suspects because we have no obvious access to such a submarine.'
The General glanced around the table, assessing the reaction of his audience. The four men from Hezbollah sat enraptured. The clerics betrayed nothing, but the Ayatollah was leaning forward on his elbows, his head resting on his upraised fingers. He had not been sitting like that before.
Commander Badr, leaning back in his chair, right next to Ravi, had a thin smile on his face as he listened to the Hamas Commander delve into the future.
The General spoke again. 'I am drawn to the conclusion that we must have a nuclear ship. Without it we are almost powerless. We cannot attack anything from the surface because that will result in instant identification. We cannot use Special Forces beyond the Middle East because we have no way of delivering them or retrieving them after a mission.
'And we certainly cannot attack anything or anyone from the air, because again that represents instant detection. We could, I suppose, copy the methods of Bin Laden and infiltrate Western countries, but that is very clumsy, and if our operatives get caught, the United States will not hesitate to lambast the country they think is the country of origin. And they wouldn't even care if they were wrong! They'd still do it.
'The acquisition of a nuclear submarine, gentlemen, changes everything. We can strike in deadly silence, unseen and unknown. And if we can be quick and decisive, the chances of anyone catching us are close to zero. No modern nation with an agenda such as ours has ever had a nuclear submarine. And it is my opinion that we should make all efforts either to buy or lease one, under whatever deceptive means we can.'
'May we presume you would not wish our acquisition of a nuclear submarine to become public knowledge?'
'You may, Admiral. I would not even want it to enter an Iranian port or any other Islamic port.'
'And I must also assume you are recommending we have an accomplice in this operation, another country whose facilities we can utilize.'
'Of course. And the nation to whom we should turn for help is obviously China.'
'Are you also suggesting we purchase a nuclear boat from them?'
'No. They do not have one good enough for our purposes.'
'Have you made any kind of study of the possibilities?'
'Yes, of course. And our options are very limited. We plainly can't buy from the West because they wouldn't sell. China does not yet have sufficient technology. Which leaves India, Pakistan, and Russia. India and Pakistan are too afraid of each other to sell anything as critical as a nuclear boat. Which leaves, all alone, Russia, which happily will sell just about anything to anyone.'
'That may be so,' replied Admiral Badr. 'But Russia is a very strong signatory to all aspects of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. They were among the first to sign it back in 1968. They don't approve of nuclear tests, underground or underwater, they have always voted to limit the spread of nuclear weapons of any kind, and they have never gone back on that. They even made certain mat Belarus, Kazakstan, and the Ukraine signed up for the NPT.
'Certainly they've never sold a nuclear submarine to anyone. Nor have any of the Big Powers, the U.S.A., Great
Britain, and France. It would be an earthshaking move if they suddenly sold a nuclear attack submarine to Iran.'
'That would depend largely on how it was done,' replied the General. 'I think an element of subtlety might be in order. We would not be involved in any way.'
'That might be difficult,' replied the Admiral.
'That would depend on how hard we seek out the Achilles' heel of each party,' said General Rashood. 'Russia is easy. They need money desperately and will sell just about anything to get it. Their biggest customer by far is China. You may assume what China wants, with its big checkbook and smiling face, China will get.
'Their Navy already has nuclear submarines, which will assuage Russian conscience. If we want to buy a submarine, China will have to do it for us.'
'And why should they?'
'Well, I think we are China's Achilles' heel. It is very hard for her to refuse us for several reasons:
1. China understands the advantages of a full-scale Sino-Iranian partnership, which is already in place because of the pipeline from Kazakstan to the Strait of Hormuz.
2. China does not want to disturb that friendship with Iran, since we guard the gateway to the Gulf, and without our cooperation it would be difficult for them to operate their new Hormuz refinery efficiently.
3. Their partnership with Iran provides an excuse for their warships to roam at will in the northern Arabian Sea and in the Gulf itself.
4. There are many oil and gas contracts coming up in the next two years all around the Gulf, and China knows that with our support and influence they have a very good chance of landing them.
5. Under American pressure, the Chinese reneged on their contract over the C-802 missile, which was supposed to be supplied to Iran. They are fervently hoping it has been forgotten. I think this might be an occasion for a timely reminder that Iran has not forgotten. And China most certainly owes the Islamic State a very big favor.'
The Ayatollah looked very thoughtful, reminded as he had been of the still-vexed and still-simmering bad feeling between the two nations over the C-802.
This sleek, jet black, near supersonic cruise missile was built by the China National Precision Machinery Import and Export Corporation. But for its range of a little over eighty miles, it relied on an excellent French-built engine, manufactured by Microturbo in Toulouse. The entire saga took place over several months, but Iran was counting on this Exocet look-alike, ultimately to threaten ships moving through the Strait of Hormuz to the Persian Gulf. The C-802 had the capacity to carry the most sinister types of warhead, and the Americans were pressuring China not to fulfill the orders from Tehran.
But Iran had a contract, with heavy front money, and ended up raging at the Chinese Ambassador and anyone else who might have been able to unclog the deal. Communications between Tehran, Beijing, Hong Kong, Toulouse, and Washington were almost blocking the airwaves at the height of the dispute. The National Security Agency in Fort Meade was eavesdropping on everyone. Admiral George Morris's men were the only people who knew precisely what was happening.
Nonetheless, China saw the danger in alienating the Americans, and over several months, despite a great deal of very nifty footwork claiming things were beyond their control, they elected not to fulfill Iran's order for the missile.
Iran hit back by stripping down one of the C-802s they did own, and going in for a spot of 'reverse engineering' — rebuilding it from scratch with parts they made themselves. Thereafter, Tehran clammed up, and it was assumed by all parties they had found a way to manufacture their own cruise missile, without further recourse to China National Precision Machinery.
There had been a lot of bad blood and mistrust. It was China that wished to repair the damage, and General Rashood had pinpointed an area where the Dragon of the East might wish to ingratiate itself with the Ayatollahs, perhaps even make amends by acquiring a nuclear submarine for them.
Admiral Badr, however, still thought the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty would prove to be a major stumbling block. 'I realize that the Treaty only covers the matter of nuclear weapons, not nuclear power,' he said. 'But the nations that do have nuclear weapons are very sensitive about letting anyone else get their hands on them.
'And a ship's nuclear reactor contains a substantial mass of uranium, the residue of which is weapons-grade U-235 from which nuclear bombs can be made. That's one reason no country with a nuclear submarine has ever even considered selling a ship, with its reactor room full of live uranium, to any other country. No one has ever purchased a nuclear submarine. Anyone who has one, built it.'
General Rashood nodded his understanding of the subject. Then he said firmly, 'If we can persuade China to make an offer for two Russian nuclear boats, I would not expect them ever to enter a Chinese port, and most definitely not an Iranian port. I would expect them to make their journey either from the Baltic or from the Northern Fleet and find their way to one of the Russian bases on the Siberian coast, probably Petropavlovsk.
'There would be no need for anyone to know they had even been sold. I don't think a regular submarine movement along the Arctic waters north of Russia, heading east, would even attract anyone's attention. They'd just
