telephoned Fuhrer Headquarters to give an estimate of 250-300 bombers taking part.168 Hitler was enraged at the failure of the Luftwaffe to defend the Reich, blaming Goring personally for neglecting the construction of sufficient flak installations.169
Despite the bombing of Cologne, the military situation put Hitler and his entourage in excellent mood in early June. On the first day of the month Hitler was flown in his ‘Fuhrer Machine’ — a spacious, four-engined Focke-Wulf, with simple interior and few special features other than a writing desk in front of his own seat — to Army Group South’s headquarters at Poltava to discuss with Field-Marshal Bock the timing and tactics of the coming offensive. Apart from Manstein, all the commanders were present as Hitler agreed to Bock’s proposal to delay the start of ‘Operation Blue’ for some days in order to take full advantage of the victory at Kharkov to destroy Soviet forces in adjacent areas. Hitler informed the commanders that the outcome of ‘Blue’ would be decisive for the war.170 Back in the Wolf’s Lair, he told his lunchtime gathering next day that the number of blue- eyed, blonde women he had seen in Poltava had slightly shaken his racial views.171 He had been astonished at how well-fed and –clothed the people of the area were. There could be no talk there of famine.172
On 4 June, Hitler paid a surprise visit — it had been arranged only the previous day — to Finland. Officially, the visit was to mark the seventy-fifth birthday of the Finnish military hero, Marshal Baron Carl Gustaf von Mannerheim, supreme commander of the Finnish armed forces. How pleased Mannerheim was to have his birthday party hijacked by Hitler can only be surmised. But the Finns had little choice other than to comply. Despite their growing unease at the alliance with Germany, which they had entered into prior to ‘Barbarossa’ in the expectation of a swift and comprehensive victory of the Wehrmacht,173 no current alternative to German tutelage was available. For Hitler, some sense of the significance he attached to the meeting can be judged from the fact that, apart from a number of trips to Italy and his meetings in southern France with Petain and Franco in 1940, it was the only time he had travelled to an area outside direct German control.174
The aim of the informal visit was to bolster Finnish solidarity with Germany through underlining for Mannerheim — a veteran of struggles with the Red Army — the immensity of the threat of Bolshevism. The Finns would at the same time be warned about any possible considerations of leaving German ‘protection’ and putting out feelers to the Soviet Union. In addition, the visit would head off any possible ties of Finland with the western Allies.175
The meeting took place in Mannerheim’s special train in the middle of woods near the air-field at Immola.176 First came the ceremonials — Hitler presented Mannerheim with the Great Golden Cross of the German Order of the Eagle — followed by lunch. Then the main participants withdrew for a confidential meeting. For an hour and a half, Hitler ran through his usual account of the war for his almost entirely silent small audience of Mannerheim, State President Risto Ryti, and Keitel. Shorn of its usual hectoring and guttural tone, his Austrian accent helped to make his rhetoric on the tape-recorded first eleven minutes — a unique survival of political comments recorded without Hitler’s knowledge — sound more lively and engaged than a written precis might make it appear.177 His main concern was to emphasize the growing danger from the Soviet Union — far greater than had been imagined even at the start of ‘Barbarossa’ — and the inevitability of the conflict. He underscored the consistency of German policy.178 Of course, he held to the version that Germany had been forced to act through a preventive war to head off imminent Soviet aggression.179 Hitler’s monologue amounted by that point to no more than a broad survey of the war. He had no intention of entering into any discussion of future military plans. He never once, for instance, mentioned the coming offensive. The Finns were only informed of that one day before it began, during Mannerheim’s return visit.180
The meeting had no concrete results. That was not its aim. For now, Hitler had reassured himself that he had the Finns’ continued support. He was well satisfied with the visit.181 For their part, the Finns maintained their superficially good relations with Germany, while keeping a watchful eye on events. The course of the war over the next six months conveyed its own clear message to them to begin looking for alternative loyalties.182
While Hitler was
V
‘Operation Blue’, the great summer offensive in the south, began on 28 June.187 A week earlier, a German plane carrying operational plans for ‘Blue’ had crashed behind enemy lines.188 Stalin thought it was deliberate disinformation and ignored it, as he did warnings from Britain.189 The offensive, carried out by five armies in two groups against the weakest part of the Soviet front, between Kursk in the north and Taganrog on the Sea of Azov in the south, was able — as ‘Barbarossa’ had done the previous year — to use the element of surprise to make impressive early gains.190 Meanwhile, on 1 July, finally, the fall of Sevastopol brought immediate promotion to Field-Marshal for Manstein.191
After the initial break through the Russian lines, the rapid advance on Voronezh ended in the capture of the city on
To be closer to the southern front, Hitler moved his headquarters on