1. What went on at this meeting and how important it proved to be was first revealed during the Nuremberg trial; see IMT XXXV, pp. 42 ff.; also IMT V, pp. 177 ff., XII, pp. 497 ff., and XXXVI, pp. 520 ff.
2. See Domarus, pp. 207, 209, 211, 214; also Baynes, I, pp. 238, 252.
3. Hans Mommsen, “The Reichstag Fire and Its Political Consequences,” in Holborn, ed., Republic to Reich, pp. 129 ff.
4. Cf. IMT IX, pp. 481 f. and PS-3593. To the very end, incidentally, Goring vigorously denied having participated in any way in setting the fire. He remarked—quite believably—he would not have needed any pretexts to strike against the Communists. “Their debt was so heavy, their crime so tremendous, that without any further prompting I was determined to begin the most ruthless war of extermination with all the instruments of power at my command against this plague. On the contrary, as I testified at the Reichstag Fire trial, the fire which forced me to take measures so rapidly was actually extremely awkward for me, since it forced me to act faster than I intended and to strike before I had made all my thorough preparations.” Hermann Goring, Aufbau einer Nation, pp. 93 f.
5. Brecht, Vorspiel, pp. 125 f. The emergency decree of February 28, 1933, read: “Articles 114, 115, 117, 118, 123, 124 and 153 of the Constitution of the German Reich are for the time being nullified. Consequently, curbs on personal liberty, on the right of free expression of opinion, including freedom of the press, of association, and of assembly, surveillance over letters, telegrams and telephone communications, searches of homes and confiscations of as well as restrictions on property, are hereby permissible beyond the limits hitherto established by law.”
6. Goebbels, Kaiserhof, p. 271, and Bullock, p. 264.
7. Proclamation by Hitler of March 10, 1933, cited in Domarus, p. 219. On the other hand cf. Hitler’s anger when faced with a complaint by von Winterfeld, Deputy Chairman of the German National People’s Party, of March 10, 1933, in: BAK Reel 43 II, 1263. Concerning Hitler’s letter to Papen, copies of which were sent to Hindenburg and to the Defense Minister, see Martin Broszat, Der Staat Hitlers, p. 111. From January 31 to August 23, 1933, the German newspapers reported the following violent deaths: 196 enemies of National Socialism and 24 followers of Hitler. During the period up to the March elections 51 opponents and 18 Nazis were killed.
8. Bracher, Sauer, Schulz, Machtergreifung, p. 158. As early as March 17, the VB triumphantly calculated that merely by excluding the eighty-one Communist deputies the NSDAP would have ten seats over an absolute majority.
9. Berliner Borsenzeitung of March 22, 1933, quoted from Horkenbach, p. 127.
10. The speech is printed in Domarus, pp. 229 ff.
11. Quoted from Philipp W. Fabry, Mutmassungen uber Hitler, p. 91; for the following quotation, which evidently reproduces the sense of remarks made in the President’s entourage, see Bruning, Memoiren, p. 650.
12. Rauschning, Gesprache, pp. 78 ff. For Carl Goerdeler’s assertion see Edouard Calic, Ohne Maske, p. 171.
13. Speech to the Reichsstatthalters of July 6; cf. VB of July 8, 1933.
14. Ibid.
15. Rauschning, Gesprache, p. 96; also Luedecke, I Knew Hitler, p. 518.
16. Thus in the above-mentioned speech to the Reichsstatthalters on July 6.
17. Heyen, Alltag, p. 134; report of the district magistrate of Bad Kreuznach.
18. Francois-Poncet, The Fateful Years, pp. 67 f.
19. Golo Mann, Deutsche Geschichte, p. 804.
20. Gottfried Benn, “Antwort an die literarischen Emigranten,” Gesammelte Werke IV, p. 245.
21. Bracher, Diktatur, p. 271.
22. Edgar J. Jung, “Neubelebung von Weimar?” in: Deutsche Rundschau, June, 1932. For the remark of Paul Valery, see Thomas Mann, Nachlese. Prosa 1951–55, p. 196.
23. Gottfried Benn, in the letter mentioned in note 20.
24. Rauschning, Gesprache, pp. 151, 179 f.
25. David Schoenbaum, Die braune Revolution, p. 150; also T. Eschenburg, “Dokumentation,” in: VJHfZ 1955:3, pp. 314 ff; also Historikus, Der Faschismus als Massenbewegung, p. 7.
26. Thus to Mayor Krogmann of Hamburg on March 15, 1933; cf. Jacobsen, Aussenpolitik, p. 395; here, too, on p. 25, illuminating information on the shifts in personnel that took place in the course of the seizure of power. In the Foreign Service, for example, “at most six per cent were replaced for political reasons,” and only a single diplomat, von Prittwitz-Gaffron, the German ambassador to Washington, quit the service because he had political reservations. For Hitler’s opinion of the Foreign Office see Rauschning, Gesprache, p. 250.
27. See Shirer, Rise and Fall, p. 210, for the foreign reaction.
28. IMT XXXIV, C-140.
29. Nolte, Krise, p. 138.
30. Thus the British journalist G. Ward Price in the course of an interview with Hitler on October 18, 1933. See VB of October 20, 1933; also Horkenbach, p. 479.
31. Hermann Rauschning, Gesprache, pp. 101 ff.
32. Cf. report of the British ambassador of November 15, 1933, in Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919—1939, 2nd Series, vol. VI (1933–34), London, 1957, pp. 38 ff. Cf. also the telegram that Martin Niemoller and other clergymen addressed to Hitler on this occasion: “In this hour of decision for the people and the Fatherland we salute our Fuhrer. We thank him for the valiant action and the clear speech that have preserved Germany’s honor. In the name of more than 2,500 Protestant pastors who do not belong to the German Christian religious movement we pledge loyal obedience and intercessory remembrances.” Quoted from Fabry, Mutmassungen, p. 123.
33. Documents on British Foreign Policy, 2nd series, vol. IV, report of January 30, 1934.
34. Thus Arnold Toynbee in 1937; quoted in M. Gilbert and R. Gott, The Appeasers, p. 82. See also Karl Lange, Hitlers unbeachtete Maximen, pp. 113 f. Similarly, Sumner Welles remarked that American attention concentrated chiefly on Hitler’s idiosyncrasies and on the resemblance of his mustache to Charlie Chaplin’s; Gilbert and Gott, pp. 125 f.
35. Many further references in Jacobsen, Aussenpolitik, pp. 369 ff. The episode with Sir John Simon is reported by Ivone Kirkpatrick, The Inner Circle, p. 68.
36. Cf. Anton M. Koktanek, Oswald Spengler in seiner Zeit, p. 458. On Hitler’s reading of Karl May, see Libres propos, p. 306; also Otto Dietrich, Zwolf Jahre, p. 164.
37. Rauschning, Gesprache, pp. 143 f. There are, however, two differing versions of Rohm’s intentions. According to one, he wanted to organize the SA as a kind of militia alongside the army; according to the other, he wanted to see the SA declared the official armed force, and the army incorporated into it. The documents, and a number of different indications, suggest strongly that Rohm advocated both ideas, depending on whom he was talking to, and conceived of the first version as a transition to the second.
38. Gorlitz and Quint, p. 440.
39. Rudolf Diels, Lucifer ante portas, p. 278. On von Blomberg’s and von Reichenau’s personalities see also Hermann Foertsch, Schuld und Verhangnis, pp. 30 ff.; also Friedrich Hossbach, Zwischen Wehrmacht und Hitler 1934–1938, p. 76, and VJHfZ
