Strong Men Armed

They were protected by squads of riflemen and machine-gunners firing through the slits of natural crevices. All of these strong-points were covered by interlocking fire. For the Americans to attack one of them would be to bring down the fire of two or three others on them, to say nothing of those which would remain silent until the Americans advanced under the delusion that they had knocked out the entire system. Then, as Hercules had found with Hydra, they would find the beheaded stump sprouting two fresh heads to bite at them.

The Umurbrogal was the Pacific’s masterpiece of defensive engineering, and it was going to be manned by a new Japanese warrior. For Lieutenant General Inoue’s training plan instructions had also killed the banzai. Inoue had agreed that “We are ready to die honorably,” but he had also gone on to suggest, in that imprecise language which was as great a military drawback as the banzai itself, that mere dying was not enough. It had to have that exotic Western thing: purpose. Otherwise: “We must preserve personnel and ordnance.” Nor was “spiritual power” any longer vaunted over material power.

“It is certain that if we repay the Americans (who rely solely upon material power) with material power it will shock them beyond imagination….”

Unlike the crimson imagery with which commanders such as Haruyoshi Hyakutate urged the Japanese soldier to eat three of the American devils with each morning’s bowl of rice, this remark had the quality of reality. A bursting shell, as Saipan had shown, did have more effect than a banzai scream. Clearly, General Inoue agreed with Napoleon’s cynical dictum that “God is on the side of the heavy artillery.” In a Japanese paraphrase, he said:

“Heavenly aid on the road to victory falls only to those commanders who have a thorough control of command….”

Nor did Inoue fear naval gunfire. He told his men:

“Without concerning ourselves with the great explosive bursts or the strong local effect of naval firing, the destructive power wrought upon personnel is not very great…. Aerial bombardment is almost identical…. By observing very carefully the activity of enemy planes and the bombs while they are falling, avoiding thereby instantaneous explosions, and by taking advantage of gaps in bombardment in order to advance, it can cause no great damage.”

In proof, Inoue ordered his men to practice crawling through the bombs dropped during the light American raids of the spring and summer. But he ordered them to the antiaircraft guns when Admiral Halsey’s warbirds struck at the Palaus from Task Force 59 carrier decks on September 6 through September 8. When the bombardment force of battleships and cruisers showed up under Rear Admiral Jesse Oldendorf in the pale moonlight of early morning, September 12, all Palau troops got under cover.

At Peleliu, Colonel Nakagawa left about a battalion south of the airfield, perhaps another battalion along the western beaches, while withdrawing the rest of his men and tanks into the Umurbrogal.

Up at Babelthuap, General Inoue prepared to receive the main American attack.

It was his only mistake.

16

The American plan in the waning summer of 1944 was to commence the invasion of the Philippines by stages.

The first stage was to open the gates: Morotai on New Guinea in the west, Peleliu-Angaur in the Palaus on the west. This would be followed by invasion of Yap on October 5, and after that, the seizure of Ulithi.

Then, in mid-November, General MacArthur would land on Mindanao in the Southern Philippines. Victory here would lead to December invasion of Leyte in the Central Philippines.

By March of 1945 the American forces in the Pacific would combine to secure either Luzon in the Northern Philippines, or to capture Formosa and ports on the China Coast. On either of these land masses the necessary large bodies of troops could be staged for the final assault on Japan.

Then the tides of war began shifting and the plan changed.

The Japanese in China launched their inevitable attacks on American air bases there and the Fourteenth Air Force had to retire from its forward fields. Soon the Japanese would make the China coast difficult to invade. For these reasons, and because no more American troops could be spared from Europe, the Formosa-China route to Japan was about to be canceled out.

And then, on September 13, Admiral Bull Halsey made his electrifying discovery that Japanese air power in the Philippines was on its last leg. On September 12, the carriers of Task Force 58 stood within sight of the mountains of Samar in the Central Philippines. They flew off 2,400 sorties. They destroyed 200 enemy planes. They sank ships. They bombed installations. They roved with such impunity that Halsey suggested to Admiral Nimitz, and thence to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that all the Palau, Yap, Morotai and Mindanao landings be called off in favor of an immediate bold thrust into Leyte in the Central Philippines.

But General MacArthur was already headed for Morotai aboard the cruiser Nashville—and the ship was maintaining radio silence. Two days of messages shooting back and forth among Nimitz in Hawaii, the Combined Joint Chiefs of Staff attending the Octagon Conference in Quebec, and Lieutenant General R. K. Sutherland speaking for MacArthur in New Guinea produced these changes:

Instead of landing on Mindanao in November and then on Leyte in December, MacArthur would go directly to Leyte in October.

The Yap landing would be called off, and the Twenty-fourth Corps would be used at Leyte instead.

The Morotai landing by the 31st Infantry Division would go forward as planned, as would the landings on Angaur, Ulithi and Peleliu. The last three, considered necessary to obtain the air bases and anchorage which Admiral Nimitz wanted to support the Philippine landings, were to be made by troops of the Third Corps under Major General Geiger; the 81st Infantry (Wildcat) Division to hit Angaur and after that Ulithi, the First Marine Division to take Peleliu.

Peleliu, it had been known for months, was going to be a tough nut. The Marines had asked for heavy preinvasion bombardment there. And yet, off Peleliu on September 14, Admiral Oldendorf got off this message from his bombardment force:

“We have run out of targets!”

That same day, correspondents and unit commanders aboard the transports broke open sealed envelopes given them by Major General Rupertus, still commanding the First Marine Division. They read that Peleliu would be tough, like Tarawa, but also just as short.

It would take, said General Rupertus, something like four days.

17

On the morning of September 15 the First Marine Division struck at Peleliu’s western beaches three regiments abreast.

On the left or north was the First Marines, using the code word Spitfire; in the center opposite the airfield was the Fifth or Lonewolf; on the right moving against the southern tip was the Seventh or Mustang.

The Marines were almost gay going in, for General Rupertus’ prediction of four days had made them cocky, but once their amtracks had bumped over the fringing reef, once Colonel Nakagawa’s thousand-eyed mountain stuffed with men and guns had begun to flash, they stopped calling to one another, stopped throwing kisses, stopped wagging four confident fingers. They ducked beneath the gunwales and began to pray.

“Playmate, this is Spider. The First Waves are on the beach. Repeat: The first waves are on the beach. Over.”

“Spider, this is Playmate. What resistance do they seem. to be meeting?