slaves, 'more than twenty thousand slaves had deserted, many of
them artisans,' according to Thucydides.
[30] Or, 'the days of Decelea.' Lit. 'the incidents of Decelea.'
[31] I.e. 'of their working since mining began.'
[32] Lit. 'are just the same to-day as our forefathers recollected
them to be in their time.'
[33] Or, 'whether the tracts already explored or those not yet opened
are the more prolific.'
It is a difficulty, but it is one on which, I believe, I can offer some practical advice. I have a plan to suggest which will reduce the risk of opening up new cuttings to a minimum.[34]
[34] Or, 'I have a plan to make the opening of new cuttings as safe as
possible.'
The citizens of Athens are divided, as we all know, into ten tribes. Let the state then assign to each of these ten tribes an equal number of slaves, and let the tribes agree to associate their fortunes and proceed to open new cuttings. What will happen? Any single tribe hitting upon a productive lode will be the means of discovering what is advantageous to all. Or, supposing two or three, or possibly the half of them, hit upon a lode, clearly these several operations will proportionally be more remunerative still. That the whole ten will fail is not at all in accordance with what we should expect from the history of the past. It is possible, of course, for private persons to combine in the same way,[35] and share their fortunes and minimise their risks. Nor need you apprehend, sirs, that a state mining company, established on this principle, will prove a thorn in the side[36] of the private owner, or the private owner prove injurious to the state. But rather like allies who render each other stronger the more they combine,[37] so in these silver mines, the greater number of companies at work[38] the larger the riches they will discover and disinter.[39]
[35] 'To form similar joint-stock companies.'
[36] See 'Cyneg.' v. 5.
[37] Or, 'deriving strength from combination.'
[38] Co-operators.
[39] Reading {ekphoresousi}, after Cobet.
This then is a statement, as far as I can make it clear, of the method by which, with the proper state organisation, every Athenian may be supplied with ample maintenance at the public expense. Possibly some of you may be calculating that the capital[40] requisite will be enormous. They may doubt if a sufficient sum will ever be subscribed to meet all the needs. All I can say is, even so, do not dispond. It is not as if it were necessary that every feature of the scheme should be carried out at once, or else there is to be no advantage in it at all. On the contrary, whatever number of houses are erected, or ships are built, or slaves purchased, etc., these portions will begin to pay at once. In fact, the bit-by-bit method of proceeding will be more advantageous than a simultaneous carrying into effect of the whole plan, to this extent: if we set about erecting buildings wholesale[41] we shall make a more expensive and worse job of it than if we finish them off gradually. Again, if we set about bidding for hundreds of slaves at once we shall be forced to purchase an inferior type at a higher cost. Whereas, if we proceed tentatively, as we find ourselves able,[42] we can complete any well-devised attempt at our leisure,[43] and, in case of any obvious failure, take warning and not repeat it. Again, if everything were to be carried out at once, it is we, sirs, who must make the whole provision at our expense.[44] Whereas, if part were proceeded with and part stood over, the portion of revenue in hand will help to furnish what is necessary to go on with. But to come now to what every one probably will regard as a really grave danger, lest the state may become possessed of an over large number of slaves, with the result that the works will be overstocked. That again is an apprehension which we may escape if we are careful not to put into the works more hands from year to year than the works themselves demand. Thus[45] I am persuaded that the easiest method of carrying out this scheme, as a whole, is also the best. If, however, you are persuaded that, owing to the extraordinary property taxes[46] to which you have been subjected during the present war, you will not be equal to any further contributions at present,[47] what you should do is this:[48] during the current year resolve to carry on the financial administration of the state within the limits of a sum equivalent to that which your dues[49] realised before the peace. That done, you are at liberty to take any surplus sum, whether directly traceable to the peace itself, or to the more courteous treatment of our resident aliens and traders, or to the growth of the imports and exports, coincident with the collecting together of larger masses of human beings, or to an augmentation of harbour[50] and market dues: this surplus, I say, however derived, you should take and invest[51] so as to bring in the greatest revenue.[52]
[40] Or, 'sinking fund.'
[41] {athrooi}-'in a body.' It is a military phrase, I think. In
close order, as it were, not in detachments.
[42] 'According to our ability,' a favourite Socratic phrase.
[43] {authis}. See for this corrupt passage Zurborg, 'Comm.' p. 31. He
would insert, 'and a little delay will not be prejudicial to our
interests, but rather the contrary,' or to that effect, thus: {kai
authis an [anutoimen ou gar toiaute te anabole blaben genesthai
an] emin oiometha} 'vel simile aliquid.'
[44] Or, 'it is we who must bear the whole burthen of the outlay.'
[45] {outos}, 'so far, unless I am mistaken, the easiest method is the
best.'
[46] Or, 'heavy contributions, subscriptions incidental to,' but the
word {eisphoras} is technical. For the exhaustion of the treasury
see Dem. 'Lept.' 464; Grote, 'H. G.'xi. 326.
[47] Or, 'you will not be able to subscribe a single penny more.'
[48] {umeis de}, you are masters of the situation. It lies with you to
carry on, etc.; {dioikeite} is of course imperative.
[49] Or, 'taxes.'
[50] Reading, after Zurborg, {dia ta ellimenia}. Or, if the vulg. {dia
en limeni}, transl. 'an augmentation of market dues at Piraeus.'
[51] I.e. as fixed capital, or, 'you should expend on plant.'
[52] Or, adopting Zurborg's emend, {os an pleista eggignetai}, transl.
'for the purposes of the present scheme as far as it may be
available.'
Again, if there is an apprehension on the part of any that the whole scheme[53] will crumble into nothing on the first outbreak of war, I would only beg these alarmists to note that, under the condition of things which we propose to bring about, war will have more terrors for the attacking party than for this state. Since what possession I should like to know can be more serviceable for war than that of men? Think of the many ships which they will be capable of manning on public service. Think of the number who will serve on land as infantry [in the public service] and will bear hard upon the enemy. Only we must treat them with courtesy.[54] For myself, my calculation is, that even in the event of war we shall be quite able to keep a firm hold of the silver mines. I may take it, we have in the neighbourhood of the mines certain fortresses-one on the southern slope in Anaphlystus;[55] and we have another on the northern side in Thoricus, the two being about seven and a half miles[56] apart. Suppose then a third breastwork were to be placed between these, on the highest point of Besa, that would enable the operatives to collect into one out of all the fortresses, and at the first perception of a hostile movement it would only be a short distance for each to retire into safety.[57] In the event of an enemy advancing in large numbers they might certainly make off with whatever corn or wine or cattle they found outside. But even if they did get hold of the silver ore, it would be little better to them than a heap of stones.[58] But how is an enemy ever to march upon the mines in force? The nearest state, Megara, is distant, I take it, a good deal over sixty miles;[59] and the next closest, Thebes, a good deal nearer seventy.[60] Supposing then an enemy to advance from some such point to attack the mines, he cannot avoid passing Athens; and presuming his force to be small, we may expect him to be annihilated by our cavalry and frontier police.[61] I say, presuming his force to be small, since to march with anything like a large force, and thereby leave his own territory denuded of troops, would be a startling achievement. Why, the fortified city of Athens will be much closer the states of the attacking parties than they themselves will be by the
