Useful Enemies

“It looks like me but I am not one hundred percent certain,” and the court’s own naked-eye comparison of the card photo with the face of John Demjanjuk sitting in the dock before it. Based on that visual inspection, the court concluded that, because the photo looked like John Demjanjuk to the court, it was John Demjanjuk.

“A positive determination by an expert as to the identity of the photograph is not required,” the court ruled. In one sentence, the court dismissed as irrelevant the photo comparison testimony of Reinhardt Altman, Patricia Smith, Anita Pritchard, and Yasser Iscan. Their combined testimony had spanned eight days.

The court’s personal and positive identification of the Trawniki card photo as that of John Demjanjuk left open the question of whether the card photograph was part of an overall card forgery. The defense had argued that a true photograph of Iwan Demjanjuk had been fraudulently attached to the card. The KGB had taken an old army photo of Iwan Demjanjuk, superimposed a black Trawniki uniform over it, removed the original photo from the card, and attached the doctored picture.

In reaching its conclusion about the authenticity of the card photo, the court relied exclusively on the testimony of Amnon Bezaleli, the Israeli police laboratory director. It found his testimony so totally convincing that it did not need a confirming opinion and ruled that the “photograph is authentic.”

The court also ruled that the Trawniki card ink, paper, typeface, and seals were authentic, as were the signatures of Karl Streibel, Ernst Teufel, and Iwan Demjanjuk. The court based its findings on its conviction that the testimony of the prosecution witnesses was more expert and convincing than the testimony of the defense witnesses.

On the broader question of whether the Trawniki card itself was authentic or forged, the court rejected the considered opinion of Julius Grant, who had declared the card a forgery. It found that in making such a judgment, Grant had stepped beyond the scope of his expertise. Grant was a chemist and an expert on ink and paper, the court noted. However, his determination that the card was a forgery was based almost exclusively on his analysis of the signature of Iwan Demjanjuk. He had arrived at the forgery determination not by analyzing ink and paper, his area of expertise, but by analyzing the characteristics of handwriting.

Grant was not an expert on handwriting analysis.

Having eliminated Grant’s testimony, the court ruled that the Trawniki card was authentic, based on the testimony of prosecution experts Amnon Bezaleli, Gideon Epstein, and, ironically, on the Palm Springs seminar statement of defense expert witness William Flynn, who had said: “I have examined the card firsthand for three days. I have examined the thing microscopically, and there’s nothing about the card that I can see that would not have passed muster.”

The court was not disturbed by the fact that Treblinka was not listed as a posting on the Demjanjuk ID card. The court argued that the Trawniki card was merely supporting evidence in the case against Demjanjuk. The court, therefore, ruled: “There is nothing in the absence of the entry itself to negate the possibility that the defendant was in Treblinka, and there is certainly nothing in that omission to damage the certificate’s authenticity.”

In the end, the court ruled that the Trawniki card and each element in it were authentic.

THE ALIBI

The court noted that an alibi defense like John Demjanjuk’s is a two-edged sword. When it is established, there is nothing better because it proves that the prosecution witnesses are either lying or mistaken. But when the alibi is not convincingly established or fails, it serves to reinforce the prosecution’s evidence, giving it “credibility and weight.”

The court ruled that Demjanjuk’s alibi failed. His explanation that for five years he had simply forgotten the name of the POW camp (Chelm) where he had been imprisoned, and then suddenly remembered it, was preposterous. In reaching that decision, the court was influenced by the fact that Demjanjuk couldn’t describe the camp he said he lived in for eighteen months.

“It is inconceivable that a person who spent eighteen months in one place would not be able to answer and give details of the place and the people with whom he came in daily contact…. This one-dimensional paucity of detail, and the absence of nuances, show that this version is fabricated.”

The court drew the same conclusion about Demjanjuk’s alleged work as a peat digger and for the same reason—the paucity of detail.

In making its determination that Chelm and the peat-digging assignment were lies, the court rejected each and every alternative explanation offered by Professor Wagenaar under direct examination by defense counsel Yoram Sheftel: Demjanjuk never knew the name of the camp; Chelm was so similar to the other camps that Demjanjuk had been in that it was not especially important to remember it; Demjanjuk simply forgot to mention it; difficult childhood and terrible war experiences had hardened his feelings to such an extent that Chelm did not stand out in his mind.

Instead, the court accepted the prosecution’s theory that Demjanjuk had fleshed out his alibi over time to make it sound more realistic and credible.

Just days before the end of the trial, the Demjanjuk family had received under an FOIA request a copy of the Danilchenko Protocol, which the Soviet Union had given to OSI in 1978—eight years before the Jerusalem trial. The court had entered the former Sobibor guard’s deposition into evidence under Israel’s 1950 Nazi and Nazi Collaboration Punishment Law after the prosecution and defense summations.

Noting that Danilchenko swore that both he and Demjanjuk had served in a Waffen SS unit in Flossenburg, Germany, where they received the blood-type tattoo, the court ruled that Demjanjuk’s removing of his tattoo was incriminating evidence.

“The removal of the tattoo—a lengthy and painful process—has no reasonable explanation,” the court reasoned, “other than disguising the clear evidence connecting the defendant with the SS forces.”

In the end, the court ruled that John Demjanjuk lied when he testified that he was imprisoned at Chelm. And he lied when he testified that he later went to Graz, Austria, and Heuberg, Germany, first to join an all- Ukrainian division and later to join Vlasov’s army. Three historians—Drs. Matityahu Meisel, Shmuel Spector, and Shmuel Krakowsky—had testified that Demjanjuk could not have been in Graz and Heuberg when he claimed he was.

Finally, the court listed what it considered to be incriminating statements by Demjanjuk:

“You are pushing me to Treblinka.”

“Why are you making such a fuss of my matter. Like with Eichmann? Eichmann was big, while Ivan is a little.”

“The Germans come and tell you… ‘You must be with us’… who are you to refuse?… Can you imagine that someone was able to refuse?… This they don’t understand…. So why trials? To try for what?”

“When the Germans would offer collaboration, who could have refused? Isn’t that clear? There was a war. Germans were in the SS. Why aren’t they asking them? Why aren’t they tried? [Why] only Ukrainians?”

The court ruled:

“We, therefore, view these expressions—even in the qualified manner in which they are stated—as the beginning of a confession.”

After the three judges read the court’s opinion, Judge Dov Levin read the verdict.

CHAPTER FORTY-EIGHT To Hang or Not to Hang

The verdict in this trial is based, first and foremost, on the testimony and statements of