faschistischen Wehrmacht, pp. 343–4; DRZW, 10/1 (Lakowski), p. 655.
81. Die Niederlage 1945, p. 429 (5.5.45); BA/MA, RM7/854, fo. 24, for the earlier confirmation order of 3.5.45 to scuttle ships. A directive had already been issued on 30 April that ‘in the event of an unforeseen development of the situation’ on the codeword ‘Rainbow’, all ships, including U-boats, were immediately to be sunk. The demand to hand over all weapons, including U-boats, was seen by Keitel and Jodl as incompatible with German honour. Donitz accepted the demand only with extreme reluctance. Some 185 U-boats were, in fact, scuttled by their commanders with the Donitz administration turning a blind eye, before the order to hand them over could take effect.—KTB/SKL, part A, vol. 68, p. 421A, Funkspruche der Skl., 3.5.45; Lutz Graf Schwerin von Krosigk, ‘Personliche Erinnerungen’, part 2: ‘25 Jahre Berlin 1920 bis 1945’, unpublished typescript, n.d., p. 324; DRZW, 10/1 (Rahn), pp. 166–7.
82. DZW, 6, p. 742. This figure includes SS and OT members. Howard D. Grier, Hitler, Donitz and the Baltic Sea: The Third Reich’s Last Hope, 1944–1945, Annapolis, Md., 2007, p. 218, has a Wehrmacht strength of 350,000 troops.
83. Die Niederlage 1945, pp. 423 (3.5.45), 426–7 (4.5.45), 430 (5.5.45); DRZW, 10/1 (Zimmermann), pp. 472–4; DZW, 6, pp. 773–4; Albert Speer, Erinnerungen, Frankfurt am Main and Berlin, 1969, pp. 496–7; Schwendemann, pp. 18–19.
84. BA/MA, RM7/854, fo. 117, Chef OKW, 6.5.45.
85. Die Niederlage 1945, p. 425 (3.5.45).
86. Die Niederlage 1945, p. 432 (6.5.45); DRZW, 10/1 (Zimmermann), pp. 474–5; DZW, 6, p. 758; Muller and Ueberschar, pp. 102–3; Schwendemann, p. 23.
87. BA/MA, RM7/854, fo. 71, Keitel telegraph, 5.5.45.
88. BA/MA, RM7/854, fo. 48, FS Chef SKL, 4.5.45.
89. According to the OKW’s calculations, 1,850,000 soldiers belonged to the army in the east on 7 May 1945.—DRZW, 10/1 (Lakowski), p. 675.
90. DZW, 6, pp. 745, 761, 763; Schwendemann, p. 24, for the figures given above, representing the OKW’s estimates on 8 May. According to DRZW, 10/1 (Lakowski), p. 674, the size of Army Group Centre was estimated at between 600,000 and 650,000 men on 7 May.
91. DZW, 6, p. 740; Muller and Ueberschar, p. 108. On Hela, the commander reported on 3 May that, short of men and weapons, the troops there were facing ‘certain destruction’.—BA/MA, RW44I/33, fo. 26, KR Blitz von General der Panzertruppe, AOK Ostpreu?en an Obkdo. d. WMFStOber (H) Nordost, 3.5.45. There were some 150,000 soldiers and 50,000 refugees on Hela at the time.—Schwendemann, p. 23.
92. BA/MA, RW44I/86, fo. 5, Bev. Gen. Kurland, gez. Moller, Brigadefuhrer, an Donitz, 5.5.45.
93. Die Niederlage 1945, pp. 426–7 (4.5.45).
94. DZW, 6, p. 758; Rendulic?, pp. 378–81; Schwendemann, pp. 25–6.
95. Die Niederlage 1945, p. 429 (5.5.45). Lohr’s request to be allowed to offer Field-Marshal Alexander his cooperation in an attempt to ‘prevent the total Bolshevization of Austria’ is printed in KTB/SKL, part A. vol. 68, p. 439A.
96. Die Niederlage 1945, p. 430 (6.5.45); Schwendemann, p. 20.
97. Die Niederlage 1945, p. 425 (3.5.45).
98. DZW, 6, p. 761; Die Niederlage 1945, pp. 427–8 (4.5.45).
99. Die Niederlage 1945, p. 422 (2.5.45).
100. Die Niederlage 1945, p. 423 (3.5.45).
101. Die Niederlage 1945, p. 431 (6.5.45).
102. DZW, 6, pp. 758–67; Muller and Ueberschar, p. 104.
103. Die Niederlage 1945, pp. 430–31 (6.5.45).
104. Die Niederlage 1945, pp. 432–3 (7.5.45). Eisenhower had given Jodl half an hour to reach a decision, but communications difficulties with Flensburg delayed the arrival of his message and receipt of Donitz’s approval.—DZW, 6, p. 774. See also Bodo Scheurig, Alfred Jodl: Gehorsam und Verhangnis, Berlin and Frankfurt am Main, 1991, pp. 331–3.
105. Reproduced in facsimile in Muller and Ueberschar, pp. 178–9. Britain had introduced ‘double summer time’ during the Second World War. This placed Britain one hour ahead of Central European Time.
106. Muller and Ueberschar, pp. 106, 180–81; Schwendemann, p. 30; Baum, p. 261. For a description of the scene, see G. Zhukov, Reminiscences and Reflections, vol. 2, Moscow, 1985, pp. 399– 400; also Antony Beevor, Berlin: The Downfall 1945, pb. edn., London, 2007, pp. 403– 5.
107. Speer, pp. 498–9.
108. IWM, EDS, F.3, M.I. 14/284 (A), report on a discussion between Keitel and General Ivan Aleksandrovich Serov, deputy commissar of the NKVD (the Soviet internal security organization, headed by Lavrenty Beria); printed in KTB/SKL, part A, vol. 68, pp. 469–71A. Authentication of part of a jawbone which the Soviets had found in the garden of the Reich Chancellery as belonging to Hitler was only made a few days later. Stalin and the Soviet authorities continued for years to disbelieve accounts of Hitler’s death.
109. BA/MA, RM7/854, fo. 120, Kriegstagebuch Seekriegsleitung, 7.5.45; KTB/OKW, vol. 4/2, pp. 1482–3 (7.5.45); Schwendemann, p. 25.
110. Schwendemann, p. 26.
111. Klaus Granzow, Tagebuch eines Hitlerjungen 1943–1945, Bremen, 1965, p. 177 (5.5.45).
112. BA/MA, NL Schorner, N60/18, unfoliated, proclamation by Schorner to soldiers of Army Group Centre, 5.5.45.
113. Die Niederlage 1945, p. 431.
114. Schwendemann, p. 25.
115. DZW, 6, p. 767.
116. BA/MA, RW44I/54, unfoliated 4pp. ‘Aufzeichnung uber die Dienstreise des Oberst i.G. Meyer-Detring zu Feldmarschall Schorner am 8.5.45 (p. 3: Unterredung mit Feldmarschall Schorner); Die Niederlage 1945, p. 438, for Meyer-Detring’s report to Donitz.
117. BA/MA, NL Schorner, N60/18, unfoliated, proclamation by Schorner to soldiers of Army Group Centre, 5.5.45; printed in Roland Kaltenegger, Schorner: Feldmarschall der letzten Stunde, Munich and Berlin, 1994, pp. 297–8.
118. In a case that raised great public interest, with much support for Schorner as well as heated criticism of his actions, the former field-marshal was found guilty in October 1957 of condemning to death without a court, then the hanging, of a corporal said to have fallen asleep, drunk, at the wheel of his lorry in March 1945. He was sentenced to four and a half years imprisonment, of which he served two before being released on health grounds. The Federal Republic refused him a pension. He lived a secluded existence in Munich supported by friends and former military comrades, until his death in 1973 at the age of eighty-one.—Peter Steinkamp, ‘Generalfeldmarschall Ferdinand Schorner’, in Gerd R. Ueberschar (ed.), Hitlers militarische Elite, vol. 2: Von Kriegsbeginn bis zum Weltkriegsende, Darmstadt, 1998, pp. 240–42; Klaus Schonherr, ‘Ferdinand Schorner—Der idealtypische Nazi-General’, in Ronald Smelser and Enrico Syring (eds.), Die Militarelite des Dritten Reiches, Berlin, 1995, pp. 506–7. See also, for the controversy around Schorner’s trial, Kaltenegger, Schorner, pp. 330–54.
119. DZW, 6, p. 767; DRZW, 10/1 (Lakowski), p. 673; Schwendemann, p. 31; Sebastian Siebel-Achenbach, Lower Silesia from Nazi Germany to Communist Poland, 1942–49, London, 1994, pp. 77–8.
120. BA/MA, NL Schorner, N60/74, ‘Mein Verhalten bei der Kapitulation im Mai 1945’ and ‘Zur Vorgeschichte der Kapitulation’, both 10.3.58.
121. Steinkamp, p. 238. Kaltenegger, Schorner, pp. 306–7, 315, supports Schorner’s own account. See also Roland Kaltenegger, Operation ‘Alpenfestung’: Das letzte Geheimnis
