Ernest Gill, a donkey engineman on the steamship Californian, was the first witness on April 26th. He said that Captain Stanley Lord, of the Californian, refused later to go to the aid of the Titanic, the rockets from which could be plainly seen. He says the captain was apprised of these signals, but made no effort to get up steam and go to the rescue. The Californian was drifting with the floe. So indignant did he become, said Gill, that he endeavored to recruit a committee of protest from among the crew, but the men failed him.
Captain Lord entered a sweeping denial of Gill’s accusations and read from the Californian’s log to support his contention. Cyril Evans, the Californian’s wireless operator, however, told of hearing much talk among the crew, who were critical of the captain’s course. Gill, he said, told him he expected to get $500 for his story when the ship reached Boston.
Evans told of having warned the Titanic only a brief time before the great vessel crashed into the berg that the sea was crowded with ice. The Titanic’s operators, he said, at the time were working with the wireless station at Cape Race, and they told him to “shut up” and keep out. Within a half hour the pride of the sea was crumpled and sinking.
Members of the committee who examined individually the British sailors and stewards of the Titanic’s crew prepared a report of their investigations for the full committee. This testimony was ordered to be incorporated in the record of the hearings.
Most of this testimony was but a repetition of experiences similar to the many already related by those who got away in the life-boats.
On April 27th Captain James H. Moore, of the steamship Mount Temple, who hurried to the Titanic in response to wireless calls for help, told of the great stretch of field ice which held him off. Within his view from the bridge he discerned, he said, a strange steamship, probably a “tramp,” and a schooner which was making her way out of the ice. The lights of this schooner, he thought, probably were those seen by the anxious survivors of the Titanic and which they were frantically trying to reach.
Steward Crawford also related a thrilling story in regard to loading the life-boats with women first. He told of several instances that came under his observation of women throwing their arms around their husbands and crying out that they would not leave the ship without them. The pathetic recital caused several women at the hearing to weep, and all within earshot of the steward’s story were thrilled.
Stories that Mr. Andrews, the designer of the ship, had tried to disguise the extent of danger were absolutely denied by Henry Samuel Etches, his bedroom steward, who told the committee how Mr. Andrews urged women back to their cabins to dress more warmly and to put on life-belts.
The steward, whose duty it was to serve Major Butt and his party, told how he did not see the Major at dinner the evening of the disaster as he was dining with a private party in the restaurant. William Burke, a first class steward, told of serving dinner at 7.15 o’clock to Mr. and Mrs. Straus, and later Mrs. Straus’ refusal to leave her husband was again told to the committee. A bedroom steward told of a quiet conversation with Benjamin Guggenheim, Senator Guggenheim’s brother, after the accident and shortly before the Titanic settled in the plunge that was to be his death.
On April 29th Marconi produced copies of several messages which passed between the Marconi office and the Carpathia in an effort to get definite information of the wreck and the survivors.
Marconi and F. M. Sammis, chief engineer of the American Marconi Company, both acknowledged that a mistake had been made in sending messages to Bride and Cottam on board the Carpathia not to give out any news until they had seen Marconi and Sammis.
The senatorial committee investigating the Titanic disaster has served several good purposes. It has officially established the fact that all nations are censurable for insufficient, antiquated safety regulations on ocean vessels, and it has emphasized the imperative necessity for united action among all maritime countries to revise these laws and adapt them to changed conditions.
The committee reported its findings as follows:
No particular person is named as being responsible, though attention is called to the fact that on the day of the disaster three distinct warnings of ice were sent to Captain Smith. J. Bruce Ismay, managing director of the White Star Line, is not held responsible for the ship’s high speed. In fact, he is barely mentioned in the report.
Ice positions, so definitely reported to the Titanic just preceding the accident, located ice on both sides of the lane in which she was traveling. No discussion took place among the officers, no conference was called to consider these warnings, no heed was given to them. The speed was not relaxed, the lookout was not increased.
The supposedly water-tight compartments of the Titanic were not water-tight, because of the non-water- tight condition of the decks where the transverse bulkheads ended.
The steamship Californian, controlled by the same concern as the Titanic, was nearer the sinking steamship than the nineteen miles reported by her captain, and her officers and crew saw the distress signals of the Titanic and failed to respond to them in accordance with the dictates of humanity, international usage and the requirements of law. Had assistance been promptly proffered the Californian might have had the proud distinction of rescuing the lives of the passengers and crew of the Titanic.
The mysterious lights on an unknown ship, seen by the passengers on the Titanic, undoubtedly were on the Californian, less than nineteen miles away.
Eight ships, all equipped with wireless, were in the vicinity of the Titanic, the Olympic farthest away—512 miles.
The full capacity of the Titanic’s life-boats was not utilized, because, while only 705 persons were saved, the ship’s boats could have carried 1176.
No general alarm was sounded, no whistle blown and no systematic warning was given to the endangered passengers, and it was fifteen or twenty minutes after the collision before Captain Smith ordered the Titanic’s wireless operator to send out a distress message.
The Titanic’s crew were only meagerly acquainted with their positions and duties in an accident and only one drill was held before the maiden trip. Many of the crew joined the ship only a few hours before she sailed and were in ignorance of their positions until the following Friday.
Many more lives could have been saved had the survivors been concentrated in a few life-boats, and had the boats thus released returned to the wreck for others.
The first official information of the disaster was the message from Captain Haddock, of the Olympic, received by the White Star Line at 6.16 P. M., Monday, April 15. In the face of this information a message reporting the Titanic being towed to Halifax was sent to Representative J. A. Hughes, at Huntington, W. Va., at 7.51 P. M. that day. The message was delivered to the Western Union office in the same building as the White Star Line offices.
“Whoever sent this message,” says the report, “under the circumstances, is guilty of the most reprehensible conduct.”
The wireless operator on the Carpathia was not duly vigilant in handling his messages after the accident.
The practice of allowing wireless operators to sell their stories should be stopped.
It is recommended that all ships carrying more than 100 passengers shall have two searchlights.
That a revision be made of steamship inspection laws of foreign countries to conform to the standard proposed in the United States.
That every ship be required to carry sufficient life-boats for all passengers and crew.
That the use of wireless be regulated to prevent interference by amateurs, and that all ships have a wireless operator on constant duty.
Detailed recommendations are made as to water-tight bulkhead construction on ocean-going ships. Bulkheads should be so spaced that any two adjacent compartments of a ship might be flooded without sinking.
Transverse bulkheads forward and abaft the machinery should be continued watertight to the uppermost continuous structural deck, and this deck should be fitted water-tight.
