[2] Lit. 'will he still need something further to complete him?'
Most certainly (replied Ischomachus). One thing is still required of him, and that is to hold aloof from property and goods which are his master's; he must not steal. Consider, this is the very person through whose hands the fruits and produce pass, and he has the audacity to make away with them! perhaps he does not leave enough to cover the expenses of the farming operations! Where would be the use of farming the land by help of such an overseer?
What (I exclaimed), can I believe my ears? You actually undertake to teach them virtue! What really, justice!
Isch. To be sure, I do. but it does not follow therefore that I find all equally apt to lend an ear to my instruction. However, what I do is this. I take a leaf now out of the laws of Draco and again another out of the laws of Solon,[3] and so essay to start my household on the path of uprightness. And indeed, if I mistake not (he proceeded), both those legislators enacted many of their laws expressly with a view to teaching this branch of justice.[4] It is written, 'Let a man be punished for a deed of theft'; 'Let whosoever is detected in the act be bound and thrown in prison'; 'If he offer violence,[5] let him be put to death.' It is clear that the intention of the lawgivers in framing these enactments was to render the sordid love of gain[6] devoid of profit to the unjust person. What I do, therefore, is to cull a sample of their precepts, which I supplement with others from the royal code[7] where applicable; and so I do my best to shape the members of my household into the likeness of just men concerning that which passes through their hands. And now observe--the laws first mentioned act as penalties, deterrent to transgressors only; whereas the royal code aims higher: by it not only is the malefactor punished, but the righteous and just person is rewarded.[8] The result is, that many a man, beholding how the just grow ever wealthier than the unjust, albeit harbouring in his heart some covetous desires, is constant still to virtue. To abstain from unjust dealing is engrained in him.[9]
[3] Cobet, 'Pros. Xen.' cf. Plut. 'Solon,' xvii. {proton men oun tous Drakontos nomous aneile k.t.l.} 'First, then, he repealed all Draco's laws, except those concerning homicide, because they were too severe and the punishments too great; for death was appointed for almost all offences, insomuch that those that were convicted of idleness were to die, and those that stole a cabbage or an apple to suffer even as villains that comitted sacrilege or murder' (Clough, i. 184). See Aul. Gell. 'N. A.' xi. 13.
[4] 'The branch of justice which concerns us, viz. righteous dealing between man and man.'
[5] For this sense of {tous egkheirountas} cf. Thuc. iv. 121; 'Hell.' IV. v. 16. Al. {dedesthai tous egkheirountas kai thanatousthai en tis alo poion} (Weiske), 'let the attempt be punished with imprisonment'; 'let him who is caught in the act be put to death.'
[6] Cf. Plat. 'Laws,' 754 E.
[7] Or, 'the royal laws,' i.e. of Persia. Cf. 'Anab.' I. ix. 16; 'Cyrop.' I. ii. 2, 3. Or possibly = 'regal'; cf. Plat. 'Minos,' 317 C; {to men orthon nomos esti basilikos}.
[8] Lit. 'benefited.'
[9] Lit. 'Whereby, beholding the just becoming wealthier than the unjust, many albeit covetous at heart themselves most constantly abide by abstinence from evil-doing.'
Those of my household (he proceeded) whom, in spite of kindly treatment, I perceive to be persistently bent on evil-doing, in the end I treat as desperate cases. Incurable self-seekers,[10] plain enough to see, whose aspiration lifts them from earth, so eager are they to be reckoned just men, not by reason only of the gain derivable from justice, but through passionate desire to deserve my praise-- these in the end I treat as free-born men. I make them wealthy, and not with riches only, but in honour, as befits their gentle manliness.[11] For if, Socrates, there be one point in which the man who thirsts for honour differs from him who thirsts for gain, it is, I think, in willingness to toil, face danger, and abstain from shameful gains--for the sake of honour only and fair fame.[12]
[10] Lit. 'Those, on the other hand, whom I discover to be roused' (to honesty--not solely because honesty is the best policy).
[11] Or, 'men of fair and noble type'; 'true gentlemen.' This passage suggests the 'silver lining to the cloud' of slavery.
[12] Cf. Hom. 'Il.' ix. 413, {oleto men moi nostos, atar kleos aphthiton estai}, 'but my fame shall be imperishable.'
XV
Soc. But now, suppose, Ischomachus, you have created in the soul of some one a desire for your welfare; have inspired in him not a mere passive interest, but a deep concern to help you to achieve prosperity; further, you have obtained for him a knowledge of the methods needed to give the operations of the field some measure of success; you have, moreover, made him capable of ruling; and, as the crowning point of all your efforts, this same trusty person shows no less delight, than you might take yourself, in laying at your feet[1] earth's products, each in due season richly harvested--I need hardly ask concerning such an one, whether aught else is lacking to him. It is clear to me[2] an overseer of this sort would be worth his weight in gold. But now, Ischomachus, I would have you not omit a topic somewhat lightly handled by us in the previous argument.[3]
[1] {apodeiknuon}, i.e. in presenting the inventory of products for the year. Cf. 'Hell.' V. iii. 17; 'Revenues,' ii. 7.
[2] {ede}, at this stage of the discussion.
[3] Or, 'that part of the discussion which we ran over in a light and airy fashion,' in reference to xiii. 2.
What topic, pray, was that? (he asked).
Soc. You said, if I mistake not, that it was most important to learn the methods of conducting the several processes of husbandry; for, you added, unless a man knows what things he has to do and how to do them, all the care and diligence in the world will stand him in no stead.
At this point[4] he took me up, observing: So what you now command me is to teach the art itself of tillage, Socrates?
[4] Keeping the vulg. order of SS. 3-9, which many commentators would rearrange in various ways. See Breit. ad loc.; Lincke, op. cit. p. 111 foll.
Yes (I replied), for now it looks as if this art were one which made the wise and skilled possessor of it wealthy, whilst the unskilled, in spite of all the pains he takes, must live in indigence.
Isch. Now shall you hear, then,[5] Socrates, the generous nature of this human art. For is it not a proof of something noble in it, that being of supreme utility, so sweet a craft to exercise, so rich in beauty, so acceptable alike to gods and men, the art of husbandry may further fairly claim to be the easiest of all the arts to learn? Noble I name it! this, at any rate, the epithet we give to animals which, being beautiful and large and useful, are also gentle towards the race of man.[6]
[5] Or, 'Listen, then, and whilst I recount to you at once the loving- kindness of this art, to man the friendliest.'
[6] Schenkl regards this sentence as an interpolation. For the epithet {gennaios} applied to the dog see 'Cyrop.' I. iv. 15, 21; 'Hunting,' iv. 7.
Allow me to explain, Ischomachus (I interposed). Up to a certain point I fully followed what you said. I understand, according to your theory, how a bailiff must be taught. In other words, I follow your descriptions both as to how you make him kindly disposed towards yourself; and how, again, you make him careful, capable of rule, and upright. But at that point you made the statement that, in order to apply this diligence to tillage rightly, the careful husbandman must further learn what are the different things he has to do, and not alone what things he has to do, but how and when to do them. These are the topics which, in my opinion, have hitherto been somewhat lightly handled in the argument. Let me make my meaning clearer by an instance: it is as if you were to tell me that, in order to be able to take down a speech in writing,[7] or to read a written statement, a man must know his letters. Of course, if not stone deaf, I must have garnered that for a certain object knowledge of letters was important to me, but the bare recognition of the fact, I fear, would not enable me in any deeper sense to know my letters. So, too, at present I am easily persuaded that if I am to direct my care aright in tillage I must have a knowledge of the art of tillage. But the bare recognition of the fact does not one whit provide me with the knowledge how I ought to till. And if I resolved without ado to set about the work of tilling, I imagine, I should soon resemble your physician going on his rounds and visiting his patients without knowing what to prescribe or what to
