All in all, he thought he had done incredibly well.
Chapter 10.
The signal from the spy was only one of twenty or thirty reports on the desk of von Mellenthin, Rommel's intelligence officer-at seven o'clock on the morning of June 4. There were several other reports from listening units: infantry had been heard talking to tanks in clear, field headquarters had issued instructions in low-grade codes which had been deciphered overnight; and there was other enemy radio traffic which, although indecipherable, nevertheless yielded hints about enemy intentions simply because of its location and frequency. As well as radio reconnaissance there were the reports from the Ic's in the field, who got information from captured weapons, the uniforms of enemy dead, interrogation of prisoners and simply looking across the desert and seeing the people they were fighting. Then there was aerial reconnaissance, a situation report from an order-of-battle expert and a summary-just about useless--of Berlin's current assessment of Allied intentions and strength.
Like all field intelligence officers, von Mellenthin despised spy reports. Based on diplomatic gossip, newspaper stories and sheer guesswork, they were wrong at least as often as they were right, which made them effectively useless.
He had to admit that this one looked different.
The run-of-the-mill secret agent might report: '9 Indian Brigade have been told they will be involved in a major battle in the near future,' or:
'Allies planning a breakout from the Cauldron in early June,' or: 'Rumors that Auchinleck will be replaced as commander in chief.' But there was nothing indefinite about this report.
The spy, whose call sip was Sphinx, began his message:
'Operation Aberdeen.' He gave the date of the attack, the brigades involved and their specific roles, the places they would pounce, and the tactical thinking of the planners.
Von Mellenthin was not convinced, but he was interested.
As the thermometer in his tent passed the 100-degree mark he began his routine round of morning discussions. In person, by field telephone and-rarely-by radio, he talked to the divisional Ic's, the Luftwaffe liaison officer for aerial reconnaissance, the Horch Company liaison man and a few of the better brigade Ic's. To all of these men he mentioned the 9 and 10 Indian Brigades, the 22 Armored Brigade, and the 32 Army Tank Brigade. He told them to look out for these brigades. He also told them to watch for battle preparations in the areas from which, according to the spy, the counterthrust would come. They would also observe the enemy's observers: if the spy were right, there would be increased aerial reconnaissance by the Allies of the positions they planned to attack, namely Aslagh Ridge, Sidra Ridge and Sidi Muftah. There might be increased bombing of those positions, for the purpose of softening up, although this was such a giveaway that most commanders would resist the temptation. There might be decreased bombing, as a bluff, and this too could be a sign. These conversations also enabled the field Ic's to update their overnight reports. When they were finished von Mellenthin wrote his report for Rommel, and took it to the command vehicle. He discussed it with the chief of staff, who then presented it to Rommel.
The morning discussion was brief, for Rommel bad made his major decisions and given his orders for the day during the previous evening. Besides, Rommel was not in a reflective mood in the mornings: he wanted action. He tore around the desert, going from one front-line position to another in his staff car or his Storch aircraft, giving new orders, joking with the men and taking charge of skirmishes-and yet, although he constantly exposed himself to enemy fire, he had not been wounded since 1914. Von Mellenthin went with him today, taking the opportunity to get his own picture of the front-line situation, and making his personal assessment of the Ic's who were sending in his raw material: some were overcautious, 128 Ken Follett - omitting all unconfirmed data, and others exaggerated in order to get extra supplies and reinforcements for their units.
In the early evening, when at last the thermometer showed a fall, there were more reports and conversations. Von Metlenthin sifted the mass of detail for information relating to the counterattack predicted by Sphinx. The Ariete Armored-the Italian division occupying the Aslagh Ridge-reported increased enemy air activity. Von Mellenthin asked them whether this was bombing or reconnaissance, and they said reconnaissance: bombing had actually ceased.
The Luftwaffe reported activity in no-man's-land which might, or might not, have been an advance party marking out an assembly point. There was a garbled radio intercept in a low-grade cipher in which the something Indian Brigade requested urgent clarification of the morning's something (orders?) with particular reference to the timing of something artillery bombardment. In British tactics, von Mellenthin knew, artillery bombardment generally preceded an attack.
The evidence was building.
Von Mellenthin checked his card index for the 32 Army Tank Brigade and discovered that they had recently been sighted at Rigel Ridge-a logical position from which to attack Sidra Ridge.
The task of an Ic was an impossible one: to forecast the enemy's moves on the basis of inadequate information. He looked at the signs, he used his intuition and he gambled.
Von Mellenthin decided to gamble on Sphinx.
At 1830 hours he took his report to the command vehicle. Rommel was there with his chief of staff Colonel Bayerlein and Kesselring. They stood around a large camp table looking at the operations map. A lieutenant sat to one side ready to take notes.
Rommel had taken his cap off, and his large, balding head appeared too big for his small body. He looked tired and thin. He suffered recurring stomach trouble, von Mellenthin knew, and was often unable to eat for days. His normally pudgy face had lost flesh, and his ears seemed to stick out more than usual. But his slitted dark eyes were bright with enthusiasm and the hope of victory.
Von Mellenthin clicked his heels and formally handed over the report, then he explained his conclusions on the map. When he had done Kesselring said: 'And all this is based on the report of a spy, you say?'
'No, Field Marshal,' von Mellenthin said firmly. 'There are confirming indications.'
'You can find confirming indications for anything,' Kesselring said. Out of the comer of his eye von Mellenthin could see that Rommel was getting cross.
Kesselring said: 'We really can't plan battles on the basis of information, from some grubby little secret agent in Cairo.' Rommel said: 'I am inclined to believe this report.'
Von Mellenthin watched the two men. They were curiously balanced in terms of power-curiously, that was,
