(18–20.2.45); Ralf Georg Reuth, Goebbels, Munich and Zurich, 1990, pp. 581–2. The suggestion appealed to Hitler, and was dropped only when it was pointed out by his military advisers that such an appalling breach of the Geneva Convention could backfire drastically, since the Allies might use their superiority in the air to start using gas and chemical warfare and, anyway, held more prisoners than those in German hands.— IMT, vol. 35, pp. 181–6, doc. 606-D. Hitler had already told Goebbels before the attack on Dresden that, should the British go over to gas warfare he would have 250,000 British and American prisoners of war shot.—TBJG, II/15, p. 368 (12.2.45).
149. Von Oven, Finale Furioso, p. 571 (7.2.45).
150. Von Oven, Finale Furioso, pp. 587–8 (25.2.45); and see also p. 577 (9.2.45). Goebbels suggested in mid-February providing an opening to the British, but Hitler thought—as he invariably did— that the right point for this had not been reached. In any case, Goebbels had just told Hitler that it was crucial to hold the west; that was more important than losing territory in the east.—TBJG, II/15, pp. 367–8 (12.2.45).
151. TBJG, II/15, pp. 337 (8.2.45), 366 (12.2.45).
152. Von Oven, Finale Furioso, p. 582 (16.2.45).
153. TBJG, II/15, pp. 379–81 (13.2.45).
154. TBJG, II/15, p. 383 (28.2.45).
155. BAB, R3/1535, fos. 18–28, Zur Rustungslage Februar–Marz 1945, with statistical appendices, fos. 29– 31, quotation fo. 28, 30.1.45.
156. TBJG, II/15, p. 290 (1.2.45).
157. Speer, p. 432.
158. Speer, p. 428, refers to Hitler’s clash with an angry Guderian over withdrawal of troops from the Courland, which the latter had pressed for, as a possible sign of a drop in authority. The fact was, however, that Hitler’s word was final. The troops cut off in the Courland remained there.
159. TBJG, II/15, pp. 311 (5.2.45), 338 (8.2.45).
160. Von Oven, Finale Furioso, p. 588 (25.2.45). Forster claimed to have told Hitler directly to seek negotiations with the western powers. However, Hitler’s secretary Christa Schroeder, Er war mein Chef: Aus dem Nachla? der Sekretarin von Adolf Hitler, Munich and Vienna, 1985, p. 74, recalled what was, presumably, a subsequent meeting from which Forster, who had been determined to tell Hitler in most forthright terms of the despairing situation in Danzig, came away revitalized and certain that Hitler could save Danzig.
161. Karl Wahl, ‘… es ist das deutsche Herz’: Erlebnisse und Erkenntnisse eines ehemaligen Gauleiters, Augsburg, 1954, p. 385. Almost twenty years later Wahl produced a very similar, but if anything even more apologetic, version of the meeting, in Karl Wahl, Patrioten oder Verbrecher, Heusenstamm bei Offenbach am Main, 1973, pp. 155–61.
162. Wahl, ‘… es ist das deutsche Herz’, p. 386.
163. Rudolf Jordan, Erlebt und erlitten: Weg eines Gauleiters von Munchen bis Moskau, Leoni am Starnberger See, 1971, pp. 251–8 (quotations, pp. 257–8).
164. TBJG, II/15, p. 323 (6.2.45); Speer, p. 431.
165. TBJG, II/15, p. 377 for Hitler’s recognition that Yalta meant there would be no break in the coalition; and p. 381 for the communique, and Goebbels’ reaction to it. A British intelligence report on 22 February suggested that ‘the very hopelessness of Germany’s fate after the war may be one of the reasons for the continuance of a struggle which daily becomes more desperate’.—Hastings, Armageddon, p. 417. For the negotiations at Yalta, see DRZW, 10/2 (Loth), pp. 289–300. The outcome of the Conference was not immediately made known to the German public, though detailed information—gleaned in the main from illicit listening to foreign broadcasts—soon seeped out.— Das letzte halbe Jahr, pp. 251–2 (23.2.45).
166. Speer, p. 433.
CHAPTER 7. CRUMBLING FOUNDATIONS
1. BA/MA, MSg2/2697, diary of Lieutenant Julius Dufner, fo. 151, 7.4.45.
2. On all fronts, the Germans could muster in early 1945 almost 320 weakened divisions, including those tied up in peripheral areas such as Norway and the Courland. East and west, their enemies faced them with around 630 full-strength divisions, nearly 500 of them on the eastern front alone.— http://www.angelfire.com/ct/ww2europe/stats.html.
3. The film was awarded a number of prizes. It appears, however, to have run for only a few days in Berlin, and to have been shown mainly for Party members and for the Wehrmacht. See David Welch, Propaganda and the German Cinema 1933–1945, Oxford, 1983, p. 234. Hitler, according to Goebbels, was delighted at the impact of the film, which was said to have made a huge impression on the General Staff.—TBJG, II/15, p. 370 (12.2.45).
4. BAB, NS6/134, fo. 14, Kurzlage des Ob.d.M., 17.3.45. Himmler requested, though with little effect, assistance from Karl Kaufmann, Gauleiter of Hamburg and Reich Commissar for Shipping, on 8 March in providing ships to transport refugees from Danzig.—BAB, NS19/2606, fos. 60–61, Himmler’s request—passing on one to him from Gauleiter Albert Forster—and reply from Kaufmann, 8.3.45.
5. Goebbels wanted to block mention of the evacuation in the Wehrmacht report. ‘On account of the strong psychological effects of the Kolberg film, we can do without that at present,’ he noted.— TBJG, II/15, p. 542 (20.3.45).
6. BA/MA, N647/13, NL Balck, Kriegstagebuch, Bd. 12, fo. 13.
7. The above course of military events draws upon: DZW, 6, pp. 517–61; DRZW, 10/1(Zimmermann), pp. 409–43, (Lakowski), pp. 550–608; DRZW, 8 (Ungvary), pp. 919–43; Lothar Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, pb. edn., Munich, 1975, pp. 418–35; Heinz Guderian, Panzer Leader, Da Capo edn., New York, 1996, pp. 411–29; Brian Taylor, Barbarossa to Berlin: A Chronology of the Campaigns on the Eastern Front 1941 to 1945, vol. 2, Stroud, 2008, pp. 280–306; John Erickson, The Road to Berlin, Cassell edn., London, 2003, pp. 443–7, 508–26; Klaus-Dietmar Henke, Die amerikanische Besetzung Deutschlands, Munich, 1995, pp. 343–64, 377–90; Gerhard L. Weinberg, A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II, Cambridge, 1994, pp. 798–802, 810–14; Antony Beevor, Berlin: The Downfall 1945, pb. edn., London, 2007, ch. 8; Max Hastings, Armageddon: The Battle for Germany 1944–45, London, 2004, ch. 12.
8. Kurt Patzold and Manfred Wei?becker, Geschichte der NSDAP 1920–1945, Cologne, 1981, p. 378.
9. BAB, NS6/137, fo. 6, Vermerk from Willi Ruder, head of the Arbeitsstab fur NS-Fuhrungsfragen in the Party Chancellery, 5.3.45; fo. 29, draft circular for distribution to the Gauleiter, 5.3.45.
10. The V1 cruise-missile and V2 rocket had long since failed to live up to expectations. Shortages of fuel and pilots greatly restricted the deployment of the Me262 fighter, jet-propelled and with higher speeds than anything the Allies could match. Only 200 or so were used, with heavy losses, and prototype new rockets and planes were barely in production by the time hostilities ceased.—DRZW, 10/1(Boog), pp. 828–9. Only a handful of the fleet of new, technologically advanced U-boats, which Donitz persuaded Hitler would prove so crucial, were available by the end of the war.—Howard D. Grier, Hitler, Donitz and the Baltic Sea: The Third Reich’s Last Hope, 1944–1945, Annapolis, Md., 2007, pp. xviii–xix, 170–79.
11. BAB, NS6/137, fos. 19–21, draft of propaganda directives for the Wehrmacht, 9.3.45.
12. BAB, NS6/136, fos. 1, 16–19, Parteirednereinsatz, 6.3.45,13.3.45, 24.3.45.
13. BAB, NS6/137, fos. 9–14, Vorlage, probably for Pg. Gerhard Klopfer, from SS-Obersturmbannfuhrer Dr Beyer, of SD office III/V, with attached partial copy of the sketch of a lecture by SS-Obersturmbannfuhrer von Kilpinski and covering letter of 19.3.45 from Ernst Kaltenbrunner, head of the SD, 20.3.45.
