government cutting off cable and telephone links. By Wednesday none remained. Embassy staffers began burning codes and classified files, so thoroughly that ashes drifted over the neighborhood, raising fears for the safety of adjoining buildings. On Thursday the eleventh, sound trucks and a crowd began to gather outside as Hitler prepared to speak in the Reichstag. An inoperative telephone abruptly rang, with word that a car would take the
The Foreign Office was as unsure as the Americans of what would happen next. Two more days of limbo followed, with the staff free to work and move about the city. Then, on Saturday the thirteenth, orders came to have everyone ready to leave Berlin the next morning. Embassy personnel would share a special train with remaining American journalists in the city. It fell to Kennan to organize the departure, working with an SS Hauptsturmfuhrer, Valentin Patzak, who would be the Americans’ keeper for the next five months. On Sunday all assembled at the embassy, “only to find the building, inside and out, already guarded by members of the Gestapo, and ourselves their prisoners.”
The group knew nothing of their destination until menus appeared, in the otherwise threadbare dining car, labeled “Berlin—Bad Nauheim.” The latter was a spa north of Frankfurt, where the young Franklin D. Roosevelt had stayed several times with his family. The Americans would be lodged in Jeschke’s Grand Hotel, a once-elite establishment closed since the European war had broken out, but now hurriedly reopened. Furniture was in storage, pipes had burst, staff had scattered, and the manager had gotten twenty-four hours’ notice that he would be housing more than a hundred Americans indefinitely. Morris, nominally Kennan’s superior, left him in charge: “I personally bore the immediate responsibility for disciplinary control of this motley group of hungry, cold, and worried prisoners, as well as for every aspect of their liaison with their German captors. Their cares, their quarrels, their jealousies, their complaints, filled every moment of my waking day.”2
I.
Years later Kennan would complain that historians—and some of his early biographers—had failed to acknowledge his organizational skills: they gave the impression “that I was a totally impractical dreamer, and could never do anything that was worthwhile in an administrative or practical sense.” He had a point. He had, after all, almost single-handedly set up the American embassy in Moscow in 1934. He ran the Berlin embassy between 1939 and 1941, which by the end of that period was providing diplomatic representation for most of German-occupied Europe. And in 1947–49 Kennan would create the first Policy Planning Staff in the Department of State: that organization would never again be as effective as it was under his direction.3
None of these tasks, however, were as difficult as Bad Nauheim. The internees included Foreign Service officers, Army and Navy attaches, journalists and radio correspondents, several wives, a few children, five dogs, one cat, and three canaries. Logistics were a constant worry, the group having encumbered itself with forty tons of baggage, in some 1,250 pieces. They had no way of knowing how long they would be there, and no means of communicating with families and friends in the United States. They were totally dependent on the Germans, who were in turn constrained only by the knowledge that their own diplomats were interned—under much better conditions—at the White Sulphur Springs resort in West Virginia. The Grand Hotel offered greater comfort than that allowed prisoners of war or concentration camp inmates, to be sure. But the food was rationed and mostly unpalatable, the rooms were cold, and recreational facilities were limited. “The boredom, the lack of space, the distance from home and family, and the inevitable friction between people” were bound to cause strains, the principal historian of the internment has written. With Morris having declined the responsibility, “Kennan provided the direction, coordination, structure, and rule enforcement for the entire community.”4
Collaboration with the Germans sounded objectionable in principle, but there was nothing to be gained in practice, Kennan believed, by refusing cooperation with Hauptsturmfuhrer Patzak to make the internment run as smoothly as possible. Withholding it would invite punishment, forcing the Americans to treat their interned Germans similarly and delaying everyone’s repatriation. Honesty required openness about what the Swiss—the intermediaries between the Americans and the Germans—were doing to get the group home. Information was unreliable, however, and even scraps could set off rumors, giving rise to false hopes and subsequent disappointment. So Kennan at times imposed censorship, in one instance even confiscating an issue of the internees’ newspaper, the
Leadership also involved being an instantly available ombudsman. On January 25—an unusual day only in that he happened to keep a list—Kennan recorded thirty-two tasks performed. They included accounting for lost luggage, obtaining stationery, determining whether photographs could be taken from hotel balconies, drafting memoranda to go to or through the Swiss, discussing the issue of tips with the hotel management, clearing up several misunderstandings with Patzak, reporting a lady’s missing powder case, and placating a husband who came in “to say that he did not want representations made about his wife.” Later, as the weather warmed up, it fell to Kennan to negotiate the use of a nearby field for baseball. The bat was an improvised tree branch. The ball was a champagne cork wrapped in a sock. Kennan played catcher for the “Embassy Reds” against the “Journalists,” under the puzzled supervision of the Gestapo. “I would never reveal George Kennan’s batting average,” Associated Press reporter Angus Thurmer replied when asked half a century later, “nor would I expect him to reveal mine. Gentlemen in this club don’t do that.”6
Through all of this, Kennan found the time to become a professor. The setting was “Badheim University,” the school the internees organized to keep themselves busy. Kennan offered a “course” on Russian history, for which he prepared over a hundred pages of lecture notes, some of them scrawled outlines, others typed and finished presentations. They began with the establishment of Christianity and extended—although more thinly toward the end—well into the Stalin era. Apart from his lecture at the Foreign Service School in 1938, these were the first he had ever delivered. They attracted sixty “enrollees,” almost twice the number as the next most popular lecturer. Kennan, the “university” organizers concluded in a written appreciation of his efforts, had “a natural gift for presenting material vividly and interestingly while meeting the highest standards of scholarship.”7
The lectures stressed historical continuities—geography, climate, soil, ethnicity, culture—as the best way to understand the Soviet Union now that it had become a wartime ally. One in particular stood out for its application of Freudian psychology: in contrast to his skepticism while in Vienna six years earlier, Kennan was now convinced “that the theory is not without foundation.” The “childhood” of peoples was just as important in determining their character as it was for individuals.
The first five centuries of Russian history had produced an “adolescent” nation with a primitive system of government, a crudely organized society, and an uneducated religious leadership. Beginning with Peter the Great, the tsars embraced modernization but their subjects did not. Industrialization and war in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries widened this gap, so that when revolution came, “the mighty tree of Tsardom, which had lost its roots in the people, could not stand the force of the gale.” It fell with “a suddenness and impact that shook the world.”
Russians at that point “shed their westernized upper crust as a snake sheds its skin,” appearing before the world as a seventeenth-century semi-Asiatic people, with “all the weaknesses of backwardness and all the strength and freshness of youth.” They moved their capital back to Moscow, and an “Oriental” despot—Stalin—installed himself in the Kremlin, bringing with him “the same intolerance, the same dark cruelty, the same religious dogmatism in word and form, the same servility, . . . the same fear and distrust of the outside world,” that had
