contrary to popular belief, such was not the case. In fact, the initial source of the idea came long before NSDD- 166. Reagan himself cited the importance of antiaircraft missiles in Afghanistan during a campaign speech in Pensacola, Florida on January 9, 1980. Coming just two weeks after the Soviet invasion, it was not clear who (if anyone) Reagan consulted, but the impact of the statement remained clear: the Stingers were a priority even before Reagan entered the Oval Office.
Reagan’s recommendation was reported by Martin Schram of the Washington Post, who wrote that Reagan, “specifically urged the supplying of U.S. shoulder-launched, heat-seeking missiles that can shoot down Soviet helicopter gunships.” Further, Reagan said the United States should supply weapons through Pakistan— another idea that later came to fruition. “There’s nothing wrong with giving free people weapons to defend their freedom,” said Reagan.28 As early as 1980, he had apparently identified the remedy for turning the war against and ultimately defeating the USSR.29
Once he won the White House, Reagan began moving in this direction. In the first weeks of his administration, he started communication with the Afghan resistance. Two rebel leaders visited Washington in late February 1981. They held a press conference at the Capitol in which they expressed hope that they would receive not just rifles and ammunition from the administration but also, as the Moscow Domestic Service duly noted in a February 26 statement, “ground-to-air missiles.”30
Though U.S. assistance came immediately, it took years to get Stingers to the Afghans. Reagan defense officials debated the wisdom of handing over one of the U.S. military’s most precious weapons, allowing it to be not just used but also replicated. This was a source of opposition by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, some Pentagon officials, and even certain CIA members.31 One Reagan official noted that some of the military brass reacted not like Cold Warriors, as they were typically portrayed, but like bureaucrats.32
While fears of compromising U.S. technology were legitimate, those who favored sending the Stingers saw no value in spending billions developing weapons simply to stockpile them. Moreover, it became apparent that the Stinger could be enormously productive in taking down the Soviets. Jack Wheeler, a conservative and friend of the Reagan administration, traveled to Afghanistan in 1983, where he witnessed the devastation wrought by Soviet helicopter gunships whose superiority the Muj could not counter. Upon his return, he was debriefed by officials from the White House, NSC, and CIA. “The Afghans control the ground,” he told them. “The Soviets control the air. Take the Soviets out of the air and they lose.”33 He found little disagreement, particularly among Undersecretary of Defense Fred Ikle, Ikle’s aide Michael Pillsbury, NSC intelligence official Vincent Cannistraro, and Ambassador Mort Abramowitz—all of whom championed the Stinger. At higher levels, Cap Weinberger joined Casey and Reagan in advocating the supplying of antiaircraft weapons.34
This top-level support notwithstanding, differences in opinion remained an obstacle. Reagan wanted the Stingers to be sent, but was blocked by bureaucratic rigidity. As State Department veteran Peter Rodman said of the Stingers: “[I]mplementing the policy in the U.S. government, as usual, was another matter…. [N]ever underestimate the power of working-level officials to obstruct a presidential decision they disagree with.”35
In addition, Reagan also faced resistance from Congress, and it was not until 1985 that there was bipartisan support for sending Stingers. Nearly every Democrat on both intelligence committees opposed the idea. A key turning point was a June 1985 trip to Pakistan by Democratic Senators Bill Bradley and David Boren, members of the Senate Intelligence Committee. When they returned, they lobbied for increased support for the rebels.36
But much to the dismay of the Stinger proponents on Reagan’s team, the support of the two Democratic senators was not enough and the obstruction continued. In April 1986, Reagan placed his signature on a decision memo that explicitly authorized Stingers to be delivered.37 Even then, a maneuver by a CIA official left the first procurement of fifty Stingers sitting behind in a Virginia warehouse, as the official lamely argued that the Soviets were testing new antimissile defenses that had to be investigated before U.S. shipments could take place. It was a startling and stifling display, ironically emanating from the same agency that was training and arming the Muj and tearing up Soviet units in Afghanistan; from no less than William J. Casey’s own organization. The disappointment could be seen by everyone. As National Security Adviser Bud McFarlane put it, “Everyone wanted to move fast, but he [Reagan] wanted to move even faster.” Reagan instructed McFarlane and Casey: “Do whatever you have to do to help the Mujahedin not only to survive, but to win.”38
The corner was finally turned when Pakistani officers traveled to the United States in June 1986 for special Stinger training—the same month that Reagan met with Afghan resistance leaders.39 Days later, a clandestine training center was set up in Rawalpindi, Pakistan, featuring an advanced electronic simulator developed in the United States. Rebels fired mock missiles at a large screen that highlighted a hit or miss.40 Shortly thereafter, the first shipment of Stingers finally arrived in Pakistan that summer.41 The hard work of the administration would soon payoff as the missiles would reverse the course of the war.
Even before the first Stinger was fired in September 1986, Gorbachev had been frustrated by the war. In his opening speech to the twenty-seventh CPSU Congress, held February 25 to March 6, 1986, he called the war a “running sore.”42 Despite his efforts of the previous year, it was clear that his military initiatives with General Zaitsev and the KGB were not having the desired effect on the campaign.
Ultimately, the Stingers would prove to be a nail in the Soviet coffin, singlehandedly eliminating the air superiority which had accounted for much of the success of the Red Army. While the war continued to rage, the bells began tolling for the Soviet Union’s military effort in Afghanistan on that day in September 1986 when the first helicopter exploded.
REYKJAVIK
As the fall of 1986 progressed, Reagan received yet more evidence that the Soviet economy was in dire shape. “It made me believe that, if nothing else, the Soviet economic tailspin would force Mikhail Gorbachev to come around on an arms reduction agreement we both could live with,” said Reagan. “If we didn’t deviate from our policies, I was convinced it would happen.” Now more than ever, said Reagan, “the Soviet economy was a basket case.”
He tried looking at the situation from Gorbachev’s viewpoint: “I knew he had to be giving high priority to reducing the vast amounts of rubles the Soviets were spending on weapons. He had to be losing some sleep over the vitality of our economy… and he must have realized more than ever that we could outspend him as long as the Soviets insisted on prolonging the arms race.”43 More accurately, it was Reagan who was prolonging the arms race. Gorbachev was “prolonging” it by not tossing in the towel. When Reagan saw Gorbachev at the Reykjavik summit in October 1986, he warned him “to join in arms reductions or face an arms race he couldn’t win.”44
A few days after Reykjavik, Gorbachev shared his fears with Soviet citizens in a nationally televised address. “The United States wants to exhaust the Soviet Union economically through a race in the most up-to-date and expensive space weapons,” he explained. “It wants to create various kinds of difficulties for the Soviet leadership to wreck its plans, including the social sphere, in the sphere of improving the standard of living of our people, thus arousing dissatisfaction among the people with their leadership.”45
Two excellent high-level sources on Gorbachev’s desperation at this moment were foreign ministers Eduard Shevardnadze and Alexander Bessmertnykh. Shevardnadze noted: “It was invariably argued that there was no reason why we should reduce our armaments, by, say, 10 or 16 items more than the other side. Yet the point was to stop the arms race…. Our country could not remain a militarized state.”46
Bessmertnykh, who had been a member of the Soviet National Security Council and one of only five members of the Defense Council, acknowledged that Reagan’s buildup, particularly the threat of SDI, did in fact prompt the Soviets to furiously counterspend: “We thought that the only way we could respond to the threat of SDI, especially, was to develop the ICBM program as much as possible. It was with that in mind… that we started to develop two modern ICBMs, which were the SS-24 and SS-25.” And yet, the Soviets realized they had to relent. In long-range missiles in particular, Bessmertnykh said that Gorbachev “understood that we did not have a chance of catching up with the United States.”47
