owing to their health and strength take a part in the affair are lost; whilst those who were left behind--as hors de combat, on account of ill-health of other feebleness--are saved.
Euth. Yes, you are right; but you will admit that there are advantages to be got from strength and lost through weakness.
Soc. Even so; but ought we to regard those things which at one moment benefit and at another moment injure us in any strict sense good rather than evil?
Euth. No, certainly not, according to that line of argument. But wisdom,[48] Socrates, you must on your side admit, is irrefragably a good; since there is nothing which or in which a wise man would not do better than a fool.
[48] See above, III. ix. 5. Here {sophia} is not = {sophrosune}.
Soc. What say you? Have you never heard of Daedalus,[49] how he was seized by Minos on account of his wisdom, and forced to be his slave, and robbed of fatherland and freedom at one swoop? and how, while endeavouring to make his escape with his son, he caused the boy's death without effecting his own salvation, but was carried off among barbarians and again enslaved?
[49] See Ovid. 'Met.' viii. 159 foll., 261 foll.; Hygin. 'Fab.' 39, 40; Diod. Sic. iv. 79; Paus. vii. 4. 6.
Yes, I know the old story (he answered).[50]
[50] Or, 'Ah yes, of course; the tale is current.'
Soc. Or have you not heard of the 'woes of Palamedes,'[51] that commonest theme of song, how for his wisdom's sake Odysseus envied him and slew him?
[51] See Virg. 'Aen.' ii. 90; Hygin. 105; Philostr. 'Her.' x.
Euth. That tale also is current.
Soc. And how many others, pray, do you suppose have been seized on account of their wisdom, and despatched to the great king and at his court enslaved?[52]
[52] Cf. Herod. iii. 129.
Well, prosperity, well-being[53] (he exclaimed), must surely be a blessing, and that the most indisputable, Socrates?
[53] {to eudaimonein}, 'happiness.' Cf. Herod. i. 86.
It might be so (replied the philosopher) if it chanced not to be in itself a compound of other questionable blessings.
Euth. And which among the components of happiness and well-being can possibly be questionable?
None (he retorted), unless of course we are to include among these components beauty, or strength, or wealth, or reputation, or anything else of that kind?
Euth. By heaven! of course we are to include these, for what would happiness be without these?
Soc. By heaven! yes; only then we shall be including the commonest sources of mischief which befall mankind. How many are ruined by their fair faces at the hand of admireres driven to distraction[54] by the sight of beauty in its bloom! how many, tempted by their strength to essay deeds beyond their power, are involved in no small evils! how many, rendered effeminate by reason of their wealth, have been plotted against and destroyed![55] how many through fame and political power have suffered a world of woe!
[54] Cf. Plat. 'Rep.' vii. 517 D; 'Phaedr.' 249 D.
[55] e.g. Alcibiades.
Well (the youth replied) if I am not even right in praising happiness, I must confess I know not for what one ought to supplicate the gods in prayer.[56]
[56] See above for Socrates' own form of supplication.
Nay, these are matters (proceeded Socrates) which perhaps, through excessive confidence in your knowledge of them, you have failed to examine into; but since the state, which you are preparing yourself to direct, is democratically constituted,[57] of course you know what a democracy is.
[57] Or, 'popularly governed.'
Euth. I presume I do, decidedly.
Soc. Well, now, is it possible to know what a popular state is without knowing who the people are?
Euth. Certainly not.
Soc. And whom do you consider to be the people?
Euth. The poor citizens, I should say.
Soc. Then you know who the poor are, of course?
Euth. Of course I do.
Soc. I presume you also know who the rich are?
Euth. As certainly as I know who are the poor.
Soc. Whom do you understand by poor and rich?
Euth. By poor I mean those who have not enough to pay for their necessaries,[58] and by rich those who have more means than sufficient for all their needs.
[58] Al. 'who cannot contribute their necessary quota to the taxes (according to the census).'
Soc. Have you noticed that some who possess a mere pittance not only find this sufficient, but actually succeed in getting a surplus out of it; while others do not find a large fortune large enough?
I have, most certainly; and I thank you for the reminder (replied Euthydemus). One has heard of crowned heads and despotic rulers being driven by want to commit misdeeds like the veriest paupers.
Then, if that is how matters stand (continued Socrates), we must class these same crowned heads with the commonalty; and some possessors of scant fortunes, provided they are good economists, with the wealthy?
Then Euthydemus: It is the poverty of my own wit which forces me to this admission. I bethink me it is high time to keep silence altogether; a little more, and I shall be proved to know absolutely nothing. And so he went away crestfallen, in an agony of self- contempt, persuaded that he was verily and indeed no better than a slave.
Amongst those who were reduced to a like condition by Socrates, many refused to come near him again, whom he for his part looked upon as dolts and dullards.[59] But Euthydemus had the wit to understand that, in order to become worthy of account, his best plan was to associate as much as possible with Socrates; and from that moment, save for some necessity, he never left him--in some points even imitating him in his habits and pursuits. Socrates, on his side, seeing that this was the young man's disposition, disturbed him as little as possible, but in the simplest and plainest manner initiated him into everything which he held to be needful to know or important to practise.
[59] Or, 'as people of dull intelligence and sluggish temperament.' Cf. Plat. 'Gorg.' 488 A.
III
It may be inferred that Socrates was in no hurry for those who were with him to discover capacities for speech and action or as inventive geniuses,[1] without at any rate a well-laid foundation of self- control.[2] For those who possessed such abilities without these same saving virtues would, he believed, only become worse men with greater power for mischief. His first object was to instil into those who were with him a wise spirit in their relation to the gods.[3] That such was the tenor of his conversation in dealing with men may be seen from the narratives of others who were present on some particular occasion.[4] I confine myself to a particular discussion with Euthydemus at which I was present.
[1] Or, 'as speakers' (see ch. vi. below), 'and men of action' (see ch. v. below), 'or as masters of invention' (see ch. vii. below).
[2] Or, 'but as prior to those excellences must be engrafted in them {sophrosune} (the virtues of temperance and sanity of soul).'
[3] Lit. 'His first object and endeavour was to make those who were with him {sophronas} (sound of soul) as regards the gods.'
[4] Reading after Herbst, Cobet, etc., {diegountai}, or if vulg. {diegounto}, translate, 'from the current accounts penned during his lifetime by the other witnesses.' For {alloi} see K. Joel, op. cit. pp. 15, 23; above, 'Mem.' I. iv. 1.
Socrates said:[5] Tell me, Euthydemus, has it ever struck you to observe what tender pains the gods have taken to furnish man with all his needs?
[5] For the subject matter of this 'teleological' chapter, see above, I. iv.; K. Joel, op. cit. Appendix, p. 547 foll. in ref. to Dummler's views.
