Chapter 5: The Fatal Turn to the East
p. 45: “‘the spring of 1941.’” Hitler’s meeting occurred at Berchtesgaden in his
p. 45: “invaded Russia in 1812.” Liddell Hart,
p. 48: “against the Soviet Union.”
p. 49: “if the United States entered.” Shirer, 829; Kimball, 84.
p. 49: “never counsel Hitler correctly.”
p. 49: “than capture of London.” Fuller, vol. 3, 413.
p. 53: “a single panzer division for Africa.” Alexander, 237. Soviet Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov went to Berlin on November 12, 1940, to discuss a four-power entente and “delimitation of spheres of influence.” Joachim von Ribbentrop, German foreign minister, outlined a remarkable proposal for Germany, Italy, Japan, and the Soviet Union to divide up Eurasia and Africa. But the plan had an air of unreality about it. Hitler had devoted large portions of
p. 55: “forced to cede to others.” Close to midnight on November 11, 1940, thirty obsolete Swordfish torpedo bomber biplanes from the British aircraft carrier
p. 56: “for a hasty departure.” Beginning January 19, 1941, small British forces struck from Sudan in the north and Kenya in the south to evict the Italians from their East African colonies of Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Italian Somaliland, and from British Somaliland, which they had occupied in 1940. The British were aided by Ethiopians who accompanied Emperor Haile Selassie, exiled by the Italians when they conquered Ethiopia in 1935–1936. The Italians had 160,000 native and 100,000 Italian troops, but they retreated before the much smaller British forces. By April 6, 1941, the British had occupied Addis Ababa, the Ethiopian capital, and most other important places in the colonies. The last Italian force surrendered at Gondar, Ethiopia, on November 27. The campaign demonstrated poor leadership by Italian officers and a tendency of Italian soldiers to surrender or run away.
p. 57: “680,000 troops in Romania.” Romanian King Carol II was forced to abdicate in favor of his eighteen-year-old son Michael I, but General Ion Antonescu took control of the country and joined the Axis on November 27, 1940.
p. 59: “Yugoslavia from all quarters.”
Chapter 6: Attacking the Wrong Island
p. 62: “‘in the Mediterranean.’”
p. 63: “‘toward the Suez Canal.’” Ibid., 488.
p. 65: “actually in British lines.” Liddell Hart,
p. 69: “‘not let the army down.’” Zabecki, vol. 1, 268 (Philip Green).
p. 70: “‘The day of parachute troops is over.’” Ibid., 138–39.
Chapter 7: Rommel’s Unappreciated Gift
p. 71: “elements of his corps arrived.”
p. 71: “‘far as the eye could reach.’” Rommel, 101.
p. 72: “‘movement around the south.’” Ibid., 91.
p. 72: “‘according to his wishes.’” Schmidt, 77.
p. 73: “‘attempt to recover Benghazi.’” Alexander, 244; Rommel, 105.
p. 76: “the ‘armored brigade’” A British brigade was made up of battalions and corresponded in size and function to a regiment in the German, American, and most other armies. The terminology grew out of the fact that most British soldiers were assigned to a regiment, which was not a tactical organization but the military home of its members. Individual battalions of this regiment were attached to brigades, but were generally called “regiments” instead of battalions.
p. 76: “only a limited combat role.” At this time the Mark III had a 50-millimeter gun with moderate velocity, while the Mark IV had a short-barreled 75-millimeter gun with relatively low velocity. Both had a top speed of about 25 mph. Neither gun could penetrate the 78-millimeter frontal armor of the British Matilda infantry tank, and had difficulty stopping the faster (30 mph) British Mark V cruiser tanks with 40 millimeters of frontal armor. Moreover, the British tanks were armed with a two-pounder (40-millimeter) gun with higher velocity and slightly better penetration (44 millimeters of armor at 1,000 yards) than the German tank guns. Since the German medium tanks had only 30 millimeters of frontal armor at this time, the two-pounder could often stop them.
p. 76: “‘That’s your affair!’”
p. 77: “‘at one stroke,’ Rommel wrote.” Rommel, 109.
p. 79: “the end of 1941.” Fuller, vol. 3, 419.
p. 79: “‘would have been impossible.’” Rommel, 120.
Chapter 8: Barbarossa
p. 82: “slightest threat to his dictatorship.” In the purges, beginning in May 1937, at least 30,000 of the Red Army’s 75,000 officers were imprisoned or executed, including the vast majority of senior officers. Another 10,000 were dismissed from the service. See Glantz and House, 11; English and Gudmundsson, 83.
p. 82: “Communist party agents in the army.” These political officers had the power to veto commanders’ orders during the revolutionary wars and disturbances in the 1920s and early 1930s. After 1934 Stalin withdrew this power, reimposed it during the purges, then withdrew it after the Finnish campaign. The commissars were restricted to political education of soldiers and ensuring political conformity among officers. See Keegan,
p. 82: “hobbled the German army.” Hitler insisted that all generals understand no holds were to be barred. In March 1941 he laid down the law to the chiefs of all three services and key army field commanders. Halder’s
