Hindenburg himself had no desire to stay in office. Hindenburg was by now eighty-four; he had long since grown tired, and he foresaw troublesome discussions in connection with the plan and new attacks upon him from his already disappointed friends on the Right. All that he would consent to was a two-year extension of his term—and even this only after much persuasion. Significantly, what swayed him was a reference to Kaiser Wilhelm I, who at the age of ninety-one had declared that he had no time to be tired. But, in the course of it all, the old President lost confidence in Bruning, whom he recognized as the motive force behind all the urging. In putting across his stratagem, the Chancellor had actually lost what he had hoped to gain.
Bruning had next to deal with the various parties and win them over to the constitutional amendment. At this point, Hitler became a key figure and was wooed and sued accordingly. This certainly helped his prestige, but it also confronted him with a perilous choice. For now he either had to make common cause with the “pillars of the system,” and thus help to consolidate Bruning’s position and deny his own radicalism, or else he had to wage an electoral campaign against the gray-haired old President, the object of so much reverence, the personification of German loyalty and the nation’s surrogate kaiser. To oppose Hindenburg might seriously hurt the movement and, moreover, offend the President personally. Given the decisive powers of the presidency, such a course might have dire consequences for Hitler’s access to power.
Gregor Strasser was for accepting Bruning’s proposal. Rohm and, above all, Goebbels were strongly against it. “What is involved here is not the President himself,” Goebbels noted in his diary. “Herr Bruning is anxious to stabilize his own position and that of his cabinet for the foreseeable future. The Fuhrer has asked for time to consider. The situation must be clarified on all sides…. The chess game for power is beginning. Perhaps it will last throughout the year. A game that will be played with drive, prudence, and partly with cunning. The main thing is that we remain strong and make no compromises.”
Hitler remained in this quandary for some time. While Hugenberg responded with a prompt and blunt rejection, Hitler kept silent. The answer he finally gave reflected both his doubts and his caution. Each man behaved in character. Hugenberg was aping Hitler’s radicalism and breathlessly trying to surpass it but in the process only revealing his poor understanding of tactics. Hitler, on the other hand, employed his radicalism as an instrument, offsetting it with a goodly dash of shrewdness. In the present case he surrounded his rejection with so many ifs and buts that he seemed to be asking for further negotiations. He had sensed the increasing estrangement between Hindenburg and Bruning and did what he could to widen the rift. In a sudden display of pendantry he assumed the role of guardian of the Constitution, and in long-winded arguments that seemed to be scrupulously concerned about the President’s being faithful to his oath of office, he advanced all kinds of legalistic objections to the Chancellor’s plan.
Basically, this answer meant that Hitler had already decided to run against Hindenburg. But he hesitated for several weeks more before announcing the decision. For his dream had always been to come into power with the President’s blessing, not as the President’s opponent. He also realized, more keenly than did his satellites, the dangers of challenging the Hindenburg legend. Consequently, he remained impassive while Goebbels and others hammered away at him to announce his candidature. However, he went along with the proposal that German citizenship be obtained for him through the good offices of Minister of the Interior Klagges of Brunswick, who was a member of the Nazi party.25 Hitler would have to be a citizen in order to run. Here was still another instance of Hitler’s curious indecisiveness. He had a fatalistic streak and liked to let things take their course, postponing action until the last moment. For, strictly speaking, the decision had been taken long ago. Goebbel’s diary reveals, step by step, Hitler’s tortuous, almost bizarre vacillations:
January 9, 1932. Everything in confusion. Much guessing about what the Fuhrer will do. People will be surprised!—January 19, 1932. Discussed the question of the presidency with the Fuhrer. I report my conversations. No decision has been taken yet. I plead strongly for his own candidacy. Actually, there probably is no other course. We draw up calculations with figures.—January 21. In this situation there really is no other choice; we have to put up our own candidate. A difficult and unpleasant struggle, but we must go through with it.—January 25. The party is quivering with militancy.—January 27. The election slogan for or against Hindenburg seems to have become inevitable. Now we must come out with our candidate.—January 29. The Hindenburg Committee is meeting. Now we must show our colors.—January 31. The Fuhrer will make his decisions on Wednesday. There can no longer be any doubts.—February 2. The arguments for the Fuhrer’s candidacy are so thoroughly persuasive that anything else is out of the question…. At noon had a long discussion with the Fuhrer. He sets forth his view of the presidential election. He decides to run himself. But first the opposition must occupy fixed positions. The Social Democratic Party will be the decisive factor. Then our decision will be communicated to the public. It is a struggle of enormously embarrassing alternatives, but we must go through with it. The Fuhrer makes his moves without the slightest haste and with a clear head.—February 3. The gauleiters are waiting for the announcement of the decision to run for the presidency. They wait in vain. This is a game of chess. You don’t tell in advance what moves you are going to make…. The party is terribly nervous, tense, but nevertheless everybody is still keeping silent…. In his leisure hours the Fuhrer is occupying himself with architectural plans for a new party headquarters as well as for a spectacular rebuilding of Berlin. He has the project all worked out, and I am constantly astonished anew at his expertise in so many fields. At night many loyal old party comrades come to see me. They are depressed because they have not yet heard of any decision. They are worried that the Fuhrer will wait too long. —February 9. Everything is still in suspense. —February 10. Outside a glassy cold winter day. Clear decisions are hovering in the clear air. They cannot be much longer in coming.—February 12. At the Kaiserhof with the Fuhrer I once again go over our computations. It is a gamble, but we must go ahead. The decision has now been taken…. The Fuhrer is back in Munich; the public decision postponed for a few days.—February 12. This week we must announce our stand on the presidential question.—February 15. Now we no longer have to hide our decision beneath a bushel.—February 16. I am going ahead as if the election campaign were already in progress. That makes for some difficulties, since the Fuhrer has not yet officially announced his candidacy.—February 19. With the Fuhrer at the Kaiserhof. I talked to him privately for a long time. The decision has been taken.—February 21. This eternal waiting is almost wearing me out.
For the following night Goebbels had scheduled a membership meeting at the Berlin Sportpalast. This was to be his first public appearance since he had been banned from public speaking on January 25. By now the election was only three weeks away, and Hitler was still wavering. In the course of the day Goebbels went to the Kaiserhof to brief Hitler on the contents of his speech. When he once more brought up the question of candidature, he unexpectedly received the permission he had so desperately waited for: to announce Hitler’s decision to run. “Thank God,” Goebbels noted. He added:
Sportpalast jammed. Genera) membership meeting of the West, East and North regions. Stormy ovations right at the start. After an hour of preamble I publicly announce the Fuhrer’s candidacy. A storm of enthusiasm rages for almost ten minutes. Wild demonstrations for the Fuhrer. People stand up cheering and shouting. They raise the roof. An overwhelming sight. This is truly a Movement that must win. An indescribable excitement and rapture prevails…. Late at night the Fuhrer telephones. I report to him, and then he comes to our house. He is glad that the proclamation of his candidacy has struck home so effectively. He is and remains our Fuhrer after all.26
The last sentence reveals the doubts that had assailed Goebbels during the preceding weeks in the face of Hitler’s weak leadership. But the sequel is just as characteristic of Hitler’s psychic pattern: the sudden surge of energy with which he, threw himself into the battle without a single glance backward, once the decision had been made. On February 26, in a ceremony at the Hotel Kaiserhof, he had himself appointed a Regierungsrat in Brunswick for the period of a week, thus acquiring German citizenship. The following day, at a meeting in the Sportpalast, he cried out to his opponents: “I know your slogan! You say: ‘We will stay at any cost.’ And I tell you: We will overthrow you in any case!… I am overjoyed to be able to fight alongside my comrades, whatever the outcome.” He picked up a remark by Police Commissioner Albert Grzesinski of Berlin, who had spoken of driving him out of Germany with a dog whip: “Go ahead and threaten me with the dog whip. We shall see whether at the end of this struggle the whip is still in your hands.” At the same time, he tried to disclaim the unwelcome role of opponent to Hindenburg, which Bruning had forced on him. Rather, it was his duty to say to the Field Marshal— whose “name the German people must always hail as that of their leader in the great struggle”—“Dear old man,
