The End

97. BA/MA, N245/2, NL Reinhardt, Briefe, fo. 41 (19.1.45).

98. BA/MA, N245/2, NL Reinhardt, Briefe, fo. 41 (20.1.45).

99. BA/MA, N245/2, NL Reinhardt, Briefe, fo. 41^v (21.1.45); N245/3, NL Reinhardt, ‘Kalenderblatter 1945’, fos. 82–3 (20–21.1.45); N245/15, Heidkamper, fos. 53–7.

100. The above account relies, except where otherwise stated, on BA/MA, N245/3, NL Reinhardt, ‘Kalenderblatter 1945’, fos. 83–4 (22–7.1.45); N245/2, NL Reinhardt, Briefe, fos. 41–2 (22.1.45, 26.1.45); N245/15, Heidkamper, fos. 68–72, 76–87; N24/39, ‘Erinnerungen von General d.I. a.D. Friedrich Ho?bach’, typescript (May 1945), pp. 45–6, 68. See also Friedrich Ho?bach, Die Schlacht um Ostpreu?en, Uberlingen, 1951, pp. 51–73; Guderian, pp. 400–401; Dieckert and Grossmann, pp. 94–5, 110-18; DZW, 6, p. 511.

101. e.g. BA/MA, RH21/3/730, fos. 3–6, ‘Auskunfte Gen.Major Mueller-Hillebrand (Chef des Stabes) uber den Einsatz der 3. Pz. Armee in Ostpreu?en, Sept. 1944–Feb. 1945’ (1955); ‘Auszug aus einem Bericht von Oberst i.G. Mendrzyk O.Qu. bei der 3. Panzer-Armee’.

102. Quoted Schwendemann, ‘Das Kriegsende in Ostpreu?en’, p. 98.

103. Schwendemann, ‘Tod zwischen den Fronten’, p. 43. I am most grateful to Dr Schwendemann for the reference to the source for these comments, BA/MA, RH20/4/617, unfoliated, Notizen uber Ferngesprache 14– 25.1.45, Gesprachsnotizen vom 24.1.45 (Ho?bach addressing leading officers at 16.00 hours that day, and speaking to Reinhardt that evening at 22.15 hours), and to Dr Jurgen Forster for obtaining for me a copy of the document.

104. BA/MA, N712/15, NL Pollex, Auszuge aus Briefen, fo. 12, 22.1.45.

105. N24/39, NL Ho?bach, ‘Erinnerungen’, pp. 46–7; Ho?bach, p. 70. That Rendulic? had a less than complete comprehension of the situation in East Prussia when he arrived there seems clear. He had as recently as 17 January been appointed by Hitler as Commander-in-Chief of Army Group Courland, and had been in Courland no more than twelve hours when, on 26 January, he was suddenly informed that he had to take over the command of Army Group North, besieged in East Prussia.—Lothar Rendulic?, Gekampft, Gesiegt, Geschlagen, Wels, 1952, pp. 331–2, 336.

106. Guderian, pp. 400–401. Rendulic?, pp. 337–55, provides a description of his period, a little over six weeks, in command in East Prussia, until 12 March, though it contains only a few inconsequential lines on Ho?bach’s dismissal on p. 343.

107. Guderian, p. 394.

108. Hastings, p. 283; Roland Kaltenegger, Schorner: Feldmarschall der letzten Stunde, Munich and Berlin, 1994, pp. 265–6; Siebel-Achenbach, pp. 59, 71–2. Hitler had initially intended Field-Marshal Model to take over the command. It was decided, however, that he was urgently needed in the west, so the command was given to Schorner.—TBJG, II/15, pp. 135 (16.1.45), 138 (17.1.45).

109. Quoted DRZW, 10/2 (Kunz), p. 39.

110. BA/MA, N60/74, NL Schorner, ‘Tragodie Schlesien, Marz 1945’, fo. 2 (1958).

111. BAB, NS6/353, fos. 157–8, Bormann, Bekanntgabe 28/45, Ungehorsam und falsche Meldungen, containing Keitel’s order in appendix; also IfZ, Fa-91/4, fo. 1069.

112. Himmler’s command had, it seems, already been agreed some days earlier, in the main, according to Goebbels, because ‘a firm hand’ was needed to turn troops ‘flooding back’ from the path of the Soviets into new fighting units. Goebbels even suggested making Himmler Commander-in-Chief of the Army, to relieve Hitler of this duty, but Hitler was unwilling to go so far and stated that Himmler first had to prove he could master operational command.—TBJG, II/15, pp. 165 (20.1.45), 181 (22.1.45), 195 (23.1.45).

113. DZW, 6, p. 513.

114. IWM, FO645/155, interrogations of Karl Donitz, 30.9.45, p. 5; 2.10.45, p. 2 (in English).

115. IfZ, ZS 1810, Bd. II, fo. 54, Donitz interview with Barry Pree, 18.11.74.

116. Quoted Schwendemann, ‘Endkampf’, p. 20; also Schwendemann, ‘Tod zwischen den Fronten’, p. 45.

117. Goebbels thought Goring, when he spoke with him on 27 January, ‘almost defeatist’ and depressed, hoping even now that Hitler would try to find a political solution.—TBJG, 15/II, p. 250 (28.1.45)

118. DZW, 6, p. 572.

119. DRZW, 9/1 (Heinemann), p. 884.

120. DRZW, 9/1 (Heinemann), p. 882.

121. DRZW, 10/1 (Lakowski), p. 559.

122. DZW, 6, pp. 575, 591.

123. David K. Yelton, Hitler’s Volkssturm: The Nazi Militia and the Fall of Germany, 1944– 1945, Lawrence, Kan., 2002, p. 131.

124. Quoted DZW, 6, p. 513.

125. DZW, 6, pp. 513–14.

CHAPTER 6. TERROR COMES HOME

1. See in general, for a similar interpretation, Robert Gellately, Backing Hitler: Consent and Coercion in Nazi Germany, Oxford, 2001.

2. For the malevolent depiction of Jews, which showed no diminution as Jews were deported from Germany, see Jeffrey Herf, The Jewish Enemy: Nazi Propaganda during World War II and the Holocaust, Cambridge, Mass., 2006, and Herf’s contribution, ‘ “Der Krieg und die Juden”: Nationalsozialistische Propaganda im Zweiten Weltkrieg’, in DRZW, 9/2, pp. 159ff.

3. BAB, NS19/2454, fos. 1–3^v: SS-Kriegsberichter-Abteilung, SS-Standarte ‘Kurt Eggers’, 26– 30.1.45.

4. 1945: Das Jahr der endgultigen Niederlage der faschistischen Wehrmacht. Dokumente, ed. Gerhard Forster and Richard Lakowski, Berlin, 1975, p. 144 (5.2.45).

5. NAL, WO219/4713, SHAEF reports, 15.2.45, 20.2.45. The threat of ‘family liability’ (Sippenhaft) against soldiers judged to be failing in their duty had been issued on numerous occasions by Wehrmacht commanders as a deterrent. It was indeed carried out in some cases, though these were exceptions rather than the rule. See Robert Loeffel, ‘Soldiers and Terror: Re-evaluating the Complicity of the Wehrmacht in Nazi Germany’, German History, 27 (2009), pp. 514–30.

6. Account (in English) of a prisoner of war, captured in the west, who had returned from the eastern front: LHC, Dempsey Papers, no. 273, pt. II, p. 7 (3.3.45).

7. BAB, NS6/135, fos. 44, 118–21, Gauleitung Mageburg-Anhalt, report of 16.2.45; report of Landratsamt in Mahr.-Schonberg, 17.2.45.

8. BAB, NS6/135, fo. 11, Auszug aus einem Bericht des Pg. Waldmann, Inspektion-Mitte, 7.3.45 (referring to impressions gathered in early February).

9. BAB, NS19/3705, fos. 6–13, ‘Beobachtungen im Heimatkriegsgebiet’, 22.2.45 and covering letter of Bormann to Himmler, 1.3.45.

10. BAB, NS19/2068, fos. 6–6^v, 20–20^v, ‘Meldungen aus dem Ostraum’, Mullrose, 16.2.45, Mark Brandenburg, 21.2.45. Reports of widespread looting in the Oder area as an indication of demoralization also in DZW, 6, p. 514. According to Goebbels’ aide, Wilfred von Oven, writing in mid-February, ‘the morale of the German soldiers on the eastern front is becoming worse by the day’.— Wilfred von Oven, Finale Furioso: Mit Goebbels bis zum Ende, Tubingen, 1974, p. 578 (11.2.45).

11. BAB, R55/601, fo. 284, Tatigkeitsbericht der RPA, 21.2.45.

12. Das letzte halbe Jahr: Stimmungsberichte der Wehrmachtpropaganda 1944/45, ed. Wolfram Wette, Ricarda Bremer and Detlef Vogel, Essen, 2001, pp. 236–7 (7.2.45).

13. Das letzte halbe Jahr, p. 251 (23.2.45).