Bad Samaritans: The Myth of Free Trade and the Secret History of Capitalism

A.1. Unfortunately, the World Bank report did not provide the data on Singapore. However, the Singapore Government’s Department of Statistics estimated that GLCs accounted for 12.9% of GDP in 1998, with the non-GLC public sector (such as Statutory Boards) accounting for another 8.9%, giving a total of 21.8%. The Department of Statistics defined GLC as those companies in which the government has an effective ownership of 20% or more. For the sources, see Chang (2006), Box 1.

7

According to World Bank (1995), Table A.1, the share of the SOE sector in GDP during 1978–91 were 4.7% in Argentina and 1.9% in the Philippines.

8

For further details on POSCO, see Chang, (2006), Box 2.

9

Chang (2006), Box 3.

10

The three principles are those of minzu (nationalism) minquan (people’s power or democracy) and minsheng (people’s livelihood).

11

www.economywatch.com/world_economy/china/structure-ofeconomy.html.

12

J. Willner (2003), ‘Privatisation and State Onwership in Finland’, CESifo Working Paper, no. 1012, August 2003, Ifo Institute for Economic Research, Munich.

13

M. Berne & G Pogorel (2003), ‘Privatisation Experiences in France’, paper presented at the CESifo Conference on Privatisation Experiences in the EU, Cadenabbia, Italy, November 2003.

14

The story of Renault’s privatization is typical of the French privatization process. Renault was first established as a private company in 1898. It was nationalized in 1945 for having been ‘an instrument of the enemy’ – its owner, Louis Renault, was a Nazi collaborator. In 1994, the French state started selling the shares, but kept a 53% share. In 1996, it relinquished its majority share, reducing its holdings to 46%. However, 11% of the shares was sold to what the company website calls ‘a stable core of major shareholders’, many of them financial institutions partly controlled by the French state. Since then, the French government has gradually reduced its share to 15.3% (as of 2005), but still remains the largest single shareholder. Moreover, an important part of this reduction in the French government’s share is explained by the acquisition in 2002 of 15% of Renault shares by Nissan, which had formed an alliance with Renault in 1999. Since Renault has owned the controlling stake (first 35%, now 44%) in Nissan since 1999, the French state effectively controls 30% of Renault’s shares, making it the dominant force in Renault. See Chang (2006), Box 2.

15

Chang (2006), Box 2.

16

W. Henderson (1963), Studies in the Economic Policy of Frederick the Great (Frank Cass, London), pp. 136–152.

17

See T. Smith (1955), Political Change and Industrial Development in Japan: Government Enterprise, 1868–1880 (Stanford University Press, Stanford) and G. C. Allen (1981), A Short Economic History of Modern Japan, 4th edition (Macmillan, London and Basingstoke), for further details.

18

See H-J. Chang (2002), Kicking Away the Ladder – Development Strategy in Historical Perspective (Anthem Press, London), p. 101.

19

T. Kessler & N. Alexander (2003), ‘Assessing the Risks in the Private Provision of Essential Services’, Discussion Paper for G-24 Technical Group, Geneva, Switzerland, September 15–6, 2003, available at the website, http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/gdsmdpbg2420047_en.pdf,

20

Indeed, there is evidence that gains in productivity in privatized enterprises usually occur before privatization through anticipatory restructuring, suggesting that restructuring is more important than privatization. See Chang (2006).

21

D.Green (2003), Silent Revolution – The Rise and Crisis ofMarket Economics in Latin America (Monthly Review Press, New York, and Latin American Bureau, London), p. 109.

22

Miami Herald, 3 March 1991. As cited in Green (2003), p. 107.

23

P. Tandon (1992), World Bank Conference on the Welfare Consequences of Selling Public Enterprises: Case Studies from Chile, Malaysia, Mexico and the U.K., Vol. 1:Mexico, Background,