Heinrich Himmler

touched on the elimination of Hitler only in passing, that Himmler had been quite serious, had asked factual questions, but had not tried to find out any names’. But Himmler could do nothing now but protect himself and Schellenberg, whom Kaltenbrunner and Mueller were now only too ready to denounce as a British agent. Langbehn was arrested, along with his wife and Puppi Sarre.

Himmler, however, won a victory elsewhere. This was the final collapse early in 1944 of Canaris’s department for military Intelligence in foreign countries, the Abwehr. It came as a direct result of the arrest of another anti-Nazi group centred round the widow of Dr Wilhelm Solf, a former German ambassador in Japan and a man of liberal, as distinct from right-wing, outlook. Solf, who hated the Nazis and did not fear to say so, had died in 1936 and his wife, Frau Hanna Solf, and her daughter, the Countess Ballestrem, maintained this independent outlook and were active helpers of those persecuted by the regime. They formed an intellectual circle of distinguished people, but on 10 September a Gestapo spy called Dr Reckse, who they believed to be a Swiss medical student prepared to take messages to Switzerland, was introduced at a tea-party given by Frau Solf for members of this group. Three months were allowed to elapse before the mass arrest of over seventy anti-Nazis belonging to the liberal wing of the resistance, including Otto Kiep, formerly of the German Foreign Office, and Helmuth von Moltke, who belonged to the legal section of the Abwehr. Attempts were also made to inveigle two other Abwehr agents, Erich and Elizabeth Vermehren, who were close friends of Kiep in Berlin, to return from their base in Istanbul for interrogation. Knowing of Otto Kiep’s arrest, they sought asylum with the British, and were flown to Cairo.²⁶

Hitler was now strongly advised by Himmler to dispense with the Abwehr, since it seemed so persistently to be staffed by intellectuals who were opposed to the regime. On 18 February 1944 Hitler broke up the organization and announced that the German Intelligence Service was to be unified. Later in the year the various sections of the Abwehr came finally under the authority of the Gestapo and the S.D., and in May Himmler gave one of his standardized speeches at Salzburg to the principals of Canaris’s former department. He derided the very term Abwehr as defensive, whereas a truly German Intelligence service, he said, should obviously be aggressive. The inspiration of the Fuhrer made defeatism impossible; Himmler even went so far as to welcome the idea of invasion because it would enable Hitler’s armies to drown the invaders ‘in the seas of their own blood’. D-Day came two weeks later.

Canaris was not immediately disgraced by the collapse of the Abwehr. He was transferred and made chief of the Office for Commercial and Economic Warfare, a suitably remote position for a man who was too involved in well-meaning personal intrigue to be an efficient master either of spies for the Nazis or agents for the resistance. The Abwehr had been a failure, staffed by amateurs and used as a convenient cover by a number of members of the resistance, such as the Pastors Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Bethge, Hans Bernd Gisevius, Otto John and Josef Muller. ‘His subordinates were able to twist him round their little finger’, wrote Schellenberg of Canaris, whose company he always enjoyed in spite of their dubious official relationship. A vast dossier against Canaris had been built up over the years against the time when Himmler should decide on the destruction of this man he professed to admire. The long delay in taking action led Schellenberg, the expert in suspicion, to sense that Canaris had some secret hold over Himmler. He was allowed to continue unassailed until after the attempt on Hitler’s life in July, when Schellenberg was sent to arrest him.

Langbehn remained imprisoned without trial until after the attempt on Hitler’s life the following year; he was the subject of speculation alike by the Nazis and the members of the resistance. Popitz’s attempt to enquire after his fate from Himmler met with no success, and Popitz himself was regarded with suspicion by many members of the resistance who knew in any case that he was dangerous because he was being closely watched. Interrogation recurred month after month, duly noted by Hassell, but it was in Himmler’s interest to keep the enquiries as obscure as possible. At least at this stage Langbehn was not tortured, and this could only have been the result of orders from Himmler.

Early in November 1943, Himmler had a long conversation with Goebbels in which they agreed that Ribbentrop’s inflexible foreign policy was deplorable, and they joined in the usual diatribe against the High Command. Then Himmler began to whitewash his own position with regard to the resistance; he told Goebbels all about the existence of a group of enemies of the State, among whom were Halder and possibly also Popitz. This circle, he said, would like to contact England, by-passing the Fuhrer. Himmler must have aquitted himself well: ‘Himmler will see to it that these gentlemen do no major damage with their cowardly defeatism’, wrote Goebbels. ‘I certainly have the impression that the domestic security of the country is in good hands with Himmler.’

VI. The Miraculous Hands

The curious relationship between Kersten and Himmler lasted for six years and became the single most powerful influence in Himmler’s life after the death of Heydrich. Even the strongest man placed in a position of unique responsibility normally needs the support of advisers, though he may turn these men into shadows of his own personality, expecting from them confirmation of every opinion he happens to hold. Some men in positions of supreme authority need someone whom they respect to stay close to them and fulfil their need for a confessor who can help them purge their consciences when their ruthlessness has led them to take actions of which they are uncertain, if not ashamed.

Kersten, as we have seen, was forced against his will to become Himmler’s confessor as well as his masseur. The relationship which grew up between them was one which neither could have forecast. Kersten has been described by his biographer, Joseph Kessel, as ‘mild-mannered with kind eyes and the sensual mouth of one who loves the good things of life’. In his gentleness lay his great strength: to patients seized by pain, much of which was neurotic in its origin, he seemed like an angel sent to bring them swift relief. Their gratitude was profound, and was increased by the speed with which his treatments had their effect. His patients all idolized Kersten, making of him a kind of saint on whom they showered their gifts and bestowed their praises.

A patient suddenly relieved of pain often turns to the man who has cured him with an urge to ease his mind. The mood of relaxation that follows treatment acts as a solvent to confession. Kersten, mild-mannered though he was, appeared to Himmler as a saviour, an indispensable, reassuring worker of miracles on whom he relied and whom eventually, in his own peculiar way, he loved. It was Kersten, in fact, who enabled Himmler to carry the unnatural burden which eventually proved to be far beyond his limited strength of character.

Kersten has described the situation very clearly himself:

‘Anybody today who holds some very responsible position — political, administrative, industrial or in any other sphere of public life — is constantly obliged to impose on himself physical and psychic stresses which are not only unaccustomed, but may even be described as unnatural. The result is to be seen in the frightening increase of illnesses in these classes due to the wear and tear of civilization: today the term “occupational disease” has been coined… A practice extending over many years has convinced me that men who are obliged to make such inroads on their physical and psychic powers can nevertheless be maintained in health and happiness through a regular course of my physioneural therapy, so that they can be equal to the heavy tasks constantly imposed upon them. It was always my sincerest wish to be at hand, unremitting in helping and relieving pain.’¹

Although Kersten used his growing influence over Himmler to save thousands of lives, his attendance on the head of the S.S. and the Gestapo during the worst years of his criminal career made him a controversial figure both during and after the war. Kersten began his treatments of Himmler unwillingly; he was, like everyone else, alarmed even at the thought of meeting him. But the needs of Himmler as a patient soon overcame Kersten’s initial antipathy, and almost immediately he sensed Himmler’s need for a confidant. The moment he was relieved of pain, Himmler began to unburden his mind. He wanted someone to whom he could talk. Who better than this Finn from Holland who looked at him with a calm and confident smile and seemed like some wise man — a ‘magic Buddha’, as Himmler once called him. The Reichsfuhrer was deeply shamed of his illness, and the fact that only a few of his intimate staff knew of his suffering placed Kersten at once in a privileged position.

Kersten kept notes of everything that passed between Himmler and himself, as well as of the conversations he had had with other leaders of the S.S. His principal allies were Brandt, Hitler’s secretary, and later Walter Schellenberg. In Kersten’s memoirs we come nearest to understanding Himmler as a man and evaluating the