Meanwhile, even as CARGRU Four personnel were deep into the training of the
Getting a squadron ready to deploy starts with refresher/upgrade training for all the flying personnel in the unit. This brings everyone in the unit up to a common level of proficiency across a range of skills and missions. As they do this, the squadron maintenance chiefs begin to bring the squadron's aircraft up to standard. This is not to say that the aircraft have been allowed to go to seed. But since the squadron is not a 'deployed' unit, and personnel were away on leave and at service schools, keeping every aircraft fully mission-capable has not been a priority. Deployed units get the pick of the 'good' airplanes, as well as first priority on training ammunition and spare parts.
While the air units were starting on their road to deployment, so too were the crews of the ships of the battle group. And the officers and enlisted personnel were re-learning the details of their trade on short training cruises out of their home ports. During these cruises, the crews powered up all the ship's systems to find out the new capabilities and liabilities the yard workers had installed. Also, during these cruises the new crew members began the bonding process with their shipmates. This is especially important in the escorts (known as 'small boys'), which will do so much of the work supporting and protecting the carrier and ARG.
For the men and women of the
• Naval Strike and Air Warfare
• Capabilities Exercise (CAPEX)-In mid-June of 1997, after CVW-1 had returned from NAS Fallon, the ships of the
• Joint Task Force Exercise (JTFEX) 97-3-Run over three weeks in late August and early September of 1997, JTFEX 97-3 was a 'final exam' for the combined GW CVBG/CVW/ARG/MEU (SOC) team. JTFEXs-the crown jewels of USACOM exercises-are the largest and most complex series of exercises regularly run by USACOM. Even as the sea services are using them as benchmark exercises for Navy groups, the other services are utilizing them in the same way: to test their own fast-reaction units (such as the 82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, or the 2nd Bombardment Wing based at Barksdale AFB, Louisiana).
With the Category II training completed, the ships and aircraft of the battle group headed home for a final leave period. During this time, the Category III training and briefings for the battle group staff and leaders took place around Washington, D.C. While their actual sequence and locations are classified, the briefings and war games were conducted by a variety of military and intelligence agencies, with the goal of sharpening the minds of the CVBG/CVW/ARG/MEU (SOC) leadership. When these exercises were finished, the CARGRU Four staff started preparing for the next group, which was based around the new
JTFEX 97-3
In the confusing (maybe anarchic is a better word) post-Cold War world of joint and coalition warfare, the USACOM staff must package and deliver to the unified/regional CinCs units that are ready to 'plug in' to a joint/ multinational JTF. The JTF must start combat operations on almost no notice, and function in an environment where the ROE can change on a moment's notice. That means the units assigned to the JTF must be trained with an eye to functioning in a variety of scenarios that were unimaginable as recently as a decade ago. Some of these may even involve situations where conflict may be avoided (if a show of force is sufficiently effective), or where conflict may not be an option (in what are called Operations Short of War).
Training units for situations like these requires more than the simple force-on-force training that was good enough for the military services during the Cold War. Exercises like Red Flag (at Nellis AFB, Nevada) and those at training facilities like the Army's National Training Center (at Fort Irwin, California) were always based upon assumptions that a 'hot' war was already happening. Because of this, the engaged forces' only requirement was to fight that conflict in the most effective manner possible. While the services teach combat skills quite well, teaching 'short-of-war' training is a much more complicated and difficult undertaking. Only in the last few years (after high- cost lessons learned in Haiti, Somalia, and Bosnia) has progress been made on this daunting training challenge.
So far, the leader in this new kind of 'real world' force-on-force training has been the Army's Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, Louisiana.[77] The JRTC staff, for example, was among the first to insert into traditional force-on-force training what the military calls 'friction' elements and non-traditional ideas like 'neutral' role-players on the simulated battlefield, and to include a greater emphasis on logistics and casualty evacuation. JRTC's focus on these kinds of layered issues have made it a model for other joint training operations run by USACOM (such as the JTFEX-SERIES exercises, which are run approximately six times a year-three on each coast).
The result of all this thinking has been a gradual evolution in the scenarios presented to participants in the JTFEXs. As little as three years ago, every JTFEX was essentially a forced-entry scenario into an occupied country