The End

standing and fanatical member of the Nazi Party, summoned a group of armed Hitler Youth members, plied them with alcohol and sent them, along with three SS men, who were to explain the task ahead, down to the disused mine. The boys were left to guard around forty to fifty Jewish women and girls who had earlier tried to escape, until they were taken out, in the dim light of a mine-lamp, to be shot by a group of SS men, two by two. The Soviets were thought by this time to be very close. The SS men were anxious to ‘get rid of the Jews no matter how’. They decided to solve their problem by shooting the rest of their captives.

The following evening, 31 January, the improvised massacre took full shape. Shielded from the village by a small wood, the SS men, their flares lighting up the night sky, drove the Jews onto the ice and into the frozen water using the butts of their rifles and mowed them down on the seashore with machine guns. Corpses were washed up along the Samland coast for days to come. One woman was so shaken at what she saw, she later recalled, ‘that I covered my eyes with my hands…. We then quickly went on walking because we could not stand the sight.’ The SS had not been altogether efficient in their massacre; some Jews survived and managed to clamber back up the beach. The survivors met varied reactions. One German refused to help three of them, saying ‘that he did not intend to feed Jewish women’. Another, however, hid them, gave them food, and protected them till the arrival of the Red Army. Doctors and nurses in the local hospital treated some wounded survivors. Two Polish labourers also gave them help. About 200 out of the original 7,000 survived.⁵³

IV

People in other parts of Germany were not prepared for the dreadful news from the east that soon started to spread like wildfire, or for the tales of horror from those who had managed to escape the mayhem. The success of the Wehrmacht in repelling the Soviet incursion into East Prussia the previous October and reassurances about German defences in the east meant that there was no psychological readiness for the scale of the disaster that gradually became clear in the second half of January.

The first brief mention of the start of the Soviet offensive in the Volkischer Beobachter, reproducing the Wehrmacht report, suggested that the attack had been expected and that German defences had been successful.⁵⁴ Within a few days, however, newspapers started to adopt a more anxious tone.⁵⁵ The public swiftly caught the note of alarm that crept in about the speed of the Soviet advance, all the more when reports of the evacuation of the civilian population could not conceal the scale of the danger, and were more than amplified by the tales of their experiences carried by the stricken refugees as they poured west. Propaganda offices throughout Germany reported that ‘the improved mood of the past weeks caused by our western offensive and the Fuhrer’s speech has disappeared in the wake of the Soviet major offensive. People are now looking to the east with the utmost concern and paying little attention to all other fronts and to political events.’ ‘The slump in mood’, the summary report continued, ‘was intensified by the disappointment that no one in any Gau, not even in the east, had reckoned with such speedy and big successes of the Soviets.’ Widespread expectation of the offensive had been accompanied by much apprehension, but also a belief that the German leadership was well prepared and would regain the upper hand in the east. There was astonishment, then, that the Red Army had gained so much territory so quickly, and that German defences, presumed to be solid, has been so easily overrun.

The shock waves rippled through Germany. A severely depressed mood was accompanied by deep worry about the future. Discussion was dominated by the events on the eastern front and there was much criticism of the media, which had given the impression that all preparations had been made to counter the awaited attack. The German leadership were reproached for underestimating Soviet strength and morale, criticism underscored by the massive advances that the Red Army continued to make despite the reported destruction of huge numbers of Soviet tanks. Notable shock was caused by the advance into the Upper Silesian industrial belt, raising fears about sustaining German armaments potential. Worries about the fate of the civilian population in the threatened regions were only mentioned in last place.

Modifying such a downbeat set of reports came the inevitable emphasis on the resilience of the population —a reflection, without doubt, of opinion mainly registered in the more Nazified sectors of the population. Despite the slump in mood, the propaganda offices declared that there was no apathy or slackening of work effort. Instead, it was claimed, there was a determination to do everything possible to fight ‘unconditionally’ in the ‘hour of decision’ and to comb out ‘anyone who can bear weapons’ to send to the front in the hope of repelling ‘the danger of Bolshevism’. Comments that such efforts were too late and pointless were rare. The holding—by and large—of the Reich borders in the west gave grounds for hope that a transformation could at some point be brought about in the east. The purpose of the German western offensive—to prevent a double attack by the enemy, east and west—had, it was said, become clearer. No one was prepared to accept that all the sacrifice, suffering and misery had been in vain. There was complete understanding, therefore, for whatever restrictions were needed in the interest of the war effort and for the ‘toughest resistance’ and defence at any price.⁵⁶

Though hardly mirroring accurately a cross-section of attitudes, such reported views do indicate the unyielding stance of a still sizeable proportion—how large is impossible to say, though if it was a minority, it was a powerful one—unprepared to admit defeat and ready to do anything to combat the threat from the east. Even as the sense that the war was irredeemably lost became increasingly commonplace, anxiety about what defeat would bring intensified a desperate refusal to give in. ‘The conviction that a victory of the Soviets would mean the extinction of life of the German people and of every individual is the general feeling of all people’ was said to have bolstered the readiness to fight on and radicalized intolerance towards those seen to be shirking their duty.⁵⁷

The lengthy summary report from the propaganda offices contained no mention of atrocities perpetrated by Red Army soldiers, or the horrors of the treks. But accounts of the refugees flooding westwards soon seeped through to the rest of the population. Immediately after the beginning of the Soviet offensive, propagandists had been warned to counter views that the Bolsheviks were not as bad as they had been painted (arising from known instances of humane treatment of German prisoners of war) by emphasizing atrocities—including reports from Memel refugees of Soviet soldiers on the hunt for German women and of mothers raped in front of their own children.⁵⁸ Goebbels, though aware of the ‘indescribable’ misery of those enduring the treks, was nevertheless initially hesitant about publishing reports on Bolshevik atrocities because of the panic they would cause.⁵⁹ There was quite justified panic, nevertheless, and the horror stories of the refugees were told wherever they went. ‘The refugees arriving here from the eastern Gaue’, ran one report from distant regions of Bavaria, ‘are bringing for the most part quite shattering news of the misery of the fleeing population which, partly in panic, has sought refuge from the Bolsheviks within the Reich.’⁶⁰ Instead of keeping silent on the atrocities, German propaganda turned, therefore, to using them as a weapon to sustain the fight. ‘How the Soviets Rampage in East Germany. Eyewitnesses Report on the Gruesome Extermination Methods of the Bolsheviks’, proclaimed the headline in the Volkischer Beobachter on 9 February and, in variants, repeatedly in subsequent weeks.⁶¹

Letters still trickling west from the afflicted areas in the early phase of the Soviet offensive also painted a graphic picture of the appalling conditions in the east and the great anxiety about the future. One letter, from Josef E. from the Glogau district on the Oder, describing the state of refugees fleeing from the Warthegau and the dread of having to leave all that was precious behind, remarked that everything had turned out so different from the hopes of the future once fostered. How long would it be, he asked, before ‘the whole of East Prussia—Posen—Silesia is deluged with the eastern hordes’? Then it was only a short way to Berlin. ‘If the tempo of the Russians can’t be stopped, and that doesn’t look likely, then anyone can work out how long the war can last. I’m hoping for an end with horror rather than horror without end,’ he concluded, repeating a phrase commonly heard at this time.⁶²

People beyond the afflicted zones had their own pressing anxieties, however, and, despite widespread dismay at the Soviet breakthrough, the loss of the eastern territories and the prospect of a lost war, could often spare little concern for the plight of the refugees. Those with fathers, sons, husbands and friends caught up in the bitter fighting during the Soviet onslaught were understandably beset with worry about the fate of their loved ones at the front. ‘Dear boy, I’ve just heard the Wehrmacht report and learnt that you are again engaged in fighting,’ wrote one mother to her son, cut off in Courland. She had heard nothing from him in over a month and feared the