which information is actually transmitted during psi. Dobbs (1967, cited in Rao 1978) proposes the existence of particles with “imaginary” mass and energy called
Other bizarre theories have been proposed and have some popularity in parapsychology. These theories have to do with what is called synchronicity. This is a notion dreamed up by psychoanalyst Carl Jung in the 1950s (Jung and Pauli 1955). The idea is straightforward, if naive. According to synchronicity, there is no such thing as a coincidence. All “coincidences” are meaningful. Palmer (1978, 1982) and others (Rao 1978) have suggested that what they feel are adequate examples of psi may not be due to transmission of information, but may be examples of such “meaningful coincidences.” The changes in theoretical views of psi may be a result of the criticisms of earlier views. As we will see in the case of UFOs, proponents of pseudoscientific claims, when faced with effective criticisms, frequently adopt even more extreme hypotheses. As the information transmission hypothesis of psi becomes less and less tenable, some in the field, while accepting the demise of one theory, are unwilling to move toward the skeptical view that allegedly positive psi results were and are due to subtle biases and experimental design flaws. Rather, they gravitate toward increasingly bizarre explanations for why the results occur.
Finally, it is important to address the issue of belief. Why is the existence of ESP and related phenomena so widely accepted by the public—in spite of what is at best very poor evidence for its reality? One reason is that paranormal topics are constantly and uncritically discussed in the media, both print and electronic. Given the high visibility of paranormal topics in the media, it is natural for people to believe that there must be something to them. Another powerful factor influencing belief is the startling personal experiences that many people have. These convince them, on purely subjective grounds, that they have had an ESP experience and, therefore, that ESP is real. The constructive nature of memory and related cognitive illusions combine forces to convince people of the reality of ESP and related phenomena.
Greeley (1987) surveyed more than fourteen thousand American adults and found that 67 percent had “experienced ESP.” What type of experiences occur in everyday life that are classified as being due to ESP? Very commonly, they are hunches or dreams that seem to come true. The cognitive illusions that operate to make this type of precognitive experience seem so real were discussed in chapter 2. A similar experience more directly related to ESP is that of thinking of a friend that one has not heard from in some time. Shortly after one has thought about the individual, one receives a phone call, letter, or some other form of communication from or about the person. As we have seen, this can be a striking experience. Such occurrences are, of course, coincidences. But most people are quite poor at estimating the probabilities of events and using probabilistic information in decision making (Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky 1982).
Gilovich, Vallone, and Tversky (1985) have demonstrated that people’s poor intuitive grasp of probabilities underlies a common belief about sports. This is the belief—held by players, coaches, and fans alike—in the “hot hand” or “streak shooting.” Gilovich, Vallone, and Tversky define this as the “belief that the performance of a player during a particular period is significantly better than expected on the basis of the player’s overall record” (pp. 295– 96). In fact, an analysis of field goal performance of the Philadelphia 76ers during forty-eight 1980–81 home games revealed no departure from chance. Gilovich, Vallone, and Tversky also conducted a shooting experiment with members of the Cornell University basketball team. Although there was no actual nonchance streak shooting in the shots taken for the experiment, observers of the shooting believed the effect was present.
Gilovich, Vallone, and Tversky’s (1985) results show that the “hot hand” is a cognitive illusion brought about by the tendency to judge short sequences having runs—whether sequences of successful shots in basketball or sequences of heads or tails in coin flipping—as differing from chance when in fact such sequences do not violate the laws of chance. As predicted by this finding, when asked to generate random sequences, people include more alternations than would occur by chance alone and fewer runs than would occur by chance. Thus, when confronted with a truly random sequence, people will perceive it as non-random and feel a need to “explain” the perceived nonrandomness. Thus, the “hot hand” belief is used to explain the perceived nonrandomness in basketball shooting, just as ESP is used to explain the perceived nonrandomness in the outcome of hunches, dreams, thoughts about acquaintances, “predictions” of psychics, and so forth.
Blackmore (1985) found that believers in ESP were worse than nonbelievers at making judgments of probability. In a coin-flipping experiment, believers significantly underestimated the number of heads or tails that would occur due to chance alone. Nonbelievers made accurate estimates. Thus, when believers are faced with a sequence of random events, they, more than the nonbeliever, will perceive it as nonchance and seek some explanation for the perceived nonchance nature of the sequence of events. ESP, or other paranormal powers, provide a perfect “explanation.”
Another study showed that believers in ESP were less able to interpret and assimilate new information if the new information was contrary to their belief in ESP than if it confirmed their belief in ESP. Russell and Jones (1980) gave believers and nonbelievers articles to read about ESP. The articles were either supportive of the reality of ESP or argued that ESP didn’t exist. Believers remembered the articles that supported their position very well. Believers’ memories about the article that argued against ESP, however, were quite inaccurate, and more than 15 percent actually remembered the article, incorrectly, as favorable to the existence of ESP. Nonbelievers, on the other hand, showed excellent memory for both articles, regardless of whether the articles supported or argued against the nonbelievers’ position.
The finding that believers are less willing or able than nonbelievers to deal with information that counters their preconceived belief is not limited to belief in ESP. It may be a general characteristic of believers. Click and Snyder studied belief in astrology; their findings are highly relevant here as they take the results of the Russell and Jones (1980) study one step further, to ask what effects confirming or disconfirming information has on believers’ and nonbelievers’ beliefs. Click and Snyder (1986) gave subjects, who were classified as believing or not believing in astrology, the opportunity to test a particular astrological prediction by asking an individual questions about his personality and habits. The “hypothesis” being tested was that this individual was, according to his horoscope, extroverted, friendly, and outgoing. Unknown to the subjects, the individual who was interviewed was a confederate of the experimenters and was instructed to provide responses of a particular type. If the question was such that it invited an “extroverted answer” (i.e., “Do you like to go to parties?”), the confederate gave an extroverted answer (“yes,” in this case). If the question invited an introverted answer (i.e., “Do you like to stay at home alone and read?”) the confederate gave an introverted answer (“yes,” in this case).
Click and Snyder (1986) found that both believers and nonbelievers asked more questions that would tend to confirm the “hypothesis.” Thus, both believers and nonbelievers got the same information from their questioning of the confederate. However, for the believers the information confirmed their belief while, for the nonbelievers, it disconfirmed their prior attitude. What effect did this information have on the attitudes toward astrology of the believers and nonbelievers? Nonbelievers were more likely than believers to see the specific astrological prediction as confirmed. That is, they used the information to modify their prior attitude. Believers did not use the information obtained to modify their belief in astrology. Within the group of believers there was a variation in the number of confirmatory questions asked of the confederate and, therefore, variation in the amount of evidence the believers received that confirmed the astrological hypothesis. This made no difference in the believers’ ratings of whether or not the hypothesis had been confirmed. No matter how much or how little confirming evidence they obtained, they saw the hypothesis as confirmed. The nonbelievers showed the opposite effect. The more confirming responses a nonbeliever received, the more he believed the hypothesis had been confirmed. In other words, nonbelievers were more willing than were believers to assimilate new information that countered their preexisting attitudes and to use that information to change their attitudes.
The pattern that emerges from these studies is one in which believers in paranormal phenomena are more rigid and unchanging in their beliefs than are skeptics, who are more willing and able to change their attitudes when presented with evidence that shows their beliefs to be incorrect. In other words, believers appear to be considerably more closed-minded than nonbelievers.
