11; 'N.' v. 15; 'Od.' xiv. 437, 441; 'Il.' vii. 321; Plat. 'Rep.' 468 D, quoting 'Il.' vii. 321.
[5] Reading {tois turannois}, or if {tous turannous}, after Cobet, 'That is how they treat crowned heads.'
[6] Cf. Tennyson, 'Ode on the Death of the Duke of Wellington':
With honour, honour, honour to him, Eternal honour to his name.
Yes, Hiero, and herein precisely lies the difference between a man and other animals, in this outstretching after honour.[7] Since, it would seem, all living creatures alike take pleasure in meats and drinks, in sleep and sexual joys. Only the love of honour is implanted neither in unreasoning brutes[8] nor universally in man. But they in whose hearts the passion for honour and fair fame has fallen like a seed, these unmistakably[9] are separated most widely from the brutes. These may claim to be called men,[10] not human beings merely. So that, in my poor judgment, it is but reasonable you should submit to bear the pains and penalties of royalty, since you are honoured far beyond all other mortal men. And indeed no pleasure known to man would seem to be nearer that of gods than the delight[11] which centres in proud attributes.
[7] Or, 'in this strong aspiration after honour.' Holden aptly cf. 'Spectator,' No. 467: 'The love of praise is a passion deeply fixed in the mind of every extraordinary person; and those who are most affected with it seem most to partake of that particle of the divinity which distinguishes mankind from the inferior creation.'
[8] {alogous}, i.e. 'without speach and reason'; cf. modern Greek {o alogos} = the horse (sc. the animal par excellence). See 'Horsemanship,' viii. 14.
[9] {ede}, 'ipso facto.'
[10] See 'Anab.' I. vii. 4; Frotscher ap. Breit. cf. Cic. 'ad Fam.' v. 17. 5, 'ut et hominem te et virum esse meminisses.'
[11] Or, 'joyance.'
To these arguments Hiero replied: Nay, but, Simonides, the honours and proud attributes bestowed on tyrants have much in common with their love-makings, as I described them. Like honours like loves, the pair are of a piece.
For just as the ministrations won from loveless hearts[12] are felt to be devoid of grace, and embraces forcibly procured are sweet no longer, so the obsequious cringings of alarm are hardly honours. Since how shall we assert that people who are forced to rise from their seats do really rise to honour those whom they regard as malefactors? or that these others who step aside to let their betters pass them in the street, desire thus to show respect to miscreants?[13] And as to gifts, it is notorious, people commonly bestow them largely upon those they hate, and that too when their fears are gravest, hoping to avert impending evil. Nay, these are nothing more nor less than acts of slavery, and they may fairly be set down as such.
[12] Or, 'the compliance of cold lips where love is not reciprocated is . . .'
[13] Or, 'to rank injustice.'
But honours have a very different origin,[14] as different to my mind as are the sentiments to which they give expression. See how, for instance, men of common mould will single out a man, who is a man,[15] they feel, and competent to be their benefactor; one from whom they hope to reap rich blessings. His name lives upon their lips in praise. As they gaze at him, each one among them sees in him a private treasure. Spontaneously they yield him passage in the streets. They rise from their seats to do him honour, out of love not fear; they crown him for his public[16] virtue's sake and benefactions. They shower gifts upon him of their own free choice. These same are they who, if my definition holds, may well be said to render honour to their hero by such service, whilst he that is held worthy of these services is truly honoured. And for my part I can but offer my congratulations to him. 'God bless him,' say I, perceiving that so far from being the butt of foul conspiracy, he is an object of anxiety to all, lest evil should betide him; and so he pursues the even tenour of his days in happiness exempt from fears and jealousy [17] and risk. But the current of the tyrant's life runs differently. Day and night, I do assure you, Simonides, he lives like one condemned by the general verdict of mankind to die for his iniquity.
[14] Lit. 'Honours would seem to be the outcome and expression of conditions utterly remote from these, in fact their very opposites.'
[15] Cf. Napoleon's accost of Goethe, 'Vous etes un homme,' and 'as Goethe left the room, Napoleon repeated to Berthier and Daru, 'Voila un homme!'' ('The Life of Goethe,' Lewes, p. 500).
[16] Reading {koines}, which ought to mean 'common to them and him'; if with Cobet {koine}, 'in public crown him for his virtue's sake, a benefactor.'
[17] Or, 'without reproach.'
Now when Simonides had listened to these reasonings to the end,[18] he answered: How is it, Hiero, if to play the tyrant is a thing so villainous,[19] and that is your final judgment, how comes it you are not quit of so monstrous an evil? Neither you, nor, for that matter, any monarch else I ever heard of, having once possessed the power, did ever of his own free will divest himself of sovereignty. How is that, Hiero?
[18] Cf. 'Econ.' xi. 1.
[19] Or, 'if to monarchise and play the despot.'
For one simple reason (the tyrant answered), and herein lies the supreme misery of despotic power; it is not possible even to be quit of it.[20] How could the life of any single tyrant suffice to square the account? How should he pay in full to the last farthing all the moneys of all whom he has robbed? with what chains laid upon him make requital to all those he has thrust into felons' quarters?[21] how proffer lives enough to die in compensation of the dead men he has slain? how die a thousand deaths?
[20] Holden aptly cf. Plut. 'Sol.' 14, {kalon men einai ten torannida khorion, ouk ekhein de apobasin}, 'it was true a tyrrany was a very fair spot, but it had no way down from it' (Clough, i. p. 181).
[21] Or, 'how undergo in his own person the imprisonments he has inflicted?' Reading {antipaskhoi}, or if {antiparaskhoi}, transl. 'how could he replace in his own person the exact number of imprisonments which he has inflicted on others?'
Ah, no! Simonides (he added), if to hang one's self outright be ever gainful to pour mortal soul, then, take my word for it, that is the tyrant's remedy: there's none better suited[22] to his case, since he alone of all men is in this dilemma, that neither to keep nor lay aside his troubles profits him.
[22] Or, 'nought more profitable to meet the case.' The author plays on {lusitelei} according to his wont.
VIII
Here Simonides took up the thread of the discourse[1] as follows: That for the moment, Hiero, you should be out of heart regarding tyranny[2] I do not wonder, since you have a strong desire to be loved by human beings, and you are persuaded that it is your office which balks the realisation of your dream.
[1] Al. 'took up the speaker thus.'
[2] 'In reference to despotic rule.'
Now, however, I am no less certain I can prove to you that government[3] implies no obstacle to being loved, but rather holds the advantage over private life so far. And whilst investigating if this be really so, let us not embarass the inquiry by asking whether in proportion to his greater power the ruler is able to do kindness on a grander scale. But put it thus: Two human beings, the one in humble circumstances,[4] the other a despotic ruler, perform a common act; which of these twain will, under like conditions,[5] win the larger thanks? I will begin with the most trifling[6] examples; and first a simple friendly salutation, 'Good day,' 'Good evening,' dropped at sight of some one from the lips of here a ruler, there a private citizen. In such a case, whose salutation will sound the pleasanter to him accosted?
[3] {to arkhein}. Cf. 'Cyrop.' passim.
[4] 'A private person.'
[5] Lit. 'by like expenditure of power.'
[6] {arkhomai soi}. Lit. 'I'll begin you with quite commonplace examples.' Holden cf. Shakesp. 'Merry Wives,' i. 4. 97, 'I'll do you your master what good I can'; 'Much Ado,' ii. 3. 115, 'She will sit you.' For the distinction between {paradeigmaton} = examples and {upodeigmata} = suggestions see 'Horsem.' ii. 2.
Or again,[7] let us suppose that both should have occasion to pronounce a panegyric. Whose compliments will carry farther, in the way of delectation, think you? Or on occasion of a solemn sacrifice, suppose they do a friend the honour of an invitation.[8] In either case it is an honour, but which will be regarded with the greater gratitude, the monarch's or the lesser man's?
[7] 'Come now.'
[8] Cf. 'Mem.' II. iii. 11 as to 'sacrifices as a means of social enjoyment.' Dr. Holden cf. Aristot. 'Nic. Eth.' VIII. ix. 160, 'And hence it is that these clan communites and hundreds solemnise sacrifices, in connection with
