Hitler

It was an exceedingly perilous situation that demanded more prudence and adaptability than a romantic people, which for centuries had felt abused, could possibly summon up. Faced with a choice between its two neighbors, Poland on the whole inclined slightly more toward Germany. But the new Germany was also more restive and greedy than a Soviet Union involved in internal power struggles, purges, and doctrinaire disputes. Polish Foreign Minister Josef Beck, a man given to intrigues and engaged in reckless juggling, complicated the situation still further by pressing ambitious plans for a “third Europe.” His idea was to establish a neutral block of powers, under Polish leadership, extending from the Baltic to the Hellespont. And he thought that he could derive advantages for Poland from Hitler’s aggressive policy. His ostensibly pro-German policy secretly aimed at “methodically reinforcing the Germans in their errors,” and he hoped “not only for the unconditional integration of Danzig into Polish territory, but, also, far beyond that, for all of East Prussia, Silesia, even Pomerania… our Pomerania,” as Poland’s propagandists now began saying more and more frequently and more openly.¹¹¹

These secret Polish dreams of becoming a great power underlay the unexpectedly sharp refusal with which Beck finally rebuffed Hitler’s proposal. Simultaneously, he mobilized a few divisions in the border area. In strictly objective terms he might not even have considered the German demands unjustified. Danzig, he admitted, was merely a kind of symbol for Poland.¹¹² But every concession must seem like a reversal of the basic aims of Polish policy, the eifort to attain both equilibrium of power in Europe and a limited degree of hegemony for Poland herself. For this reason, too, the only tactical way out of the situation—gaining time by partial concessions—was barred. Moreover, Beck and the Warsaw government feared that Hitler’s first demands would be followed by an endless succession of new ones, so that only an unequivocal refusal could preserve the integrity of Poland. To sum up, Poland found herself confronted with her typical situation: she had no choice.

This impasse was fully exposed when Beck, on March 23, 1939, rejected the British proposal of consultative agreement between Great Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and Poland. He did not want to enter any group to which the Soviet Union belonged. He had rejected an anti-Soviet alliance with Germany and was still less prepared to accept an anti-German alliance with the Soviet Union. What he failed to see was that given the acuteness of the situation Hitler had created, he had to choose. From now on his only protection against the Soviet Union was the dread protection of Germany; and only the aid of the Soviet Union could save him from the German demands. He knew quite well—and the Soviet Union confirmed his knowledge in a Tass communique of March 22—that such aid meant the equivalent of suicide for Poland. But Beck was prepared to face destruction rather than to accept protection from Poland’s old oppressor to the East. Politically, he based his attitude on the dogma of the insurmountable antagonism between Germany and the Soviet Union. But by rejecting both his neighbors with equal vehemence he unwittingly created the conditions for a rapprochement between them. The front for the outbreak of the war was beginning to take shape.

Simultaneously, Beck was reassured by the attitude of the British government. Still indignant at Hitler’s occupation of Prague, Chamberlain at the end of March decided upon a desperate step. Acting on the basis of several unconfirmed reports of an impending German coup de main against Danzig, he asked Warsaw whether Poland had any objections to a British declaration guaranteeing her integrity. Despite the warnings of some of his more perspicacious fellow countrymen, who regarded it as “childish, naive and at the same time unfair to propose to a country in Poland’s situation that it compromise its relations with so strong a neighbor as Germany,”¹¹³ Beck promptly consented. He later declared that he needed less time to make his decision than was needed to flip the ash from a cigarette. On March 31 Chamberlain made his famous statement in the House ol Commons: England and France “in the event of any action which clearly threatened Polish independence… would feel themselves bound at once to lend the Polish Government all support in their power.”¹¹⁴

This promise of assistance was the great turning point in the policies of that phase. England had decided unconditionally to oppose Hitler’s expansionist ambitions wherever and whenever it encountered them. It was an extraordinary and impressive decision, though one as deficient in wisdom as it was superabundant in dramatic consequences. Its origins in the emotions of a disappointed man were all too apparent, and critics quickly pointed to the inherent flaws of such a guarantee: it required no counterguarantee from the Poles if Hitler attacked some other European country, and did not oblige the Poles to conduct negotiations for aid with the Soviet Union, whose partnership would necessarily be of crucial importance. Moreover, the grave question of war or peace for Europe was being given into the keeping of a handful of stubborn, nationalistic men in Warsaw who a short while ago had made common cause with Hitler against Czechoslovakia, betraying the very principles of independence they were now so anxiously appealing to.

Chamberlain’s decision of March 31 forced Hitler to reassess his position. He considered the British guarantee a warrant for the eccentric Poles to involve Germany in military undertakings whenever it pleased them. But far more crucial in his eyes was that England had now at last revealed herself as an enemy. She would not allow him to move freely against the East and was evidently resolved to push matters to the ultimate confrontation. He could not obtain the grand mandate of the bourgeois powers to proceed against the Soviet Union. Consequently, his whole strategic concept was threatened. It seems clear that this last day of March gave him the final impetus to that radical turn which had been hinted at in various remarks since the end of 1936, but which had been repeatedly postponed. Now he actually proceeded “to the liquidation of the Work of his youth,” as he had phrased it a short while before. He abandoned his courtship of England, which had rejected him. He concluded correctly that whenever he set out to conquer new Lebensraum in the East he would clash with England. Consequently, to achieve his central idea he would first have to defeat Great Britain. If he wished to avoid a two-front war, one more thing followed: he would have to come to a temporary arrangement with the future enemy. It so happened that the conduct of Poland provided him with an opening. An alliance with the Soviet Union was now within reach.

Hitler’s policy during the following months was one grand, large-scale maneuver to bring about this swing and so shape the antagonistic fronts in Europe to accord with his purposes. Admiral Canaris, who happened to be present when news of the British guaranty to Poland arrived, reported Hitler’s furious outburst: “I’ll cook them a stew that they’ll choke on.”¹¹⁵ The following day he utilized the launching of the Tirpitz in Wilhelmshaven for a violent speech against the British “encirclement policy.” He issued a dire warning to the “satellite states whose task is to be set against Germany” and indicated that he was about to terminate the Anglo-German Naval Treaty:

I once made an agreement with England—namely, the Naval Treaty. It is based on the earnest desire which we all share never to have to go to war against England. But this wish can only be a mutual one.

If this wish no longer exists in England, then the practical preconditions for this agreement are removed and Germany also would accept this very calmly. We are self-assured because we are strong, and we are strong because we are united…. Those who are powerless lose the right to live!¹¹⁶

Everyone who met Hitler during this period has reported him flaring up furiously against England.¹¹⁷ Early in April the Propaganda Minister issued a directive whose tenor was that England must be represented as Germany’s most dangerous adversary. Simultaneously Hitler broke off his negotiations with Poland. He ordered State Secretary von Weizsacker to inform the Poles that the offer had been unique and would not be repeated. At the same time new demands, as yet unspecified, were hinted at. And, as if to stress the gravity of the situation, Hitler suddenly once more expressed interest in the German minorities in Poland, whom he had overlooked for years during which they, together with the Jews, had been the favorite victims of the Poles’ resentments and outbreaks of chauvinistic arrogance.

But even more can be read from the secret message Hitler issued to the armed forces on April 3, setting up a new operation with the code name “Case White”:

The present attitude of Poland requires… the initiation of military preparations to remove, if necessary, any threat from this direction for all future time.

The German relationship to Poland continues to be governed by the principle of avoiding trouble. Poland’s policy toward Germany hitherto has been based upon the same principle, but if she should change it and adopt an attitude threatening to the Reich, a final reckoning may become requisite without regard to the existing treaty.