Thieves Of Mercy

craft so perfect a parody? No doubt he was making a small fortune off his royalties, with all the copies that had been sold. It was just too bad that the anonymous author would never get the credit he deserved.

HISTORICAL NOTE

THE RIVER DEFENSE FLEET

When New Orleans fell to David Farragut’s fleet, it signaled the beginning of the end for Confederate control of the Mississippi, and a great blow to the Confederacy overall. Not because New Orleans was an active shipping port-the river had been sealed off from the sea by the Union blockade for some time-but because the city was still an important center for shipbuilding and the natural command center for operations on the Mississippi.

Despite its importance, and the obvious threat of Farragut’s fleet in the Gulf, Secretary of the Navy Mallory believed that the greater threat to New Orleans was the squadron of City Class gunboats and the Union Army coming down from the north. Mallory insisted that Flag Officer George Hollins keep his small squadron in Tennessee to oppose the Union advance. It was only at the last moment, and largely on Hollins’s initiative, that the naval forces of the river were moved south to oppose Farragut, a case of too little too late.

With Hollins’s fleet nearly wiped out at New Orleans, the bulk of the Mississippi River defense rested with the River Defense Fleet.

This fleet was not a part of the navy, but rather of the War Department, and under the command of the general of the army in the Mississippi Department, Brigadier General M. Jeff Thompson. The fleet was first organized in January of 1862 and consisted of fourteen steamers fitted with rams in the bow and a single gun fore and aft. The ships were specifically not gunboats, as the army had no faith in the riverboat crews’ ability with ordnance. They were designed to be fast rams, sinking their enemies in the manner of the ancient Greeks and Romans.

For command of the ships, the army looked specifically to experienced river men, captains and pilots. The men they found were fiercely independent, which is not usually a good quality for military men who must work in organized and concerted efforts. General Lovell, in command in New Orleans, recognized the potential for trouble when he wrote, “Fourteen Mississippi captains and pilots would never agree about anything after they once get underway.”

THE BATTLE AT PLUM POINT

The Union Navy on the Mississippi had a bad record of letting Confederate forces take them by surprise. It happened at Head of the Passes, when Commodore Hollins caught Captain John Pope’s Union fleet napping and sent them racing for the Gulf in a humiliating incident known as “Pope’s Run.” It happened later when Arkansas steamed out of the Yazoo River and blasted her way through Farragut’s fleet at Vicksburg. And it happened at Plum Point.

Plum Point was perhaps the least excusable, since the Federals were perfectly aware of the existence of the Confederate fleet just a few miles downriver at Memphis. And while the presence of seven “cotton clad” rams might not have been reason to remain on high alert, still there was no excuse for being caught without enough steam up to turn the paddle wheels.

The much and deservedly maligned River Defense Fleet had its moment of glory on May 10, 1862, when they steamed around Plum Point Bend and found the Cincinnati and Mortar Boat Number Sixteen tied to the bank, the rest of the fleet upriver in various states of unreadiness.

Despite the Yankees’ being able to get into battle quickly, the Rebels accomplished a great deal in their attack. The Cincinnati and Mound City were sunk by that most ancient of weapons, the ram. The ram had become unworkable when sail took the place of the galley slave, an early example of jobs lost to technology. It was steam that made it feasible again after several thousand years.

Union and Confederate reports of the fighting might lead one to believe they described two different battles. The Confederates elevated their accomplishments to the level of stunning victory, while the Federal officers brushed over the damage the River Defense Fleet did and laid erroneous claim to having damaged or destroyed a number of ships.

In his official report, Captain Davis, commanding the Federal forces, wrote, “Commander Walke informs me that he fired a 50-pound rifle shot through the boilers of the third of the enemy’s gunboats of the western line, and rendered her, for the time being, helpless. All of these vessels might easily have been captured if we had possessed the means of towing them out of action…” It is an absurd claim, but typical of the spin added to Union reports of the action.

There can be no question that the River Defense Fleet carried out a well-executed and successful surprise attack on the Union forces, a clear Southern victory. Unfortunately for the Confederates, the resources of the Union rendered the sinking of two ironclads little more than an inconvenience to the Union Navy.

The ships were raised and sent upriver to Cairo for repair, and soon were back in action. Even Captain Stembel of the Cincinnati, who was shot during the action, recovered, despite the fact that the bullet “entered his shoulder just above the shoulder blade, on the right side, and passing through the neck, came out in the front of the throat, directly under the chin.” But the ability of the Union Navy to repair the damage does not change the fact that the Battle at Plum Point Bend, one of the war’s few fleet actions, was a complete-and rare-victory for Confederate forces afloat.

THE IRONCLADS ARKANSAS AND TENNESSEE

Secretary of the Navy Stephen Mallory was a great believer in ironclads, feeling that their technological superiority would give the South an edge against the numerically superior Union Navy. He was not the only one in the Confederacy to feel this way. Soon after the start of the war, shipbuilders and aspirants to shipbuilding began to apply to the Navy Department for contracts to build ironclads.

One of those men was John T. Shirley of Memphis, a man who enjoyed the friendship of a number of influential people in the Confederate government and military. In August of 1861, Shirley contracted “to construct and deliver to the secretary of the Navy, of the Confederate States, on or before the 24th of December, 1861, two vessels of the character and description provided…” Four months was not an excessive amount of time to build two ships, but it was adequate. Adequate, that is, if the workmen and material had been readily available, which they were not.

By April of 1862 the ships were still under construction, with the Arkansas planked up and her armor being fitted, while the first planks were just being applied to the Tennessee. With General Grant and Admiral Foote, and later Davis, pressing down from the north, and Admiral Farragut gathering his forces in the Gulf of Mexico, there was a growing sense of urgency. Months before, Mallory had written, “the completion of the ironclad gunboats at Memphis, by Mr. Shirley, is regarded as highly important to the defenses of the Mississippi.” With the fall of Island #10 and New Orleans, urgency turned to desperation.

There is some question as to exactly when Arkansas was launched. It was sometime around the fall of New Orleans, for immediately following that event, plans were made to tow the ship to the Yazoo River, where it was thought she would be safe long enough for her crew to complete her construction.

Arkansas, with the material needed to complete her loaded on a barge, was towed downriver, and then up the Yazoo. In Yazoo City, her new commander, the energetic and highly competent Isaac Brown, saw her finished. The following July, Brown drove the Arkansas straight through Farragut’s fleet at Vicksburg, and assured her a place in the annals of naval history.

The Tennessee was not so lucky. By the time New Orleans fell, it was pretty clear that she would never be completed. So clear, in fact, that her engines-a rare and valuable commodity in the