The End

post-war claims and his private reflections at the time, Bosch, in ‘getting on with his own work’ so effectively in the interests of the war effort, had helped to keep things going even in such desperate straits.

The impact of the transport crisis on iron and steel production in the escalating crisis of the autumn was extremely grave. Supplies from Belgium and France had dried up during the summer, but German production remained almost at full capacity until September before entering upon a steep decline from October onwards, and was down by half in December from 2 to 1 million tons in the month.²⁴ Hermann Rochling, head of the Reich Iron Federation and a member of the Technical Department in Speer’s ministry, pointed out the huge drop, about 350,000 metric tons a month, in raw steel when Lorraine and Luxemburg fell out of production, then the big fall of around 50 per cent in production from the Saar and the Ruhr district, partly on account of disruption of the railways through bombing.²⁵ In the Ruhr, Germany’s biggest industrial heartland, steel production had been sustained at relatively stable levels, despite increased difficulties, during the first nine months of 1944, according to Dr Walther Rohland, head of the main committee for the iron-producing industry in the Speer Ministry and Deputy Chief of the Reich Iron Federation. Reserves were, however, almost used up by September. Then, from October, a drastic deterioration set in as the transport crisis deepened.²⁶

According to Gunther Schulze-Fielitz, head of the Energy Department, the total capacity of Germany’s power stations had expanded during each year of the war. Electricity supplies held up well until November but then declined sharply as coal deliveries became seriously impaired. By November, coal stocks at power stations were down by 30 per cent compared with the previous year. Many had sufficient coal for only a week.²⁷ As most of the reports acknowledged, the impact of the incessant air raids on transport installations was uppermost in the production problems by late 1944. By the end of the autumn the difficulties were becoming impossible to surmount.

Without the constant improvisation in all production areas by Speer’s capable subordinates, the decline would undoubtedly have set in earlier and been more steep. Richard Fiebig, head of the main committee for railway vehicles, pointed out, for instance, that through efficiencies his department ‘not only succeeded in balancing the losses of workshops through bombing and loss of territory, but we actually increased the output’. From September, 1,100 to 1,200 locomotives per month were being lost to enemy raids, but 6,800 were being repaired each month during the autumn, in spite of decreasing repair capacity.²⁸ Extraordinarily rapid, though inevitably piecemeal, repairs were also made in towns and cities, in factories and workshops, after bombing raids, thanks in no small part to the surplus of manpower through inactive production that the raids themselves had made available. From autumn onwards, between 1 and 1.5 million people were at any one time engaged on work resulting from air- raid damage.²⁹

Perhaps most remarkably, according to Saur, owing to long gestation periods in production the total output of weapons increased continuously throughout 1944, reaching its absolute peak for practically all weapon types in December 1944.³⁰ Saur was prone to excessive optimism (and invariably ready to convey this to Hitler). He went so far as to claim, as ‘one of the best informed men in Germany as to the war situation’, that, on a purely statistical basis, Germany’s situation on the eve of the Ardennes offensive ‘looked good’. He pointed out that Germany’s total number of soldiers under arms was greater than ever before, as was production of guns, tanks and U-boats in that month and the quantity of weapons and ammunition in the hands of the fighting troops. Of course, as he acknowledged, when it came to the quality of the troops, which had certainly fallen as increasingly the young, ill-trained or battle-weary were conscripted, it was a different matter. Saur’s final point, emphasizing the great numerical strength of the Volkssturm, whose fighting capabilities were widely derided within both the Wehrmacht and in the civilian population, is sufficient indication of the spurious grounds for his apparently optimistic outlook. Nevertheless, it is striking that, far from being resigned to inevitable defeat, Saur still felt that at the outset of the Ardennes offensive ‘Germany held many good cards’.³¹

Speer certainly did all he could during the deepening transport and production crisis that autumn to sustain the faltering German war economy. His efforts included a visit to the Ruhr and three to the western front to inspect the extent of the crisis and assess what improvised measures could be taken to improve the dire situation. Each time he reported directly to Hitler, enabling him to put specific proposals in his briefings in the full expectation of gaining Hitler’s approval.³²

On 11 November he informed Hitler of the increasingly serious situation in the Ruhr district, subjected to systematic intense bombing that autumn.³³ Transport was the overriding concern. Speer appointed a plenipotentiary, the head of the Reichsbahn administration, Dr Karl Lammerz, with powers to coordinate transport throughout the region without waiting for directions from Berlin, and also organized emergency measures to keep supplies moving (including food for the civilian population) and set industry to work again. These involved deploying 50,000 foreign workers supplied by Bormann by removing them from digging fortifications, another 30,000 taken from the armaments industry—a sign of the desperation—and 4,500 skilled electricians, pipe-layers and welders brought in from other parts of the Reich. The Gauleiter were ordered by Bormann to draft the local population of their areas, if necessary, to help in the removal of damage. Some 10 per cent of mineworkers were envisaged for this work, even at the cost of temporarily reducing output from the pits—another extraordinary reflection of how bad the situation was. Other emergency measures were put in place to clear the waterways. The local population was to be mobilized, as in times of flood emergencies, to help in repairing the damage. Despite all this, Speer pointed out, it was not possible in the short term to prevent a drastic drop in production. The severity of the damage meant that stockpiles of coal sufficed for no more than ten days and would be exhausted by the end of November if no great improvement could be made. Rail transport, gas and electricity supplies were seriously threatened. He was, therefore, instigating an emergency programme (including strict allocation of railway wagons and priority for coal transportation) that would guarantee at least partial armaments production and sustain current levels of arms deliveries in the short term.³⁴

Between 15 and 23 November Speer visited several units of Army Group B, the Krupp works at Essen and several other major concerns in the Ruhr. He made a number of recommendations to overcome the damage to waterways, shipping and bridges, and improve anti-aircraft defences. He urged the accelerated expansion of aerodromes to take the Messerschmitt 262 jet-fighter and other modern planes, and more efficient use of the labour force. He was critical about the sluggishness in providing the necessary labour from other parts of the Reich, especially when 128,000 men from the Ruhr, among them skilled workers, had been conscripted for fortification work outside the area when they were so badly needed to restore the damaged Ruhr industrial heartland. He wanted alterations in steel allocation, with priority to be removed from U-boats and shifted to restoration of transport and reconstruction of Ruhr industrial works. Otherwise, he could propose only minor improvements. Lack of transport meant people were having to walk long distances to work each day over damaged roads. There was a shortage of shoes, which Speer requested be provided from elsewhere in the Reich. Because of damage to power stations and electricity cables, many people were without lighting. He recommended a ‘special action’ to provide candles and other means of lighting, including pit-lamps. Factories could not contact each other since the telephone system was not fully working, and the Reich postal service did not have the manpower to restore the system. He advocated a communications regiment from the army to be sent to restore and maintain a communications system for industry. Overall, the tenor of his report was that, despite the huge damage, there were still unused capacities of labour and resources if systematically deployed to overcome the worst.³⁵

Hitler accepted Speer’s recommendations at their meeting at the end of November. He agreed, for example, that the Reich should provide a labour force of between 100,000 and 150,000 to assist the Ruhr, and that all workers from the area conscripted for digging elsewhere should be returned. He also ordered an improvement in shoe provision for the Ruhr.³⁶

In the build-up to the Ardennes offensive, Speer paid another, shorter, visit to the western front between 7 and 10 December, visiting mainly units of Army Groups B and G to hear their experiences and suggestions on the armaments situation. Major improvements were no longer possible. The armaments industry was by now scraping the barrel. (This had not prevented Speer, however, just before leaving for the western front, impressing a selected audience with an array of improved weapons in preparation.³⁷) He was reduced to recommending incentives—additional army stores goods or leave—for troop units with especially low losses of weaponry. He also encouraged intensified propaganda efforts by the NSFOs to explain how well the armaments industry was performing despite all difficulties, and to combat rumours on shortages of tanks and fuel that were damaging troop morale. He pointed out to Hitler that Saar coal and gas were keeping the whole of south-west German industry going. The severe consequences if the Saar fell to the enemy were obvious.³⁸