Dark Eagles: A History of the Top Secret U.S. Aircraft

636

Wilcox, Scream of Eagles, 100.

637

Spick, Jet Fighter Performance, 149.

638

Wilcox, Scream of Eagles, 102-9; and Spick, Jet Fighter Performance, 149.

639

Wilcox, Scream of Eagles, 75. The 'Doughnut' refers to the round gunsight used by fighters.

640

Spick, Jet Fighter Performance, 150. Several sources have claimed that the MiG 21F has a center of gravity problem. As the fuel burned off, it Notes 327 was claimed, the center of gravity would move aft. With over 25 percent of the fuel still remaining, the safety limit would be exceeded. The plane would then pitch up, which the horizontal stabilizers could not counter. It is now clear that this is not correct.

641

Wilcox, Scream of Eagles, 76, 77. The use of captured enemy aircraft did not start with Have Doughnut and Have Drill. During World War II, the flight line at Wright Field was home to Zeros, ME 109s, FW 190s, and Ju 88s. The British had a special unit to test-fly captured German planes, while the Germans had examples of nearly every Allied fighter and bomber. The German's 'Rosarious Flying Circus' took the captured planes to operational units for dogfight training. As with Have Drill, selected German pilots were allowed to fly the P-47s and P-51s. The Japanese had examples of U.S. aircraft, including an early model B-17, a P-40, a P-51, and an F4U Corsair. The Soviet air force actually used captured German planes in combat. During the Korean War, the U.S. actively tried to get a Soviet MiG 15 pilot to defect, offering $100,000. On September 23, 1953, North Korean air force Capt. Ro Kum Suk flew a MiG 15 to Kimpo Air Base. (He had not heard of the offer, but was given the $100,000.) The MiG 15 was flown in simulated attacks on B-36, B-47, F-86D, and F-84F aircraft. The difference between these earlier wartime examples and the Yak 23, Have Doughnut, Have Drill, and subsequent MiG operations is that the planes were 'acquired' by secret means, in violation of the export agreement between the Soviet Union and client states. If it was done without the knowledge of the client state's government, then the United States would not want this publicized; if it was done with the government's knowledge, then the client state would not want this known. Intelligence arrangements (both official and unofficial) between governments (even with allies such as Israel) have always been considered particularly sensitive.

642

James Feron, 'Iraqi Pilot in MiG 21 Defects to Israel,' New York Times, August 17, 1966, 9.

643

Don Linn and Don Spering, MiG 21 Fishbed in Action (Carrollton, Tex.: Squadron/Signal Publications, 1993), 7; and James Feron, 'Iraqi Pilot in MiG 21 Defects to Israel,' New York Times, August 17, 1966, 9.

644

Ehud Yonay, No Margin for Error (New York: Pantheon, 1993), 220.

645

F. Clifton Berry Jr. and Benjamin F. Schemmer, 'Soviet Jets in USAF Use: The Secret MiG Squadron,' Armed Forces Journal International (September 1977), 26.

646

Yonay, No Margin for Error, 220; and Piotr Butowski with Jay Miller, OKB MiG: A History of the Design Bureau and Its Aircraft, (Stillwater, Minn.: Specialty Press, 1991), 96, 97.

647

James Feron, 'Israel Asked Not to Let West See MiG,' New York Times, August 19, 1966, 6.