Foxbat

‘You might be reading too much into that, Richard. Those bases are within easy missile range of Seoul. If the North Koreans are planning an invasion, they might guess we’d take out their most southerly bases, and they’re warming up these others as reinforcements.’

‘I might agree with you, Walter, except for these pictures.’ Muldoon sorted through the images on the table and selected two of them. ‘This one is the launch pad at Mayang, and this is Ok’pyong. Notice anything odd about them?’

Hicks leant forward and pored over the images for a few seconds.

‘Here,’ Muldoon said, and proffered a three-inch magnifying glass.

‘Thanks.’ A couple of minutes later Hicks sat back in his chair. ‘Nothing strikes me as significant there. In each frame I see a missile beside the launch tower but that’s about it.’

Muldoon nodded. ‘N-PIC has confirmed that they’re both No-dong

liquid-fuelled weapons. They’re a tried and tested design with a range of about twelve hundred miles. What N-PIC is concerned about isn’t the missile itself but the trucks parked near the pads in both pictures.’

‘What? The five-tonners?’

‘That’s what they look like, but according to N-PIC those aren’t standard trucks. Their sides are solid, probably steel, not canvas, which is unusual. They also have metal rear doors, which again is non-standard. And in one of the pictures the satellite got an oblique view of the interior of one of them, from which evidence N-PIC thinks there’s a large metallic object inside it.’

‘Which means what?’

‘The analysts can’t be certain, but there’s a strong possibility that these trucks have been built specially to transport nuclear weapons, and their unusual metal structure actually serves as a kind of lead-lined box devised to hold them safely. The design isn’t unlike those we ourselves have used in the past. And this picture’ – Muldoon selected another one – ‘shows what looks remarkably like a warhead being installed in the No-dong on the pad at Mayang.’

Hicks peered back at the images. ‘So if the guys at N-PIC are right, the North Koreans may have shipped a couple of their nukes from wherever they store them to Mayang and Ok’pyong. What about the other sites?’

‘N-PIC’s looking into that right now. The analysts are running back-checks to see if they can trace the routes those trucks took to get to the missile bases. That might confirm, or at least indicate, their likely cargoes. But assuming our deduction is right, the question really is why would they be preparing nuclear-tipped missiles at two of their east coast bases?’

‘What’s the payload of the No-dong? Can it carry a nuke?’

‘If you’d asked me that question a week ago, I’d have said “no”. But, since the Taep’o-dong launch from Ok’pyong, my best guess is “maybe”. The payload’s about one thousand kilograms, well over two thousand pounds. All our analysis to date suggests that if the DPRK has managed to fabricate any nuclear devices, they’ll be fairly small, around a ten- to twenty-kiloton yield, which is exactly what we saw in the Pacific. And if a Taep’o-dong can carry one, it would probably also be within the No-dong’s delivery capabilities.’

‘And another aspect to this,’ Hicks interrupted, ‘is the size of the North Korean nuclear arsenal. How many weapons do they possess? What’s the latest estimate?’

Muldoon shook his head. ‘It depends who you’re speaking to. Until yesterday, guesses could vary from none to about six. Today, some people are talking maybe a dozen or more. But if these pictures mean what we think, that suggests they’ve got available a minimum of two nukes. Which brings me to the location of those weapons. Why the east coast? They can’t target US reinforcement shipping or the Enterprise group because, without surveillance aircraft or satellites, they have no way of knowing where they are. Unless the Chinese are telling them, which is pretty unlikely in the current political climate. But, in any case, medium-range missiles like the No-dong aren’t much use against mobile targets, because they’re just not accurate enough. Interceptor-launched air-to-surface missiles are a much better solution.

‘That implies their targets are more likely to be static – downtown Seoul, for example – but the No-dong is really the wrong weapon for launching an attack on any part of South Korea, because it’s got too long a range. And we’ve positioned Patriot batteries all the way along the southern edge of the Demilitarized Zone and around Seoul so their chances of prosecuting a successful attack aren’t that good. I’m wondering therefore if they’ve got another target in mind.’

‘You mean Japan?’ Hicks looked up sharply. ‘You think they’d launch a first strike at Japan?’

‘I don’t know. They might not need to,’ Muldoon replied. ‘The threat would probably be enough. Just suppose that is in fact Pyongyang’s plan. Once they’ve got all their assets in position, they simply phone up Seoul, Tokyo and the White House and say they’re going to cross the DMZ and occupy the entire peninsula. They’ve got the troops and armour to do it, easily. And add the scenario that if they meet any resistance from South Korean forces they’ll nuke Japan. And, if we try to interfere, they’ll do the same to the US west coast.’

‘Jesus. Nuclear blackmail with a twist. So these missiles are aimed at Japan, but the real target’s South Korea and the US of A.’

‘Exactly. And knowing the reputation of that slant-eyed little bastard in Pyongyang, I’ve no doubt at all that he’d push the button if he had to, because he’d have nothing left to lose. Don’t forget that Oplan 5027 includes plans to take control of the entire peninsula if North Korea does launch any kind of an invasion attempt. If he makes the threat and then loses the battle, he knows as well as we do that North Korea will cease to exist within a matter of weeks.’

Muldoon gathered up the photographs and replaced them in the red ‘Top Secret’ folder on the table.

‘So what do we do about it?’ Hicks asked, obviously a rhetorical question. ‘This is a hell of a case to build on just a couple of satellite images that could easily be interpreted more than one way.’

‘I don’t know, Walter. I don’t know if the N-PIC analysts are right and, if they are, I don’t know what we should do about it. But whatever response is appropriate, the Agency certainly won’t be involved. This must now be a purely military matter, so I’d suggest going back to the Joint Chiefs through the DNI and passing the buck to them.’

HMS Illustrious, Yellow Sea

The Admiralty’s intention in sending Illustrious into the Yellow Sea had been to try to intimidate the North Koreans into not doing anything stupid, like crossing the DMZ, though just how successful one small carrier and a handful of aircraft would be was obviously a matter of opinion. Richter personally didn’t think a nation possessing about the fourth-largest military machine in the world would take much notice, but nobody was ever going to ask his opinion.

His CAP sortie had been entirely uneventful, ninety minutes spent cruising at high level in bright sunshine, and had served really only to reacquaint him with the Harrier. But throughout the sortie he had remained supremely aware that, for the second time in his life, having been involved in the Falklands War as a Harrier pilot on board the Invin cible, he was flying a fully-armed jet fighter in a potentially, if not actually, hostile environment.

Back on board, he changed and showered, had a meal in the Wardroom, and then went to bed. He was back in the flying programme in less than six hours, so was determined to snatch what sleep he could, when he could.

Pyongyang, North Korea

Kim Yong-Su sat in front of the computer monitor in his office and checked the operational readiness database.

Thirty minutes after he’d been given the order to execute ‘Golden Dawn’, he’d instructed all the units under his control to report their readiness, and he’d received confirmation from the last airfield, Haeju, just a few minutes before. As far as he knew, everything was now fully prepared for the operation but, as a precaution against incompetence or over-enthusiasm, or even treachery, at a lower level, he’d carefully recorded the name and rank of each officer who’d reported his unit ready in the database, together with the date-time group when that report was made. He’d also tape-recorded each telephone call, and placed every signal in his office safe. If heads rolled after this, Kim Yong-Su was determined that his wouldn’t be among them.

He checked the listings yet again, making absolutely sure he’d missed nothing and that the North Korean war machine was in all respects ready for immediate combat, then he picked up the red telephone on the corner of his