The Crusader

Another line of Moscow’s propaganda assault, which was prolific in Pravda, was to refer to the Caribbean “adventure” as a “piratic attack.”²⁴ Soviet commentator Valentin Zorin, who judged Reagan a “blockhead” who “does not care to think,”²⁵ called the invasion “naked banditry.” Americans, he claimed, were “the most misinformed people on earth.” This was the result, he said, curiously speaking of the United States and not of the USSR, of “a gigantic propaganda machine…. When you leave the country, you get access to normal information.” Yet, a frustrated Zorin reluctantly conceded that, “A considerable number of Americans applauded Reagan.”²⁶

“WE’RE GOING TO WIN THE COLD WAR”

The radiance exuding from Reagan and his team was clear in an internal report only days after Grenada. That November, Reagan and his contingent of underminers got an exciting glimpse of the depth of Soviet desperation, courtesy of Herb Meyer.

Meyer was special assistant to Bill Casey and vice chair of the National Intelligence Council, a prestigious seat at the CIA, where he observed the full scope and brunt of the Reagan strategy. That strategy, said Meyer, citing the tandem of Reagan and Casey, was “very dangerous…very gutsy….And there were a lot of people who said, ‘Oh dear, you’re right, the bear is wounded. Don’t poke sticks at a wounded bear.’ But the Reagan-Casey approach was: ‘Hey, my enemy is on his knees. It’s a good time to break his head.’”²⁷

It was in this spirit that Herb Meyer revealed dramatic intelligence findings in the weeks after Grenada in November 1983. This intelligence demonstrated that the Soviets now understood Reagan’s rejection of their nation’s very existence: “[Y]ou could see that in the intelligence. What they were saying was: ‘Uh, oh, he caught on.’ Because they knew they could be had. One thing about a bully: he knows exactly how strong he is and how weak he is. And the Soviets knew that Reagan knew that they could be had.”²⁸

This new development caused Meyer to write an extraordinary memo, read carefully up through the chain of command. In his memo, Meyer assessed that the USSR was entering a “terminal phase,” but in spite of this good news, there was a danger: a cornered Kremlin might opt for war. On the other hand, wrote Meyer, “If present trends continue, we’re going to win the Cold War.”²⁹

It was a view that mirrored Reagan’s own precisely, only this time it was supported by concrete analysis from the intelligence community. This memo was the articulation of a point which Reagan had known long before he was president: that the Soviet system would weaken with each passing year, and at some point would collapse, giving rise to a wave of a freedom. It was a proclamation that he reiterated that December just before Christmas, telling French reporters from Le Figaro that contrary to what Communism professed, it was “freedom which is infectious and democracy which is the wave of the future. The tide of history is a freedom tide.”³⁰

His year of strong words and decisive action was helping to expedite the Soviet demise. Now, as the focus turned to the election year ahead, the strategy to undermine would need to rely on the mechanisms that the NSC had already put in motion. Next, it was time to let the people decide who would lead them forward in the four years ahead.

14. Winning the Second Term: 1984

WITH THE COLD WAR STRATEGY NOW IN PLACE, RONALD REAGAN had to focus on another political strategy, one that, if it failed, would never allow an opportunity for that “take-down” strategy that had consumed the fertile anti-Soviet minds at Bill Clark’s National Security Council. The president needed to preserve himself before he could hasten the decomposition of the system that he believed was rotting as quickly as the occupant of Lenin’s tomb. In short, Ronald Reagan had to get reelected. As such, 1984 was not so much about formulating policy to win the Cold War but, instead, devising a political campaign to win Reagan the Electoral College.

Because Reagan believed that Grenada reflected America’s recovery and return to greatness, the operation continued to play a prominent role in his speeches and words well into 1984. In a January interview with the Washington Post, kicking off the election year, the president said he perceived a “new feeling,” a “great change” in the “confidence” of Americans. “I think the reaction of our people to the success of our rescue mission in Grenada was an indication.”¹ These were sentiments that he would continue to reiterate throughout 1984, as he claimed that Grenada had not only helped that region “but perhaps helped all Americans stand a little taller.”²

Not only was Grenada in the win column, but the economy was exploding, as one-time double-digit unemployment, interest rates, and inflation were down to single digits, including an inflation rate near 2 percent, not to mention thriving growth rates not seen in decades. Buoyed by the good news, Ronald Reagan could now be heard everywhere making statements about the turnaround in the national psyche.³

While his 1980 campaign had focused on the need to restore morale, the 1984 campaign highlighted the renewal of morale. A bumper sticker circulated by the campaign in 1984 was already a bit behind the times when it stated simply: “PRESIDENT REAGAN: Bringing America Back.” It was already back; it was “Morning Again in America,” as the warm and fuzzy Reagan TV commercials celebrated. These ads borrowed the then-new anthem of country music artist Lee Greenwood, which rang out, “I’m proud to be an American.”

It was a strong message and one that was established early on in the year when Reagan’s January 1984 State of the Union address set the tone for the months ahead. “There is renewed energy and optimism throughout the land,” he proclaimed. “America is back, standing tall, looking to the eighties with courage, confidence, and hope.” After that declaration in the fourth sentence of the speech text, nearly every other paragraph in his address contained a word like “revival,” “spirit,” “confidence,” “credibility,” “purpose,” or phrases like “crusade for renewal,” “restore pride,” or “new strength.”⁴ It was a turnabout for which an emotional Reagan would later literally thank God: “We can be grateful to God that we have seen such a rebirth of it [patriotism] here in this country.”⁵ He often said that the change in morale was among his “proudest” achievements.⁶

Indeed, this achievement was such a success that it has gone undisputed by even the political left, including academic political scientists and historians.⁷ In other words, credit for the accomplishment came from those not expected to credit Reagan.⁸ Outside of academia, there were as many if not more journalists who credited Reagan with recovery.⁹ Time’s dean of presidential correspondents, Hugh Sidey, said flatly: “No one can deny that Ronald Reagan restored morale to a country that needed it”—a view seconded by veteran CBS reporter Mike Wallace, among numerous others.¹⁰ Edmund Morris goes so far to claim that Reagan changed the national mood “overnight.” The change was so quick, said Morris, “that it can only be ascribed to him.”¹¹

Foreigners were also impressed: Canadian Doug Gamble was so taken that he moved to the United States at this time, desiring a country that wore its patriotism on its sleeve. Fondly recalling the Reagan era, he spoke descriptively of “the good old lump-in-your-throat, tears-in-your-eyes, hair-standing-up-on-the-back-of-your-neck patriotism that was so thick in the air you could almost reach out and grab a fistful of it.”¹²

It is easy to forget that by 1984 Ronald Reagan had achieved this renewal while critics tore at him and his policies. He was called stupid, uncaring, a warmonger—and had been especially vilified in the previous, intense Cold War year.

THE KREMLIN VS. REAGAN

Most impressive, similar assessments came even from the enemy’s camp—from as far leftward as the