31. BAB, R55/620, fos. 101–3, report by Generalleutnant Dittmar, 26.9.44.
32. BA/MA, RH19/IV/14, Tatigkeitsbericht der Geh. Feldpolizei fur September 1944 (27.10.44).
33. BAB, NS19/1858, fos. 1–7, Chef des NS-Fuhrungsstabes des Heeres, Kurze Aktennotiz uber Frontbesuch im Westen in der Zeit vom 22.9–3.10.1944, 5.10.44.
34. On 1 September, the OKW passed on an order from Hitler that troops retreating from the west and not needed for relocation to other theatres were to give up weaponry and equipment as they crossed the frontier into Germany, which could then be redeployed for the western front.—BAB, NS6/792, fo. 15–15v, Oberbefehlsleiter Hellmuth Friedrichs, head of Abteilung II (Parteiangelegenheiten) in the Party Chancellery, to western Gauleiter, 1.9.44.
35. DZW, 6, p. 108; BA/MA, RW4/494, fo. 94, Chef des OKW, Ma?nahmen gegen Auflosungserscheinungen in der Truppe, 23.9.44.
36. BA/MA, RW4/494, fo. 108, Jodl to Ob.West, etc., 16.9.44; DZW, 6, pp. 106–9, partial facsimile of Hitler’s order of 16.9.44, p. 109; Heinrich Schwendemann, ‘ “Verbrannte Erde”? Hitlers “Nero- Befehl” vom 19. Marz 1945’, in Kriegsende in Deutschland, Hamburg, 2005, p. 158.
37. DZW, 6, pp. 119–20; Groehler, pp. 331–2.
38. NAL, WO208/4364, pp. 2–6 (quotation, in English, p. 6) (26–8.10.44).
39. DZW, 6, p. 111. For examples of the fanaticism and belief in Hitler among wounded SS men in France, see Beevor, p. 324.
40. Kurt Patzold and Manfred Wei?becker, Geschichte der NSDAP 1920–1945, Cologne, 1981, pp. 369–70.
41. Bernd Wegner, Hitlers politische Soldaten, Paderborn, 1982, p. 306.
42. Examples from August and September 1944 in Ortwin Buchbender and Reinhold Sterz (eds.), Das andere Gesicht des Krieges: Deutsche Feldpostbriefe 1939–1945, Munich, 1982, pp. 154–61. A number of large samples of soldiers’ correspondence in August and September 1944 tested by the censors showed mixed results. Some indicated a slight rise in positive attitudes towards the regime and the war effort. Others pointed in the opposite direction, with a small increase in negative attitudes and trend towards war- weariness. Unsurprisingly, however, political views were expressed (or hinted at) in only a fraction of the correspondence. Most of the letters confined themselves to personal matters.—DRZW, 9/1 (Forster), pp. 631–3. The limited indoctrination with the ideals of National Socialism is a general hallmark of letters to and from the front, dominated above all by private concerns. See DRZW, 9/2 (Kilian), pp. 287–8. For an assessment of the value of the letters as a reflection of ordinary soldiers’ mentalities, see Klaus Latzel, ‘Wehrmachtsoldaten zwischen “Normalitat” und NS-Ideologie, oder: Was sucht die Forschung in der Feldpost?’, in Muller and Volkmann, pp. 573–88.
43. DRZW, 9/1 (Rass), pp. 686–90; Christoph Rass, ‘Menschenmaterial’: Deutsche Soldaten an der Ostfront. Innenansichten einer Infanteriedivision 1939– 1945, Paderborn, 2003, pp. 121–34, esp. pp. 122–3; also Andreas Kunz, Wehrmacht und Niederlage: Die bewaffnete Macht in der Endphase der nationalsozialistischen Herrschaft 1944 bis 1945, Munich, 2007, p. 114. Omer Bartov, The Eastern Front, 1941–45: German Troops and the Barbarisation of Warfare, New York, 1986, p. 49, estimates that around 30 per cent of officers had been members of the Nazi Party.
44. NAL, WO219/4713, fos. 907–8, SHAEF report, 4.9.44.
45. NAL, WO219/4713, fos. 906–7, SHAEF report, 11.9.44.
46. BAB, R55/601, fo. 104, Tatigkeitsbericht, weekly propaganda report, 4.9.44.
47. ‘Wollt Ihr den totalen Krieg?’ Die geheimen Goebbels-Konferenzen 1939–1943, ed. Willi A. Boelcke, Munich, 1969, p. 452; Marlis Steinert, Hitlers Krieg und die Deutschen, Dusseldorf and Vienna, 1970, p. 43.
48. BAB, R55/601, fo. 113, Tatigkeitsbericht, weekly propaganda report, 11.9.44.
49. TBJG, II/13, p. 388 (2.9.44).
50. MadR, vol. 17, p. 6708 (17.8.44); BHStA, MA 106695, report of RPvOB, 6.9.44. The first V2 rocket attack on London on 8 September, causing only a few casualties, was not publicized in the German press. When eventually, two months later, news of the V2 attacks was broadcast, there was a mixed reaction. Satisfaction, revived hopes and an upturn in mood were reported, though Berliners were said to have been ‘not specially impressed’.—Steinert, pp. 511–12; Das letzte halbe Jahr: Stimmungsberichte der Wehrmachtpropaganda 1944/45, ed. Wolfram Wette, Ricarda Bremer and Detlef Vogel, Essen, 2001, p. 147 (7–12.11.44).
51. BAB, R55/601, fos. 78–9, Tatigkeitsbericht, weekly propaganda report, 14.8.44.
52. Robert Gellately, Backing Hitler: Consent and Coercion in Nazi Germany, Oxford, 2001, pp. 226–30.
53. BAB, R55/623, fos. 56–9, Wochenubersicht uber Zuschriften zum totalen Kriegseinsatz, 28.8.44.
54. MadR, 17, pp. 6697–8 (10.8.44).
55. Michael Kater, The Nazi Party: A Social Profile of Members and Leaders, 1919– 1945, Oxford, 1983, p. 263 (figure 1).
56. Figures from Patzold and Wei?becker, pp. 354, 375, 419 n. 17.
57. TBJG, II/13, p. 389 (2.9.44); Eleanor Hancock, National Socialist Leadership and Total War 1941–45, New York, 1991, p. 164.
58. On 31 August Bormann ordered schools and universities to continue until their pupils, students or teachers were conscripted for work in armaments, in accordance with the restrictions laid down by Goebbels.— BHStA, Reichsstatthalter Epp 644/2, unfoliated, Party Chancellery circular 209/44, 31.8.44.
59. DZW, 6, pp. 230–31; Hancock, p. 148.
60. Dieter Rebentisch, Fuhrerstaat und Verwaltung im Zweiten Weltkrieg, Stuttgart, 1989, pp. 520–21.
61. Goebbels decided, however, having gained Hitler’s agreement, not to proceed with this further increase of the age limit for women’s labour duty.—TBJG, II/14, p. 218 (16.11.44).
62. TBJG, II/13, pp. 307–9 (24.8.44).
63. BAB, R43II/680a, fos. 135–7, Spende des Fuhrers (Eierkognak) an die NSV, costs of supplying the liqueur, 12–18.8.44.
64. BHStA, Reichsstatthalter Epp 681/6, unfoliated, Stuckart to RVKs, 3.9.44; BAB, R43II/1648, Lammers to RVK, 4.9.44.
65. Rebentisch, p. 522.
66. Hancock, pp. 155, 158.
67. Hancock, pp. 151, 156. Goebbels was well aware that 70 per cent of the exempted occupations were in the armaments industry.—TBJG, II/13, p. 239 (10.8.44).
68. DRZW, 5/2 (Muller), pp. 750, 752, 762, 767; DZW, 6, p. 229.
69. TBJG, II/13, p. 397 (3.9.44).
70. TBJG, II/13, pp. 196–7 (2.8.44).
71. DZW, 6, p. 231; TBJG, II/13, p. 239 (10.8.44); BAB, R3/1740, fos. 38–9, Speer-Chronik.
72. DRZW, 5/2 (Muller), p. 761.
73. Von Oven, p. 124 (1.9.44).
74. Hancock, pp. 162–4; Dietrich Orlow, The History of the Nazi Party, vol. 2: 1933–1945, Newton Abbot, 1973, pp. 470–72; BAB, R3/1740, fos. 43, 81, Speer- Chronik.
75. BAB, R3/1740, fos. 103–4, Speer-Chronik; TBJG, II/13, pp. 370 (31.8.44), 378 (1.9.44), 388–9 (2.9.44), 452 (10.9.44), 490 (16.9.44), 525–7 (20.9.44), 568 (26.9.44); von Oven, pp. 127–9 (3.9.44), 134 (10.9.44).
76. DRZW, 5/2 (Muller), pp. 764–6. For Bormann’s antagonism, see Louis Eugene Schmier, ‘Martin Bormann and the Nazi Party 1941–1945’, Ph.D. thesis, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1969 (University Microfilms Inc., Ann Arbor), pp. 304–8, 312–13.
