aversion, reinforced by his experiences of 1923, for the arrogant, stiff, monocle-wearing “old fogies,” and Himmler once heard him remark about the generals, “One day they’ll take a shot at me.”38 But their backing was indispensable if he were to consolidate his power. He kept in mind the great lesson of the November putsch, never again to get involved in open conflict with the armed forces. He attributed his defeat at that time to the opposition of the army, just as he attributed his success in 1933 to the support or at least the benevolent neutrality of the army leadership. Moreover, he would need their technical expertise for the rearmament program which he had already launched in the summer of 1933. In view of his expansionist plans, he knew there was no time to lose. Moreover, only the regular army possessed the offensive power that he required—a militia such as Rohm had in mind was, strictly speaking, an instrument of defense.
Yet Hitler must have been pleasantly surprised by the way top army men behaved toward him. In Defense Minister von Blomberg and in the new chief of staff, Colonel Walther von Reichenau, he found two partners who, for different reasons, were entirely amenable to his wishes.
Blomberg was an enthusiast by temperament. He had in turn subscribed to democracy, anthroposophy, the idea of a Prussian socialism, then “something close to Communism”—this after a trip to Russia—and finally been drawn more and more to authoritarian ideas until he succumbed to Hitler’s blandishments. In 1933, Blomberg later avowed, he had been vouchsafed things he no longer could have hoped for: faith, veneration for a man, and complete dedication to an idea. A friendly remark of Hitler’s, a contemporary source tells us, could bring tears to his eyes; and Blomberg used to say that a cordial handshake of the Fuhrer’s could cure him of colds.39
Reichenau was of a different stamp: a sober man with a Machiavellian turn of mind who kept his ambitions free from emotion. He quickly decided that he could make use of Nazism to further his personal career and the power of the army. At the proper moment the Nazis could be tamed, he thought. As intelligent as he was coolheaded, by nature decisive, sometimes to a fault, he was the almost perfect embodiment of the modern, technically trained and socially unbiased army officer who unfortunately carried his lack of prejudices to moral categories also. At a meeting of army commanders in February, 1933, he opined that the general breakdown could be stemmed only by dictatorship. This thesis so well suited Hitler’s purposes that he must have asked himself why he should turn down the proffered allegiance of the military experts in favor of the troublesome Rohm. Among his intimates he tended to make fun of these “bandylegged SA men who think they’re the material for a military elite.”
Hitler’s usual way of handling his enemies was to play them off against each other and let them fight it out between them. But in this case he was fairly frank about which side he favored. It is true that he constantly whipped up the SA’s militant activism and would, for example, exhort the storm troopers: “Your whole life will be nothing but struggle. From struggle you came; do not hope for peace today or tomorrow.” His appointment of Rohm to the cabinet on December 1 and his remarkably cordial letter of thanks to the chief of staff at the end of the year were widely interpreted, within the SA, as an official blessing. Nevertheless, he repeatedly assured the army that it was and would remain the sole armed force in the nation. And his decision at the beginning of the new year to reintroduce compulsory military service within the framework of the army ran counter to all Rohm’s plans for a vast militia. But Rohm continued to believe that Hitler was, as always, playing some deep game and secretly agreed with him now as he supposedly had in the past.
Consequently, Rohm decided that he was being blocked by some of Hitler’s advisers. Accustomed to overcoming all difficulties by frontal assault, he resorted to noisy invective and heavy pressure. He called Hitler a “weakling” who had fallen into the hands of “stupid and dangerous creatures.” But he, Rohm, was going to “free him from those fetters.” And while the SA began posting armed guards around its headquarters, Rohm sent a memorandum to the Ministry of Defense declaring the defense of the country was the “domain of the SA” and leaving the army the sole task of military training. Incessantly speechmaking and fulminating, he thus gradually set the stage on which his destiny was to be played out. At the beginning of January, 1934, only a few days after Hitler had thanked his chief of staff and intimate friend in such warm words for his services, the Chancellor ordered Rudolf Diels, chief of the secret state police office (the incipient Gestapo) to gather incriminating documents on “Herr Rohm and his friendships” and also on the SA’s terroristic activities. “This is the most important assignment you have ever received,” he told Diels.
Meanwhile, the army had not been idle. Rohm’s memorandum had made it plain to the Reichswehr leaders that there was no midcourse: Hitler would have to choose between themselves and the SA. Ostentatiously meeting the Nazis halfway, early in February Blomberg directed that the “Aryan clause” be applied to the officer corps and made the swastika the official symbol of the armed forces. Army Commander in Chief General von Fritsch justified this step on the grounds that it would “give the Chancellor the necessary impetus against the SA.”40
In fact, Hitler now found himself forced to take an unambiguous position. On February 2 he delivered an address to the gauleiters assembled in Berlin. The speech both reflected his perplexities at the time and constituted a noteworthy statement of principles. The minutes of the meeting record:
The Fuhrer stressed… that those who go on saying the Revolution isn’t over yet are fools… and continued that in the movement we have people who by revolution mean nothing but a permanent state of chaos….
The Fuhrer said that the most crucial task at the moment was the selection of people who on the one hand are competent, on the other hand can carry out the measures of the administration in blind obedience. The party must act as a kind of monastic order, assuring the necessary stability for the entire future of Germany…. The first Leader had been chosen by Destiny; the second must from the start have a loyal, sworn community behind him. No one may be selected who has a private power base!
Only one man can be the Leader…. An organization with such a hard core and strength will endure forever; nothing can overthrow it. The community within the movement must be incredibly loyal. There must not be any internecine struggles; we must never allow differences to be bared to outsiders! The people cannot trust us with blind faith if we ourselves destroy this trust. Even if wrong decisions are made, the effects can be mitigated by our unconditionally sticking together. We must never allow one authority to be played off against the other.
Therefore: no superfluous discussions! Problems which the various headquarters have not yet clarified may under no circumstances be discussed in public, for that would entail involving the masses of the people in the decisionmaking process. That was the insanity of democracy, whereby the value of all leadership is lost.
We must never engage in more than a single fight at a time. Fights in single file. Not “Many enemies, much honor,” but “Many enemies, much stupidity.” Moreover, the people cannot wage or understand twelve struggles going on at once. Consequently we must always present the people with only a single idea, make them concentrate on one single idea. In questions of foreign policy it is crucial to have the entire people hypnotically behind one; the whole nation must be literally filled with a sporting spirit, be following this struggle with the passion of gamblers. This is essential. If the whole nation takes part in the struggle, the whole nation is the loser. If it is indifferent, only the leadership loses. In the one case the people are roused to fury against the opponent, in the second case only against the leader.41
These principles were in fact to obtain deep into the war years. The practical conclusions were not long in coming. As early as February 21, 1934, Hitler confided to Anthony Eden that he intended to reduce the SA by two thirds and insure that the remaining formations received neither weapons nor military training. A week later he summoned the commanders of the army and the leaders of the SA and SS, headed by Rohm and Himmler, to the Ministry of Defense, on Bendlerstrasse. In a speech that the army officers received with applause and the SA leaders heard with horror, he sketched the basic lines of an agreement between the Reichswehr and the SA. The duties of the brown-shirted storm troops would be limited to a few minor military functions; their chief assignment was to be the political education of the nation. Hitler begged the SA leadership not to obstruct him in such grave times—and added menacingly that he would crush anyone who tried to.
Rohm failed to note these warnings or regarded them as mere verbal maneuvers. For the time being he kept his composure and invited everyone present to a “reconciliation breakfast.” But as soon as the generals had left, he freely vented his anger. He is said to have called Hitler an “ignorant corporal” and declargd bluntly that he “had no intention of keeping the agreement.” He is also alleged to have said that Hitler was “disloyal and badly in need of a vacation.” Subsequently SA Obergruppenfuhrer Lutze went to see Hitler at Obersalzberg and in a conversation lasting several hours reported Rohm’s insults and veiled threats.
