‘Meanwhile, there are a few other pointers, like the lengthened runway and the hangars. Every time the N- PIC analysts have spotted an aircraft on the ground, it’s been parked close to one of the original hangars, not the new ones. When an aircraft’s pulled out of a hangar to fly or do a ground run or whatever, it’s normally left outside that hangar. That suggests the F-5s are in the two original structures, and there’s something different kept in the new hangars.’
‘Have they ever spotted anything in or near them?’ Hicks asked.
‘Not so far. Occasionally one of the birds might get a picture when one of the doors is open, but the hangars are built into the rock on the south side of the airfield, so the interior’s always in shadow. The pass made yesterday was the first time they’ve seen anything significant. And the other thing is that those four hangars invariably have guards stationed outside them, almost always two-man patrols. So my tentative analysis is that there are several MiG-25s based at T’ae’tan, maybe as many as a squadron. But that raises more questions, like where did they come from? We’re talking more freely to the Kremlin these days, and as far as I know they haven’t sold much to the North Koreans over the last five years.’
‘OK, Richard, let’s assume for the moment that you’re right, and that there’s a squadron, or at least a significant number, of Foxbats at T’ae’tan. If the Russians didn’t sell the MiGs to the DPRK, where did they come from?’
Muldoon smiled slightly. ‘That, Walter is the big question, but it’s always possible they stole them.’
‘You’re kidding.’
‘No, I’m not. A couple of days ago the NSA detected some traffic on a military net in Iran that might have been referring to a missing aircraft. They’re not certain, because it’s possible the two people overheard were talking about a crashed aircraft – the context was ambiguous. But it could also be that some pilot’s been bribed to fly his MiG out of Iran for a few pieces of silver.
‘And then there’s Ain Oussera. We asked the Brits to go in there and take a look inside a heavily guarded hangar. They did, and found the building was empty, so the British SIS reckons the Algerians have also lost one or two aircraft, and the guards were simply there to preserve the scene while it’s investigated. That sounds far- fetched, I know, but I’m inclined to agree with them. Ain Oussera’s known to be a Foxbat base, so if they have lost any aircraft, most likely they’re MiG-25s. And subsequently the Brits fielded a request from the GRU for assistance in tracing certain aircraft movements inside Russia, and N-PIC supplied some satellite pictures for them. I gather the SIS has a man working with the GRU in Moscow right now.’
In fact Richter was, at that moment, a long way from Moscow. After leaving police headquarters, they’d gone straight out to the airfield at Bolshoye Savino, and fifteen minutes later they were sitting in the 764 IAP commander’s office.
Lavrenti Oustenka was a full colonel, and looked it. He was one of those people who, no matter how they were dressed, where they were or what they were doing, just looked like a senior military officer. His hair was cropped to within a millimetre of his scalp, his chin bore not the slightest sign of stubble, and even sitting in the chair behind his wide desk he appeared to be fully at attention. He also didn’t appear to show any particular aversion to having a Western intelligence officer involved in the operation to track down the men who’d recently killed one of his young pilots.
What he did appear to harbour doubts over was how successful that operation might be. ‘Perm is a big city, you know, with well over a million inhabitants. It won’t be easy to find these men, even assuming that they’re still here and didn’t leave straight after the killing.’
‘My guess, Colonel,’ Bykov said, ‘is that they’re still here. I won’t insult you by pointing out that this information is classified, but I can tell you that we’re unable to account for sixteen MiG-25 interceptors, from a variety of bases throughout Russia. We suspect that agents of a foreign power have been approaching MiG-25 pilots and inducing them to defect. And some of those pilots have been taking their aircraft with them.’
Oustenka shook his head. ‘With respect, General, I find that difficult to believe. We keep meticulous records of all our aircraft. If a pilot did decide to defect, like Belenko did back in the nineteen seventies, it would be immediately obvious. A plane takes off and doesn’t return – the station would soon know and Moscow would be informed. And there’s also the question of range. The MiG-25 has a ferry range of about two thousand five hundred kilometres with full tanks, and it doesn’t possess an in-flight refuelling capability. How could an aircraft stolen from here, say, possibly get as far as China or North Korea? It would run out of fuel hundreds or even thousands of kilometres before reaching its destination.’
Bykov nodded. This was ground that he and Richter had covered at length on their flight from Moscow.
‘We’re looking at something a little more subtle than some pilot climbing into a jet, heading east and hoping for the best. We believe that some senior officers have been paid off, and have been actively assisting with these thefts. That solves both the paperwork problem and the actual defection. When the MiG flies away from an airfield, everyone involved knows it won’t be returning. The squadron commander will just instruct that the aircraft is being transferred to another squadron, or going off for deep maintenance, or is surplus to requirements and is being scrapped.
‘That fabrication serves to keep the documentation correct, and also means that there’s no problem over the aircraft’s range. The air traffic control or operations people will just schedule the aircraft for refuelling at appropriate airfields along whatever route they’ve already chosen to get it out of Russia. This isn’t some casual thieving, Colonel. Whoever’s doing this is highly organized and very efficient. We’ve only just found out that our Air Force is missing sixteen aircraft, perhaps even more, yet until now nobody in Moscow had any suspicion that something was wrong.’
Oustenka now looked a little less doubtful. ‘I can assure you, General, that all
‘I don’t doubt it,’ Bykov replied dryly. ‘Now, the scenario we envisage is that these foreign agents first find a pilot who’s willing to participate. Then it’s up to the pilot to identify those senior officers whose cooperation would be essential, and who in turn would be approached with the offer of a bribe. Only when everyone who needs to be involved has been suborned would the theft go ahead, as the appropriate documentation is prepared.’
‘And you think Lenkov was approached?’
‘Yes – and the fact that he’s dead means he wasn’t prepared to go along with them.’
‘But why would he even have talked to them?’ Oustenka asked.
‘We don’t know,’ Richter said, ‘but we presume their pitch would have been credible, and obviously unrelated to their real objective. For example, perhaps they told him they were making a documentary film about the Russian Air Force and would need some shots of MiG-25s engaged in practice air combat. Or they were trying to recruit current front-line pilots for instructor duties with a Third-World air force. Something like that.’
Oustenka nodded, and Bykov leant forward. ‘Yes, Colonel?’ he said.
‘When I heard that Lenkov had been killed, I interviewed each squadron member individually and asked them if they had any idea who might have wished to harm him. One officer, Pavel Bardin, told me he’d been with Lenkov in a bar in the city one evening when three men approached them. They claimed to be looking for qualified MiG-25 pilots to join the air force of one of the Gulf States. Bardin took their contact number, though he wasn’t really interested in taking such a step, but he said that Lenkov seemed more enthusiastic.’
Bykov looked triumphant. ‘Where is this Bardin? Can we see him?’
Oustenka stood up and walked to the door of his office. He barked an order, then returned to his seat. ‘He’ll be here in a couple of minutes.’
‘Okay, Richard,’ said Walter Hicks, ‘you’ve almost convinced me about the “what”. Based on your investigations, I think it’s at least possible that the DPRK has acquired a squadron of Foxbats. But what I still don’t see is the reason. Why would the North Koreans go to all this trouble to get their hands on some forty-year-old obsolete interceptors?’
‘I have no idea,’ Muldoon shrugged. ‘If they’d got their grubby little hands on a squadron of any new- generation air-superiority fighters, I’d be a lot more worried, because that could indicate they’re planning an invasion against the South. You’re quite right, the Foxbat
