have no wants at all is, to my mind, an attribute of Godhead;[5] to have as few wants as possible the nearest approach to Godhead; and as that which is divine is mightiest, so that is next mightiest which comes closest to the divine.
[5] Cf. Aristot. 'Eth. N.' x. viii. 1.
Returning to the charge at another time, this same Antiphon engaged Socrates in conversation thus.
Ant. Socrates, for my part, I believe you to be a good and upright man; but for your wisdom I cannot say much. I fancy you would hardly dispute the verdict yourself, since, as I remark, you do not ask a money payment for your society; and yet if it were your cloak now, or your house, or any other of your possessions, you would set some value upon it, and never dream, I will not say of parting with it gratis, but of exchanging it for less than its worth. A plain proof, to my mind, that if you thought your society worth anything, you would ask for it not less than its equivalent in gold.[6] Hence the conclusion to which I have come, as already stated: good and upright you may be, since you do not cheat people from pure selfishness; but wise you cannot be, since your knowledge is not worth a cent.
[6] Or rather 'money,' lit. 'silver.'
To this onslaught Socrates: Antiphon, it is a tenet which we cling to that beauty and wisdom have this in common, that there is a fair way and a foul way in which to dispose of them. The vendor of beauty purchases an evil name, but supposing the same person have discerned a soul of beauty in his lover and makes that man his friend, we regard his choice as sensible.[7] So is it with wisdom; he who sells it for money to the first bidder we name a sophist,[8] as though one should say a man who prostitutes his wisdom; but if the same man, discerning the noble nature of another, shall teach that other every good thing, and make him his friend, of such a one we say he does that which it is the duty of every good citizen of gentle soul to do. In accordance with this theory, I too, Antiphon, having my tastes, even as another finds pleasure in his horse and his hounds,[9] and another in his fighting cocks, so I too take my pleasure in good friends; and if I have any good thing myself I teach it them, or I commend them to others by whom I think they will be helped forwards on the path of virtue. The treasures also of the wise of old, written and bequeathed in their books,[10] I unfold and peruse in common with my friends. If our eye light upon any good thing we cull it eagerly, and regard it as great gain if we may but grow in friendship with one another.
[7] Add 'and a sign of modesty,' {sophrona nomizomen}.
[8] {sophistas}. See Grote, 'H. G.' viii. 482 foll.; 'Hunting,' xi. foll.
[9] Cf. Plat. 'Lys.' 211 E.
[10] Cf. 'Symp.' iv. 27.
As I listened to this talk I could not but reflect that he, the master, was a person to be envied, and that we, his hearers, were being led by him to beauty and nobility of soul.
Again on some occasion the same Antiphon asked Socrates how he expected to make politicians of others when, even if he had the knowledge, he did not engage in politics himself.
Socrates replied: I will put to you a question, Antiphon: Which were the more statesmanlike proceeding, to practise politics myself single- handed, or to devote myself to making as many others as possible fit to engage in that pursuit?
VII
Let us here turn and consider whether by deterring his associates from quackery and false seeming he did not directly stimulate them to the pursuit of virtue.[1] He used often to say there was no better road to renown than the one by which a man became good at that wherein he desired to be reputed good.[2] The truth of the concept he enforced as follows: 'Let us reflect on what a man would be driven to do who wanted to be thought a good flute player, without really being so. He would be forced to imitate the good flute player in the externals of his art, would he not? and first or all, seeing that these artists always have a splendid equipment,[3] and travel about with a long train of attendants, he must have the same; in the next place, they can command the plaudits of a multitude, he therefore must pack a conclave of clackers. But one thing is clear: nothing must induce him to give a performance, or he will be exposed at once, and find himself a laughing-stock not only as a sorry sort of flute player, but as a wretched imposter. And now he has a host of expenses to meet; and not one advantage to be reaped; and worse than all his evil reputation. What is left him but to lead a life stale and unprofitable, the scorn and mockery of men? Let us try another case. Suppose a man wished to be thought a good general or a good pilot, though he were really nothing of the sort, let us picture to our minds how it will fare with him. Of two misfortunes one: either with a strong desire to be thought proficient in these matters, he will fail to get others to agree with him, which will be bad enough; or he will succeed, with worse result; since it stands to reason that anyone appointed to work a vessel or lead an army without the requisite knowledge will speedily ruin a number of people whom he least desires to hurt, and will make but a sorry exit from the stage himself.' Thus first by one instance and then another would he demonstrate the unprofitableness of trying to appear rich, or courageous, or strong, without really being the thing pretended. 'You are sure sooner or later to have commands laid upon you beyond your power to execute, and failing just where you are credited with capacity, the world will give you no commiseration.' 'I call that man a cheat, and a great cheat too,' he would say, 'who gets money or goods out of some one by persuasion, and defrauds him; but of all imposters he surely is the biggest who can delude people into thinking that he is fit to lead the state, when all the while he is a worthless creature.'[4]
[1] {apotrepon proutrepen}. See K. Joel, op. cit. p. 450 foll.
[2] Cf. 'Cyrop.' I. vi. 22.
[3] Or, 'furniture of the finest,' like Arion's in Herod. i. 24. Schneid. cf. Demosth. 565. 6.
[4] Here follows the sentence [{emoi men oun edokei kai tou alazoneuesthai apotrepein tous sunontas toiade dialegomenos}], which, for the sake of convenience, I have attached to the first sentence of Bk. II. ch. i. [{edokei de moi . . . ponou.}] I believe that the commentators are right in bracketing both one and the other as editorial interpolations.
BOOK II
I
Now, if the effect of such discourses was, as I imagine, to deter his hearers from the paths of quackery and false-seeming,[1] so I am sure that language like the following was calculated to stimulate his followers to practise self-control and endurance: self-control in the matters of eating, drinking, sleeping, and the cravings of lust; endurance of cold and heat and toil and pain. He had noticed the undue licence which one of his acquaintances allowed himself in all such matters.[2] Accordingly he thus addressed him:
[1] This sentence in the Greek concludes Bk. I. There is something wrong or very awkward in the text here.
[2] Cf. Grote, 'Plato,' III. xxxviii. p. 530.
Tell me, Aristippus (Socrates said), supposing you had two children entrusted to you to educate, one of them must be brought up with an aptitude for government, and the other without the faintest propensity to rule--how would you educate them? What do you say? Shall we begin our inquiry from the beginning, as it were, with the bare elements of food and nutriment?
Ar. Yes, food to begin with, by all means, being a first principle,[3] without which there is no man living but would perish.
[3] Aristippus plays upon the word {arkhe}.
Soc. Well, then, we may expect, may we not, that a desire to grasp food at certain seasons will exhibit itself in both the children?
Ar. It is to be expected.
Soc. Which, then, of the two must be trained, of his own free will,[4] to prosecute a pressing business rather than gratify the belly?
[4] {proairesis}.
Ar. No doubt the one who is being trained to govern, if we would not have affairs of state neglected during[5] his government.
[5] Lit. 'along of.'
Soc. And the same pupil must be furnished with a power of holding out against thirst also when the craving to quench it comes upon him?
