England. Hitler had immediately ordered their mass-production on a huge scale. When Wernher von Braun, the genius behind the construction, had explained some months later what the rocket was capable of, and shown him a colour-film of it in trials, Hitler’s enthusiasm was unbounded. It was, he told Speer, ‘the decisive weapon of the war’, which would lift the burden on Germany when unleashed on the British. Production was to be advanced with all speed — if need be at the expense of tank production. By autumn 1943 it had already become plain that any expectation of early deployment was wildly optimistic.50 But in February 1944, Speer was still indicating to Goebbels that the rocket programme could be ready by the end of April.51 In the event, it would be September before the rockets were launched.52
The alternative project of the Luftwaffe, the ‘Kirschkern’ Programme, which produced what came to be known as the V1 flying-bombs, was more advanced. This, too, went back to 1942. And, like the A4 project, hopes of it were high and expectations of its production-rate optimistic. Production began in January 1944. Tests were highly encouraging.53 Speer told Goebbels in early February it would be ready at the beginning of April.54 Milch pictured for Hitler, a month later, total devastation in London in a wave of 1,500 flying-bombs over ten days, beginning on Hitler’s birthday, 20 April, with the remainder to be dispatched the following month. Within three weeks of exposure to such bombing, he imagined, Britain would be on its knees.55 Given the information he was being fed, Hitler’s illusions become rather more explicable. Competition, in this case between the army’s A4 project and the ‘Kirschkern’ Programme of the Luftwaffe, played its part. And ‘working towards the Fuhrer’, striving — as the key to retaining power and position — to accomplish what it was known he would favour, to provide the miracle he wanted, and to accommodate his wishes, however unrealistic, still applied. Reluctance to convey bad or depressing news to him was the opposite side of the same coin. Together, the consequence was inbuilt, systemic, over-optimism — shoring up unrealizable hopes, inevitably leading to sour disillusionment.
IV
During February, Hitler, perusing the international press summarized for him as usual in the overview provided by his Press Chief Otto Dietrich, had seen a press notice from Stockholm stating that a general staff officer of the army had been designated to shoot him. SS-Standartenfuhrer Johann Rattenhuber, responsible for Hitler’s personal safety, was instructed to tighten security at the Wolf’s Lair. All visitors were to be carefully screened; not least, briefcases were to be thoroughly searched. Hitler had reservations, however, about drawing security precautions too tightly.56 In any case, within days the matter lost its urgency since he decided to leave the Wolf’s Lair and move to the Berghof, near Berchtesgaden. The recent air-raids on Berlin and increasing allied air-supremacy meant that the prospect of a raid on Fuhrer Headquarters could no longer be ruled out. It was essential, therefore, to strengthen the walls and roofs of the buildings. While workers from the Todt Organization were carrying out the extensive work, headquarters would be transferred to Berchtesgaden.57 On the evening of 22 February, having announced that he would be speaking to the ‘Old Guard’ in Munich on the 24th at the annual celebration of the announcement of the Party Programme in 1920, he left the Wolf’s Lair in his special train and headed south.58 He would not return from the Berghof until mid-July.
He had been unwell in the middle of the month. His intestinal problems were accompanied by a severe cold. The trembling in his left leg was noticeable.59 He also complained of blurred vision in his right eye, diagnosed a fortnight later by an ophthalmic specialist as caused by minute blood-vessel haemorrhaging.60 His health problems were by now chronic, and mounting.61 But he was a good deal better by the time he arrived on 24 February in one of his old haunts, Munich’s Hofbrauhaus, to deliver his big speech to a large gathering of fervent loyalists, the Party’s ‘Old Guard’ as they called themselves.62 In this company, Hitler was in his element. His good speaking-form returned. The old certitudes sufficed. He believed, the assembled fanatics heard, more firmly than ever in the victory that toughness in holding out would bring; retaliation was on its way in massive attacks on London; the allied invasion, when it came, would be swiftly repelled. His peroration reached culmination-point when he told his wildly enthusiastic audience, which interrupted constantly with rapturous applause, that the road from the promulgation of the Party Programme to the takeover of power had been far harder and more hopeless than that which the German people had to go down to attain victory.
He would go his way without compromise. He linked this to the ‘Jewish Question’: just as the Jews had been ‘smashed down’ in Germany, so they would be in the entire world. The Jews of England and America — held as always to blame for the war — could expect what had already happened to the Jews of Germany. It was a crude attack on the prime Nazi ideological target as compensation for the lack of any tangible military success. But it was exactly what this audience wanted to hear. They loved it.63 Many of them were less enamoured with the evening after the speech, spent in a cold and damp air-raid shelter, fearing a heavy raid on Munich which did not materialize.64 By then, Hitler had left Munich and headed for the Berghof — its alpine splendour now also affected by the danger from the air, covered by camouflage netting, its great hall dimly lit, connected with newly constructed passages to air-raid bunkers.65
At the beginning of March, Hitler summoned Goebbels to the Berghof. The immediate reason was the prospect of the imminent defection of Finland.66 In fact, for the time being this proved a false alarm. Finland would eventually secede only six months later.67 But the meeting with Goebbels on 3 March was, as usual, not confined to a specific issue, and prompted another
He told Goebbels that, in the light of the Finnish crisis, he was now determined to put an end to the continued ‘treachery’ in Hungary. The government would be deposed and arrested, the head of state Admiral Horthy placed under German ‘protection’, the troops disarmed, and a new regime installed. Then the Hungarian aristocracy and, especially, the Budapest Jews (who, naturally, were taken to be behind the problem) could be tackled. Weapons, manpower, oil, and foodstuffs to be confiscated from Hungary would all stand Germany in good stead. The whole issue would be dealt with as soon as possible.68
On the military situation, Hitler exuded confidence. He thought a shortened front in the east could be held. He wanted to turn to the offensive again in the summer. For this he would need forty divisions that would have to be drawn from the west following the successful repulsion of an invasion. Before that, the southern flank would have to be cleared up. He was concerned at the difficulties in breaking down the bridgehead at Anzio, on the west coast of Italy, where the Allies had landed some 70,000 American and British troops in January but had failed to exploit the element of surprise and found themselves pinned down.69 He blamed, as usual, his military leaders, in particular his commander in the area, Kesselring, and regretted giving him such unrestricted powers of command. It was, thought Hitler, another indication that ‘he had to do everything himself’.70
On the invasion to be expected in all probability during the subsequent months, Hitler was ‘absolutely certain’ of Germany’s chances. He outlined the strength of forces to repel it, emphasizing especially the quality of the SS-divisions that had been sent there. He also pointed to the superiority of Germany’s weaponry, especially tanks, where the new ‘Panther’ and ‘Tiger’ tanks, if not available in adequate numbers as yet, were a great improvement on the older models. (Despite ever intensifying bombing raids, the dispersal of industrial plant under Speer had managed so far to sustain production.) Even in the air, Hitler reckoned Germany would be able to hold its own. It was rare for Goebbels to offer any hint of criticism of Hitler in his diary entries. But on this occasion the optimism seemed unfounded, even to the Propaganda Minister, who noted: ‘I wish these prognoses of the Fuhrer were right. We’ve been so often disappointed recently that you feel some scepticism rising up within you.’71
Hitler also expected a great deal from the ‘retaliation’, which he envisaged being launched in massive style in the second half of April, and from the new fire-power and radar being built into German fighters. He thought the back of the enemy’s air-raids would be broken by the following winter, after which Germany could then ‘again be active in the attack on England’.72 Hitler needed little invitation to pour out his bile on his generals. It was easier for Stalin, he commented. He had had shot the sort of generals who were causing problems in Germany. But as regards the ‘Jewish question’, Germany was benefiting from its radical policy: ‘the Jews can do us no more harm.’73
