Seas of Crisis

MOSCOW: Do not ask of me impossible promises. You had a Titan II explode during maintenance in Arkansas in 1980. It blew the lid off the silo and hurled the warhead through the air. Can you assure me that such a thing will not occur again in America?

WASHINGTON: Yes, we have had accidents. But never an attempted rogue attack like from your submarine in 1968.

MOSCOW: Do not harass me further with such ancient history!

WASHINGTON: Then you can assure me that no such unauthorized launch was attempted today? And no more attempts are in progress?

MOSCOW: [Long hesitation] Of course not! It was a maintenance accident!

Gotcha twice now. That “long hesitation” suggests Kurzin’s team hasn’t been wiped out yet… but the Russian president chooses to count on the fact that they will be.

WASHINGTON: We will monitor the situation carefully. I have nine SSBNs at sea. They alone give me a thousand warheads for a retaliatory strike. Each W-88 yields half a megaton.

MOSCOW: I will not be extorted by any such wholly unjustified insinuations or threats!… However, as a safety concession, we will hold our strategic thermonuclear assets below their maximum force readiness. We will not raise readiness if you do not go to your DEFCON One. Let us agree now to both avoid a launch-on-warning strategy.

Jeffrey knew that launch-on-warning meant “pushing the button” as soon as you received indication that the other guy’s ICBMs were taking off. The Russian president is nervous…. As well he should be. And he just telegraphed, to me and my commander in chief, that Kurzin does still have a chance.

WASHINGTON: I agree to not follow a policy of launch-on-warning. The events in Srednekolymsk show us both how dangerous such tactics can be. Misinterpretation of vague or unconfirmed data can lead to disaster.

MOSCOW: I concur wholeheartedly.

WASHINGTON: I will keep my strategic thermonuclear forces at DEFCON Two, but giving me an equivalent assurance about your own strategic command-and-control is not enough. You must stay immediately available for further verbal consultation. And do not evacuate your leadership. Do not evacuate your civilians from cities. I would consider either as proof of impending aggression. In return, as a gesture of good faith, I will not leave the White House for the next forty-eight hours. I am sure you have assets that can verify my whereabouts.

MOSCOW: I give my word on these matters. I will remain in my suite in the Kremlin for two days.

WASHINGTON: Why did you not inform us in advance of your maintenance work in Srednekolymsk? By treaty you are required to, precisely to avoid confrontations like this.

MOSCOW: [Long hesitation] The announcement was issued. It may have been misplaced. We must all be more cautious in future.

Another bald-faced lie, and a cover-up too, Jeffrey thought.

WASHINGTON: You really need to shake the dust and deadwood from your bureaucracy. You misplace important messages too often. I sometimes suspect that you do it on purpose.

MOSCOW: This conversation is ended.

WASHINGTON: No it is not. I must insist on more. The tactical nuclear conflict with Germany is too destabilizing, and they will have their own theories about unfolding events at Srednekolymsk despite what you might tell them. The potential for misunderstanding or unintentional provocation between your country and mine is high, when additional thermal signatures from Srednekolymsk may not yet be ruled out, or others elsewhere may be misidentified. Human error and mechanical breakdown in any complex system are most likely, and most damaging, while under such stress.

MOSCOW: With that I agree. What do you want?

WASHINGTON: Issue an order to your high political and military commanders immediately, and insist on positive confirmation of receipt of the order by each.

MOSCOW: What order?

WASHINGTON: That if for some reason in the next two days their contact with you is temporarily lost, for instance due to an attempted coup or sudden illness, they are not to exercise independent initiative, or implement succession plans, going so far as launching any ICBMs themselves. Only during the next two days, as a cooling-off period for both our nations.

MOSCOW: [Pause, background murmurs audible, appears to consult with advisors] You are overreacting to nothing. However, that being the case, I see no harm in issuing such orders. Provided that you reciprocate, regarding your own chain of custody for thermonuclear forces. I will not be held hostage to American whims because of a minor maintenance accident!

WASHINGTON: I will reciprocate. Caution is not whimsy, with half the world already at war.

MOSCOW: This discussion is ended. [Terminates call.]

Jeffrey smiled to himself despite the uncertainties and dangers, and the trials that he knew lay ahead. The President of the United States had politely but firmly kicked ass, while skillfully putting in place arrangements to avoid inadvertent escalation by either side — setting things up for the bluff about a next-generation missile shield. And he’d caught the President of Russia, on the record, repeatedly telling blatant untruths. If Kurzin’s team succeeded, those untruths would come back to haunt him — partly at Jeffrey’s behest. But if Kurzin made the wrong mistakes, Jeffrey was the one who’d be haunted.

The U.S. had raised its H-bomb alert status to DEFCON 2 at the start of the war with the Berlin-Boer Axis. The last time this had happened was during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

I’ve had my doubts about this scheme all along, but it’s way too late to back out now.

Chapter 26

As Nyurba watched, Ildarov’s team switched each SS-27 over to internal battery power; indicator lights showed that operations continued to be nominal. By remote control they disconnected all physical and electronic links to the missiles, except for the launch umbilicals.

“We are ready to launch, sir,” the major said. “I think.”

“Deploy all reserve TV cameras. We need to see how the launches go, and what the Russians try next.”

More display screens lit up. The inferno topside still raged furiously, but all three silo lids were clear of obstructions.

Nyurba couldn’t afford to take any chances. The unbreakable mission doctrine, and circumstance, forced him to issue the most difficult order he ever imagined having to give.

“Major, contact bunker two and bunker three vestibules and all bunker entryway squads. Inform them to take cover, we’re preparing to attempt missile launch.” Too much hinged on that single important qualifier, attempt. But it got worse. Nyurba continued. “Men unfit to run for twenty miles without assistance are to be…” He struggled for the words. “Rendered permanently unavailable for hostile interrogation. This is a direct order. I accept full responsibility.”

A dark pall came over the group of commandos in the bunker. Everyone knew this was coming, but repression and denial, and their own will to survive, had up to now kept them from accepting the brutal, raw fact.

“Each martyr today might be helping save hundreds of millions of lives later on. The calculus of war is abhorrent, but inescapable. May God forgive me.”

I doubt He will. There’s war fighting, and then there’s murder. Nyurba had to blink back tears. The squadron had trained together for a year. Every man felt like a brother. Their bonding was stronger than family.

Ildarov needed to clear his throat twice to be able to speak. He relayed the orders.

“Bunker two acknowledges…. Medics in bunker three vestibule acknowledge…. Squads at entryways to all bunkers acknowledge.” The major’s voice was dead and flat.

“Very well,” Nyurba said coldly. “Launch the missiles.”

His heart had been pounding. Now he took a deep breath, his throat painfully constricted with grief, waiting