rudolf von Sebottendorf would have made of the knowledge that they were descended from little green men and not white supermen can only be guessed at. What can be said with certainty is that the Luftwaffe did not need alien technology for its futuristic designs. The Treaty of Versailles at the end of World War I forbade Germany to build military aircraft. So, frustrated aircraft designers turned their attention to designing extreme shapes for the new sport of gliding. The case in point were the Horten brothers, who were building delta- winged gliders in the 1930s. When Germany under Hitler re-armed, the Horton boys built “flying wing” jet planes for the Luftwaffe. Then there was Professor Heinrich Focke who patented a flying-disc design in 1939, Alexander Lippisch who helped build the delta-winged Me163 rocket plane, Arthur Sack who constructed an aircraft with a circular wing… The Germans did not need alien technology. They could do it all by themselves. Vorsprung durch Technik, as they say.

THE TONKIN GULF INCIDENT

By early 1964 South Vietnam seemed to be losing the war against its Communist insurgency, sponsored by Ho Chi Minh’s regime in North Vietnam. This was a major concern to the US, which feared a “domino effect” should the South fall, in which country after country in Asia would turn Red. To aid the South Vietnamese effort, President Lyndon B. Johnson provided a number of fast patrol boats; ostensibly these were for defensive purposes, but secret OPLAN-34A sanctioned them for covert attacks on North Vietnamese military targets. US warships, operating in international waters just off the North’s coast, were to direct the operations.

On the night of 4 August, two US Navy destroyers, the C. Turner Joy and the Maddox, were patrolling the Gulf of Tonkin off the North Vietnamese coast when they came under apparent torpedo-attack from North Vietnamese PT boats. President Johnson, after assessing North Vietnamese radio intercepts and on the advice of Admiral Ulysses S. Grant Sharp, went on national TV to denounce North Vietnam’s “open aggression on the open seas”. Within three days Congress had passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution (there were just two dissensions in the Senate, see Document, p.550), which authorized the president “To take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression… [and] to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.”

Up to 7 August 1964, the US had only been “advising” in the Vietnam War. From that day forth, it was fighting it. A campaign of heavy bombing was ordered immediately, and by early 1965 thousands of US troops were arriving in theatre almost daily.

According to the Los Angeles Times, “the Communists, by their attack on American vessels in international waters, have themselves escalated hostilities”. The North Vietnamese started it!

Or, perhaps, not. Even on 4 August there were doubts that the Maddox and C. Turner Joy had actually come under attack. The Maddox’s captain blamed “freak weather conditions” for affecting the radio, while Admiral Grant Sharp of the Pacific Fleet cited edgy personnel, adding in a communique to the White House, “A lot of these torpedo attacks were from the sonar operators!”

The personnel on the US ships were definitely hyped up, because the Maddox had come under attack two days previously. Why did the US Government not denounce North Vietnamese aggression on that occasion? Because the Maddox had been operating illegally and provocatively inside North Vietnamese waters. The radio decrypts used to justify the official account of the Gulf of Tonkin almost definitely relate to 2 August, not 4 August.

Nearly fifty years later, the weight of evidence is that the “incident” in the Gulf of Tonkin was a fabricated pretext for the US to step up its involvement in Vietnam. In the words of the US Navy Historical Center, “North Vietnamese naval forces did not attack Maddox and Turner Joy that night.’ The defense secretary at the time, Robert McNamara, admitted in a 2001 TV documentary The Fog of War: Eleven Lessons from the Life of Robert S. McNamara, that the US “initiated the action”. The same documentary revealed that five weeks before Tonkin, Johnson had told McNamara over the phone, “I want to be able to trap these people [the North Vietnamese].”

Lyndon B. Johnson was gunning for war. By the tramlines of his morality, Johnson acted justifiably in escalating the conflict with a “white lie” because he hoped to keep the people of South Vietnam free of Communist totalitarianism. Less generously, Professor Peter Dale Scott has suggested that Johnson was encouraged by the oil corporations to intervene, since they wanted control of the “considerable offshore oil deposits in the South China Sea”. In this oily scenario President John F. Kennedy had been assassinated for his peacenik signing of National Security Action Memorandum 263, which reduced the number of military advisors in South Vietnam. The oil boys wanted more army boots on the ground, not less.

Why exactly the Tonkin Gulf incident was faked up may never be known, but faked it was.

Further Reading

Peter Dale Scott, The War Conspiracy, 1972

DOCUMENT: TONKIN GULF RESOLUTION AND US SENTATE DEBATE

Eighty-eighth Congress of the United States of America

AT THE SECOND SESSION

Begun and held at the City of Washington on Tuesday, the seventh day of January, one thousand nine hundred and sixty-four

Joint Resolution

To promote the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia.

Whereas naval units of the Communist regime in Vietnam, in violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of international law, have deliberately and repeatedly attacked United States naval vessels lawfully present in international waters, and have thereby created a serious threat to international peace; and Whereas these attackers are part of deliberate and systematic campaign of aggression that the Communist regime in North Vietnam has been waging against its neighbors and the nations joined with them in the collective defense of their freedom; and Whereas the United States is assisting the peoples of southeast Asia to protect their freedom and has no territorial, military or political ambitions in that area, but desires only that these people should be left in peace to work out their destinies in their own way: Now, therefore be it Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.

Section 2. The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia. Consonant with the Constitution of the United States and the