about Goerdeler’s suggestion (243-44).

40. Elfriede Nebgen, qtd. in Muller, Stauffenberg, 385.

41. Muller, Stauffenberg, 393.

42. Muller, Stauffenberg, 374.

43. Spiegelbild, 502.

44. Hoffmann, Widerstand, 305.

45. Van Roon, Neuordnung, 288-89. For Stauffenberg’s view, see Hoffmann, Widerstand, 308. For doubts about Stauffenberg’s agreement on making contact, see Muller, Stauffenberg, 419.

46. Schlabrendorff, Offiziere, 109. The version in the older paperback edition is somewhat different.

8. The Eleventh Hour

1. Eberhard Zeller, Geist der Freiheit: Der zwanzigste Juli (Munich, 1963), 346.

2. Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich, trans. Richard and Clara Winston (New York: Collier), 378. At first Mertz von Quirnheim was unhappy about being trans­ferred from the front, but soon he felt “liberated” because he was close to Stauffenberg and the conspiracy; see Peter Hoffmann, Claus Schenk Graf von Stauffenberg und seine Bruder (Stuttgart, 1992), 386-87.

3. Peter Hoffmann, Widerstand, Staatsstreich, Attentat: Der Kampf der Opposi­tion gegen Hitler, 3rd ed. (Munich, 1979), 468.

4. Ferdinand Sauerbruch, Das war mein Leben (Munich, 1976), 432-33.

5. Zeller, Freiheit, 506, n. 9.

6. Dorothee von Meding, Mit dem Mut des Herzens: Die Frauen des 20. Juli (Berlin, 1992), 255-56. A report quoted in Hoffmann’s Widerstand shows that Wer­ner von Haeften himself “suffered” from the idea of assassinating someone (777, n. 67).

7. Joachim Kramarz, Claus Graf Stauffenberg, 15. November 1907-20. Juli 1944: Das Leben eines Offiziers (Munich, 1963), 201; see also Hoffmann, Stauf­fenberg, 338.

8. Gerhard Ritter, Carl Goerdeler und die deutsche Widerstandsbewegung (Stuttgart, 1984), 408.

9. Harald Poelchau, Die letzten Stunden: Erinnerungen eines Gefangnispfarrers (Cologne, 1987), 117. See also Hoffmann, Widerstand, 465. For Captain Gehre, see Helena P. Page, General Friedrich Olbricht: Ein Mann des 20 Juli (Bonn and Berlin, 1992), 261. For the current rumors, see Marie Wassiltschikow, Die Berliner Tagebucher der “Missie” Wassiltschikow, 1940-1945 (Berlin, 1987), 229-30 and 232.

10. Kunrat von Hammerstein, Spahtrupp (Stuttgart, 1963), 262. For Stauffenberg’s comments about Stieff, see Archiv Peter, ed., Spiegelbild einer Verschworung: Die Kaltenbrunner-Berichte uber das Attentat vom 20 Juli 1944 (Stuttgart, 1961).

11. Zeller, Freiheit, 327ff.

12. Hans Speidel, Invasion 1944 (Stuttgart, 1949), 138-39. Christian Muller also points out the distance between Rommel and the resistance, legends to the contrary. The field marshal was actually only identified with the resistance as a result of his forced suicide (Oberst i.G. Stauffenberg: Eine Biographie [Dusseldorf, 1970], 422).

13. Berthold von Stauffenberg was interrogated on July 22, 1944; see Spiegelbild, 21. For the statement to Klausing, see Spiegelbild, 131. For another version of events and Stauffenberg’s reasons for holding off, see Hoffmann, Widerstand, 473, and Stauffenberg, 417ff. Hoffmann emphasizes the “unbelievable” action of Stieff, Fellgiebel, and Wagner, whom he sees as effectively withdrawing their support for the entire uprising by insisting on Himmler’s presence. He seems to go too far, however, in view of the fact that all three generals were without doubt strongly opposed to the regime and that they supported the assassination attempt on July 20 even though Himmler was again absent

14. The source of the quotation is Captain Eberhard Siebeck, whom Mertz von Quirnheim had summoned to Berlin for a few days to support the coup. He is also the source of the comment that follows about the relaxed atmosphere on Bendlerstrasse after the assassination attempt was canceled. When Stauffenberg asked Mertz von Quirnheim what he personally thought about an assassination attempt if Himmler was not present, the reply was terse: “Do it!” See Hoffmann, Widerstand, 474-75. See also Page (Olbricht), who casts doubt, not without good reason, on the thesis advanced mainly by Hoffmann that Stauffenberg hesitated at the last moment. That thesis is based on accounts by Hans Bernd Gisevius, who was of course biased, and Mertz von Quirnheim’s wife. In Page’s view, it may be just a matter of confusing the events of July 15 with those of July 11. Although her view seems plausible, the intervention of Fellgiebel, Stieff, and Wagner is not mentioned.

15. According to Gisevius, it was Helldorf who reported the “euphoric mood,” commenting that “a stone seemed to have been lifted from Olbricht’s heart” (Bis urn bittern Ende [Zurich, 1954], 589). Page (Olbricht) expresses well-founded doubts about the “euphoria” as well.

16. See Zeller, Freiheit, 373, although there is no indication of source.

17. Count Romedio Galeazzo von Thun-Hohenstein, Der Verschworer: General Oster und die Militaropposition (Berlin, 1982), 256.

18. Spiegelbild, 217. It may be that at the time he spoke to Goerdeler Stauffenberg still did not know for sure that he would be making a presentation at Fuhrer headquarters on July 20.

19. Ursula von Kardoff, Berliner Aufzeichnungen, 1942-1945 (Munich, 1992), 209 (entry of July 18, 1944).

20. Spiegelbild, 117.

21. Spiegelbild, 146.

22. Casar von Hofacker assessed the chances of the coup attempt as “only ten percent”; see Walter Bargatzky, Hotel Majestic: Ein Deutscher im besetzten Frankreich (Freiburg, 1987), 131. For Schulenburg and Berthold von Stauffenberg, see Hoffmann, Widerstand, 479; for Beck, see 462. For Stauffenberg, see Muller, Stauffenberg, 460.

23. Ritter, Goerdeler, 408.

9. July 20, 1944

1. The most thorough studies of the assassination attempt are Peter Hoffmann, Widerstand, Staatsstreich, Attentat: Der Kampf der Opposition gegen Hitler, 3rd. ed. (Munich, 1979), 496ff. and 813ff, and Christian Muller, Oberst i.G. Stauffenberg: Eine Biographie (Dusseldorf, 1970), 477ff, 484-85, and 613ff. See also Archiv Peter, ed., Spiegelbild einer Verschworung: Die Kaltenbrunner-Berichte uber das Attentat vom 20. Juli 1944 (Stuttgart, 1961), 85-86. The widespread belief that the assassina­tion attempt failed because the briefing was suddenly shifted to a “barracks” is un­ founded. In actual fact, the “noon briefings” had been held for quite some time in what was known as the “Speer barracks’ while the “evening briefing” was always held in the bunker. It is true that if the explosion had occurred in the bunker, with its cement walls, everyone present would have been killed because of the much greater concentrating effect.

2. Peter Hoffmann, Claus Schenk Graf von Stauffenberg und seine Bruder

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