176. Watt, How War Came, 463, 465. Sumner Welles, Acting Secretary of State in the USA, was told on 22 August by Joseph E. Davies, former US Ambassador in Moscow, that news of the non- aggression pact was ‘not unexpected’ (Davies, 453–4).
177. The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, 200.
178. Nicolson, 154.
179. Chips, 208–9.
180. N. J. Crowsen (ed.), Fleet Street, Press Barons, and Politics: the Journals of Collin Brooks, 1932–1940, Camden Soc, 5th Ser., vol.11, London, 1998, 252.
181. Roberts, 174; Allan Merson, Communist Resistance in Nazi Germany, London, 1985, 212–13.
182. Heinz Kuhnrich, ‘Der deutsch-sowjetische Nichtangriffsvertrag vom 23. August 1939 aus der zeitgenossischen Sicht der KPD’, in Eichholtz and Patzold, 517–51, here 519 (quotation), 529.
183. Below, 184.
184. See TBJG, I/7, 74–7 (24 August 1939, 25 August 1939) for the uncertainty of Goebbels who, at this time on the Berghof, was probably echoing Hitler’s own sentiments.
185. Documents concerning German-Polish Relations and the Outbreak of Hostilities between Great Britain and Germany on September 3, 1939, London, 1939, 96–8, No.56; DBFP, 3rd Ser., VII, 170–71 (here 171), No.207; DGFP, D, VII, 215–16, No.200; Henderson, 256.
186. Documents, 99, No.57; DBFP, 3rd Ser., VII, 161–3 (here 162), No.200; see Henderson, 247–8, 256–7, 301–5.
187. Documents, 99–100, N0.57; DBFP, 3rd Ser., VII, 161–3 (here 163), N0.200; DGFP, D, VII, 210–16, No.200; Domarus, 1244–7.
188. DBFP, 3rd Ser.VII, 201–2 (quotation 201), N0.248.
189. Documents, 100–101, N0.58; DBFP, 3rd Ser., VII, 201–2 (here 202), N0.248; DGFP, D, VII, 210–16, No.200; Henderson, 257; Domarus, 1249–50.
190. Domarus, 1247–8; DBFP, 3rd Ser., VII, 177–9 (here, 178), No.211.
191. Weizsacker, Erinnerungen, 252.
192. TBJG, I/7, 76 (25 August 1939); Below, 187; Watt, How War Came, 464–5. And see Hitler’s remarks to Reich Press Chief Otto Dietrich: ‘No democratic government can survive such a defeat and embarrassment as Chamberlain and Daladier have had inflicted on them through our Moscow treaty.’ (cit. Peter Kleist, Zwischen Hitler und Stalin, Bonn, 1950, 66. (‘Keine demokratische Regierung kann sich halten, der eine solche Niederlage und zugleich Blamage zuteil geworden ist, wie Chamberlain und Daladier durch unseren Moskauer Vertrag.’)) The speeches of Chamberlain and Halifax can be found in Documents, 107–18.
193. Ribbentrop Memoirs, 116.
194. Documents, 120–22, N0.68; DBFP, 3rd Ser., VII, 227–31, Nos.283–4; Henderson, 259; Schmidt, 458–9; Domarus, 1256–7.
195. Documents, 122–3, No.69; DBFP, 3rd Ser., VII, 230, No.284; Domarus, 1257.
196. Henderson, 259. See also DBFP, 3rd Ser., VII, 235, 239, Nos.286, 293.
197. TBJG, I/7, 77 (26 August 1939).
198. IMG, xxviii.389, D0C.1780-PS (Jodl’s diary, 23 August 1939) for the time set for the operation. Hitler took the decision to go ahead at 3.02p.m. on 25 August and various subsidiary orders to army units followed (Franz Halder, Kriegstagebuch. Tagliche Aufzeichnungen des Chefs des Generalstabes des Heeres 1939–1942, ed. Arbeitskreis fur Wehrforschung Stuttgart, 3 vols., Stuttgart, 1962–4 (= Halder KTB), i.33 (26 August 1939); Vormann, in IfZ, F34/1, Fol.24). Saturday -a day favoured by Hitler for the withdrawal from the League of Nations, the introduction of conscription, the reoccupation of the Rhineland, and the Anschlu? — was possibly chosen since it delayed the likely response time of the British government. (See Domarus, 1239 and n.654. See also Weinberg II, 634; Walther Hofer, Die Entfesselung des Zweiten Weltkrieges, Frankfurt am Main, 1964, 274; Hermann Graml, Europas Weg in den Krieg. Hitler und die Machte 1939, Munich, 1990, 287 (and 277ff. for a detailed account of the developments during the last days of August.)
199. Weinberg II, 633–4.
200. Below, 178.
201. Generaloberst Halder, Kriegstagebuch. Bd. 1: Vom Polenfeldzug bis zum Eride der Westoffensive (14.8.1939–30.6.1940), ed. Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, Stuttgart, 1962 [= Halder KTB], 26 (22 August 1939); The Halder War Diary, 1939– 1942, ed. Charles Burdick and Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, London, 1988 (the abridged English translation of Halder KTB = Halder Diary), 32; DGFP, D, VII, 557–9, Appendix I (extracts from Halder’s diary); Domarus, 1239.
202. Below, 182.
203. TBJG, I/7, 77 (26 August 1939).
204. Henderson, 258; Halder KTB, i.31 (25 August 1939), mentions the lifting of telephone restrictions on Britain and France by Canaris. TBJG, I/7, 79–80 (27 August 1939), refers to the introduction of ration cards, though not yet for bread and potatoes. See Shirer, 148, 150 for grumbling at the ration cards.
205. Halder KTB, i. 31–3 (25–6 August 1939), IfZ, F34/1, Vormann, Fols.24– 5.
206. Halder KTB, i. 31 (25 August 1939), 39 (28 August 1939); IfZ, F34/1, Vormann, Fols. 26–8.
207. Muller, Heer, 416–17.
208. Halder KTB, i. 33 (26 August 1939), 39 (28 August 1939); Engel, 59 and n.160.
209. Domarus, 1254–5.
210. Weinberg II, 630–31.
211. DGFP, D, VII, 285–6, No.271. Mussolini remarked that he had been preparing for war in 1942.
212. Schmidt, 462.
213. TBJG, I/7, 78 (26 August 1939). See Halder’s remark: ‘Fuhrer rather gone to pieces’ (‘Fuhrer ziemlich zusammengebrochen’), Halder KTB, i.34 (26 January 1939). According to Vormann, Hitler walked up and down the room in a state of agitation speaking to this and that person. To Vormann, he said: ‘We now have to be sly, sly as foxes’ (‘“Schlau mussen wir jetzt sein, schlau wie die Fuchse”’) (IfZ, F34/1, Vormann, Fol.26).
214. IfZ, F34/1, Vormann, Fol.43: ‘The refusal of Mussolini was felt on all sides to be treachery and most harshly condemned’ (‘…war die Absage Mussolinis allseitig als Verrat empfunden und scharfstens verurteilt worden’). See also Below, 187–9, where, however, Hitler, despite the ‘hard words’ against his ally, did not doubt Mussolini’s loyalty.
215. IfZ, F34/1, Vormann, Fols.26–8; Ribbentrop Memoirs, 117. On the effect on Hitler’s prestige, Muller, Heer, 420 and n.206.
216. Schmidt, 462.
217. Schmidt, 459–61; IMG, x.240; Robert Coulondre, Von Moskau nach Berlin 1936–1939. Erinnerungen des franzosischen Botschafters, Bonn, 1950, 421–4; Weinberg II, 634 and n.32; Hofer, Entfesselung, 275; Graml, Europas Weg, 288–9.
218. Weinberg II, 635.
219. Ribbentrop Memoirs, 116–17. There is no corroborative support for Ribbentrop’s unlikely claim that, learning of the British-Polish pact, he had persuaded Hitler to halt the attack on
