Hitler. 1936-1945: Nemesis

the corner. Only Britain stood in the way. For perhaps the only time during the Third Reich there was genuine war- fever among the population. Incited by incessant propaganda, hatred of Britain was now widespread. People were now thirsting to see the high-and-mighty long-standing rival finally brought to its knees.¹⁰⁹ But mingling with the aggression were still feelings of fear and anxiety.¹¹⁰ Whether triumphalist, or fearful, the wish to bring the war to a speedy end was almost universal.

Hitler had meanwhile changed his mind about delivering his Reichstag speech on the Monday. On 3 July British ships had sunk a number of French warships moored at the naval base of Mers-el-Kebir, near Oran, in French Algeria, killing 1,250 French sailors in the process. Churchill’s move, a show of British determination, was to prevent the battle-fleet of his former allies falling into Hitler’s hands.¹¹¹ For Hitler, this brought a new situation. He wanted to await developments. He was uncertain whether he ought to go ahead and appeal to England.¹¹² When Ciano met him the day after Hitler had returned to Berlin, the Italian Foreign Minister found him ‘rather inclined to continue the struggle and to unleash a storm of wrath and of steel upon the British’. However, Ciano added, ‘the final decision has not been reached, and it is for this reason that he is delaying his speech, of which, as he himself puts it, he wants to weigh every word.’¹¹³ He was to postpone his speech three times — an indication of his uncertainty about how to proceed at this crucial time — before finally scheduling it for the 19th.¹¹⁴ ‘Despite everything the Fuhrer still has a very positive attitude towards England,’ remarked Goebbels. ‘He is still not ready for the final blow. He wants to think over his speech again in peace and for that reason go to the Obersalzberg.’ If London should refuse the last offer, then Britain would be ‘immediately following dealt an annihilatory blow. The English apparently have no idea what then awaits them.’¹¹⁵

While he was at the Berghof, Hitler had talks with his military leaders about a possible invasion of Britain, should his ‘peace offer’ be rejected. At these discussions, an invasion was still seen as a last choice rather than first option. Raeder, reporting on a study that the naval leadership had been conducting since the previous November, had on his own initiative already as early as 21 May, during the early stages of the western offensive, raised with Hitler the possibility of a landing.¹¹⁶ They had spoken again on 20 June about it, and Hitler had briefly also discussed the matter with Brauchitsch.¹¹⁷ The Wehrmacht had officially learned on 2 July of Hitler’s decision that under certain conditions a landing in Britain could be undertaken.¹¹⁸ Raeder had advised Hitler in June that a naval landing could only take place once the Luftwaffe had secured air superiority over southern England.¹¹⁹ He repeated this precondition when he met Hitler on 11 July on the Obersalzberg, advocating ‘concentrated bombing’ to begin forthwith. But naval ambitions went far beyond a presumed British surrender, thus obviating the need for what Raeder, as well as Hitler, saw as the risky venture of invading Britain. Germany would need a big navy to defend its colonial empire, in particular against the looming threat of the United States.¹²⁰ Taking the opportunity to push the interests of the navy, Raeder held out, therefore, the prospect of building up a great battleship fleet to combat any potential Anglo-American naval alliance.¹²¹ The next day Jodl outlined for Hitler initial thoughts on operational plans for a landing.¹²² On Saturday, 13 July, it was Halder’s turn to travel to the Berghof to report on operational plans.¹²³ But a landing was to be a last resort. ‘The Fuhrer is greatly puzzled by England’s persisting unwillingness to make peace,’ Halder noted. ‘He sees the answer (as we do) in England’s hope in Russia and therefore counts on having to compel her by main force to agree to peace. Actually that is much against his grain. The reason is that a military defeat of England will bring about the disintegration of the British Empire.’ As Halder recorded, Hitler reiterated what he had told Goebbels and others. ‘This would not be of any benefit to Germany. German blood would be shed to accomplish something that would benefit only Japan, the United States, and others.’¹²⁴

The talk was only of England at this time. Hitler regretted that he had not done more to ‘sign up’ (angebeuert) the Duke of Windsor while he had still been King. He wondered how useful Sir Oswald Mosley — the leader of the ‘Blackshirts’, the British Union of Fascists — might be.¹²⁵ He remained uncertain how to act. ‘It’s my impression that F[uhrer] is still unsure and doesn’t know what he should do and how he should do it,’ noted army adjutant Gerhard Engel, wondering whether Hitler would indeed give his Reichstag speech.¹²⁶ A brief trip out from the Berghof to the steelworks in Linz and tank factory at Wels saw him pressing for expansion. Whether or not the British should come to terms, German armaments were intended for use again before long.¹²⁷

On 16 July Hitler then signed ‘Directive No. 16 for Preparations of a Landing Operation against England’. The preamble ran: ‘Since England, in spite of its militarily hopeless situation, still gives no recognizable signs of readiness to come to terms, I have determined to prepare a landing operation against England and, if need be, to carry it out. The aim of this operation is to exclude the English motherland as a basis for the continuation of the war against Germany, and, if it should be necessary, to occupy it completely.’¹²⁸ Operational plans followed. But the qualifications in the preamble — ‘if need be’, ‘if necessary’ — indicated Hitler’s half-heartedness.

This conveyed itself to his army leaders. Rundstedt, Commander-in-Chief in the West, simply did not take ‘Sealion’ seriously — a feeling endorsed by Goring’s report of Hitler telling him privately that he did not intend to carry out the operation. He never even bothered to attend the amphibious landing exercises. To him and all who studied them, given the strength of the British navy, the logistic difficulties seemed insuperable.¹²⁹

If the British would only see sense, thought Hitler, it would be far more desirable than an invasion. After signing the directive, he fixed his Reichstag speech for the evening of Friday, 19 July, in the Kroll Opera House.¹³⁰

The Reichstag had a military appearance that evening. Six seats, of deputies who had fallen in the western campaign, had laurel wreaths placed on them. In the front row were the gold-braided top brass of the military, their chests heaving with medals and decorations, many preening themselves on their new promotions to Field-Marshals and Colonel-Generals.¹³¹ (Hitler had a cynical view about promoting his military leaders. Through acts of generosity, as in ancient times, they would be bound all the more, whatever their political views, to their oaths of loyalty, and to him as the bestower of such gifts. He intended their salaries to be tax-free, and would not be miserly with donations of landed estates once the war was finally won.¹³² This altered nothing of his view that the army leadership — Brauchitsch and Halder in particular — had been found seriously wanting once more, and that his own judgement had again been proved right in the western campaign.¹³³) Hitler was in impressive form, speaking more quietly and less hysterically than was often the case. William Shirer, watching from the gallery, admired the performance. ‘The Hitler we saw in the Reichstag tonight was the conqueror, and conscious of it, and yet so wonderful an actor, so magnificent a handler of the German mind, that he mixed superbly the full confidence of the conqueror with the humbleness which always goes down so well with the masses when they know a man is on top… His oratorical form was at its best… I’ve often admired the way he uses his hands, which are somewhat feminine and quite artistic. Tonight he used those hands beautifully, seemed to express himself almost as much with his hands — and the sway of his body — as he did with his words and the use of his voice.’¹³⁴

The point of his speech, as he told Goebbels earlier that day, was to make Britain a brief but imprecise offer, indicating that it was the last word, and leaving the choice to London.¹³⁵ A large part of the speech, which lasted no less than two and a quarter hours, was spent describing the course of the war, praising the military achievements of the commanders, and listing their promotions. As he came to the names of the twelve generals who were to be made Field-Marshals, Hitler saluted each of them. From their places in the balcony, they stood to attention and returned the salute.¹³⁶ Special mention was made of Goring, now elevated to Reich Marshal. Goring was like a child with a new toy when Hitler gave him the accompanying insignia.¹³⁷ Hitler then emphasized the strength of Germany’s position. Only in the last few minutes of his speech did he reach the point that everyone was waiting for: his ‘appeal to reason, also in England’.¹³⁸ The ‘appeal’ came and went — in those words, and little besides. There was the usual accusation levelled at Churchill as the warmonger. There was the threat that Britain, and the British Empire, would be destroyed. There was a hypocritical expression of regret for the victims of continued war. And there was the victor’s ‘appeal to reason’. That was all.¹³⁹ It was little wonder that the reaction, even among those around Hitler, was one of disappointment — especially when the British categorical rejection of the ‘offer’ was announced within the hour.¹⁴⁰

Hitler had misjudged the mood in Britain. And his speech had not been tuned to offer anything that might