U.S. hostages held by the Iranians. The scenes of abandoned helicopters and burned bodies at Desert 1 damaged American confidence in a way even Vietnam did not. Unveiling the revolutionary possibilities of stealth seemed to be a way to counter Republican charges that President Carter had neglected defense.
On August 22, 1980, Defense Secretary Brown held a press conference:
I am announcing today a major technological advance of great military significance.
This so-called 'stealth' technology enables the United States to build manned and unmanned aircraft that cannot be successfully intercepted with existing air defense systems. We have demonstrated to our satisfaction that the technology works.
Brown noted that the effort had been kept secret for three years due to the efforts of the few people in government who had been briefed on the project and the contractors involved.
However, in the last few months, the circle of people knowledgeable about the program has widened, partly because of the increased size of the effort, and partly because of the debate under way in the Congress on new bomber proposals. Regrettably, there have been several leaks about the stealth program in the last few days in the press and television news coverage.
In the face of these leaks, I believe that it is not appropriate or credible for us to deny the existence of this program. And it is now important to correct some of the leaked information that misrepre-sented the Administration's position on a new bomber program…
I am gratified that, as yet, none of the most sensitive and significant classified information about the characteristics of this program has been disclosed. An important objective of the announcement today is to make clear the kinds of information that we intend scrupulously to protect at the highest security level.
Also at the press conference was William Perry. He explained that, 'even as we acknowledge the existence of a stealth program, we will draw a new security line.' The information to be guarded was the specific techniques used, how effective they were, the characteristics of the aircraft under development, and the funding and schedules of the programs. (In retrospect, it is clear the secret they were trying to protect was faceting.) Perry also noted that 'stealth technology does not involve a single technical approach, but rather a complex synthesis of many. Even if I were willing to describe it to you, I could not do it in a sentence or even a paragraph.'[383]
The press coverage that followed the Brown statement indicated how little the popular press understood about stealth. A
In the wake of the press conference, the Republicans charged that the White House had released classified information for political gain. President Carter responded by blaming the Ford administration for not classify-ing stealth from the start.
Congress also became involved. On August 20, 1980, the House Armed Services Committee had been briefed on stealth. They were told that the subject was highly secret. Then, two days later, the press conference was held, which provided more information than they had been given. The committee held hearings, which cast doubts on the explanation for the disclosure. Benjamin Schemmer, editor
More damaging was the testimony given by Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt Jr., the former chief of naval operations. He testified that President Carter had decided to deliberately leak stealth information. This would be used as an excuse to announce the program's existence, so the administration could take credit for it. Zumwalt named as the alleged leaker of the information the deputy assistant to the president for national security affairs, David L. Aaron.
Aaron submitted an affidavit with the committee denying Zumwalt's charges. However, he refused to testify under oath due to a dispute between the committee and the White House over executive privilege.
The committee found Defense Secretary Brown's explanation for the press conference flimsy. In a report issued in February 1981, they stated they could not understand how the 'damage-limiting tactic' was supposed to work. An official announcement was sure to attract more attention to the program than 'no comment.' Based on the testimony of Schemmer and Zumwalt, along with Aaron's refusal to testify and Brown's weak explanation, the committee concluded that the disclosure had been made for political ends. The committee also stated that the announcement of the stealth program had done 'serious damage… to the security of the United States and our ability to deter or to contain a potential Soviet threat.'[385]
Any attempt to use stealth as an election year ploy by the Carter administration had backfired. The concept and possibilities of stealth, which few in the public and press could understand, did not mitigate the failure at Desert 1. Ronald Reagan was elected president in a landslide.
The unveiling of stealth had another effect. It was to warn both Republicans and Democrats that misfortune awaits those who disclose Black projects. Not surprisingly, the new administration had very different ideas on how to handle Black airplanes.
They disappeared from sight.
When the Groom Lake test site was established in 1955, the location's isolation was sufficient protection. It was about twenty miles from the near-est highway and thirty miles from any town. 'Ozzie' Ritland, who selected the site, said they were looking 'for the most isolated part of the United States of America' to test fly the U-2. During the U-2 operations, there were a few sightings, but as Ritland recalled, 'they would see the airplane, but they weren't so curious and it was far enough into the desert.'[386]
Although there were a number of
The 1979
This was to have major consequences in the decade to follow.
With the increased press attention, several code names for the test site soon became known. These included the Ranch, Area 51, and what was actually the call sign for Groom Lake's tower. The name's evocative and sinister sound ensured it caught the public's fancy — 'Dreamland.'
With the publication of the name Groom Lake, the flaw in Dreamland's security became apparent. The site was bordered by public land. It was possible to hike into the area and observe the site, without trespassing.
There was an obvious solution.
The withdrawal of public land for military use must be periodically renewed. When the air force submitted a renewal to Congress, it added 89,600 acres of the Groom Mountains to the 3.3 million of the Nellis Air Force Base range.[387] For a full two years, Congress did nothing about the request.[388]
In the meantime, the Reagan administration had begun a major buildup of strategic nuclear forces. This sparked opposition by 'peace activists,' such as Greenpeace. A standard tactic was attempting to disrupt military activities, particularly those dealing with nuclear weapons. On April 18, 1983, four Greenpeace demonstrators entered the nuclear test site via the dirt road that led to Groom Lake. For five days, they hid out in the mountainous ter-rain, before finally surrendering to the test site guards. It was widely believed that this incident caused the government to take action.