quiet person in Rhodesian Air Force days, turned out to be a much-revered multi-millionaire in a niche none of us would have believed possible.
Vic Wightman was an eccentric who would not allow his family to use salt in any food. He had three hates. These were Americans, dogs and insurance agents. His worst fear was to be visited by an American insurance agent with a dog. Vic was an excellent squadron commander and strike pilot whose name comes up often in this book. When Vic left the force he ended up flying a Lear Jet out of Nelspruit in South Africa on cloud-seeding and other weather-related work. He started his day there by walking barefoot from home to work over a forested hill to enjoy the bush and the local wildlife. He remained without shoes when flying his executive jet and sometimes astounded his bosses in Johannesburg by emerging barefoot from his aircraft to attend company meetings. In addition to one already covered, some of Vic’s experiences will be revealed later.
Army claims air kills
4 SQUADRON PROVOSTS WERE BECOMING MORE and more involved with internal strikes whether operating in conjunction with helicopters, being called to assist ground forces or acting against targets located during visual recce by other 4 Squadron pilots.
All 4 Squadron pilots were great operators but one junior pilot was already emerging as a star performer. Almost every action involving Air Sub-Lieutenant ‘Cocky’ Benecke with the callsign Juliet 4 turned to success. This had much to do with his amazing eyesight, as will be seen.
Brian Murdoch (E4), Cocky Benecke (J4) and Kevin Peinke (R4), all flying Provost, were involved in an action inside Rhodesia on 18 April when others of 4 Squadron were still tied up with the air search in Mozambique. Selous Scouts operator Mick Hardy and his pseudo terrorist group had initiated this widespread running action.
Mick had been successful in locating three bases that one particularly large ZANLA group used in random rotation. Mick’s problem was that he could not tell which of the bases was occupied at any given time. His Officer Commanding, Ron Reid-Daly, went to JOC Hurricane at Bindura to arrange for the grouping of all available helicopters and troops to move in behind simultaneous air strikes on all three bases. Unfortunately there was some confusion and the terrorists survived.
Undaunted, Mick picked up the trail and established two alternative bases for which a first-light attack by RAR was planned. Due to scepticism following the abortive attack of the previous day, the local RAR commander approached his task in an uncaring manner, causing Mick Hardy to realise that his target of about thirty CTs would be lost if he did not take the initiative. He did this by dealing directly with the Air Force.
Following the action that accounted for eight CTs killed and four captured the RAR, who came to the party late, proudly claimed all to their own credit. This was an ongoing difficulty for the Air Force; not that it should have mattered who achieved the successes. But apart from niggling the airmen, problems caused by ground forces claiming most Air Force successes, a consequence of inter-company rivalries, could prejudice annual allocation of funds to Air Force by the Government Treasury. Fortunately a more balanced situation developed as time went on but the reader can judge who did what in this particular action. The Air Strike Report is difficult to follow without an accompanying sketch, but it gives a fair idea of the widely spread actions involved. As with most hurriedly written ASRs, little attention was given to grammar.
Juliet 4 and Yellow section consisting of 4 helicopters were scrambled to just north of Banji acting on information received from c/s 91 that 14 terrs were heading in a north westerly direction from their location. This group was not seen and whilst orbiting overhead 4 terrs were seen to run into a thicket north east of 91’s location. J4 then directed two choppers onto either side of a stream that they had gone into, to act as stop groups and the one helicopter came under fire. J4 put in a strike using front gun and Sneb with no results. J4 remained in the area and saw one terr running east along the river just south of Bobgarande School. He carried out a front gun attack and was hit in the process. J4 was then informed of 4 terrs running in the fields to the south of the river and was directed to them. A strike was carried out by J4 and one terr with an RPD fell. E4 arrived at this time and carried out an attack on the subsequent three. All 3 fell, 1 then got up and started running again. E4 carried out another attack on him and he fell again. E4 then directed ground forces onto their position. The last terr to fall opened fire on the ground forces and he was shot by them. The other two who were shot by E4 were found dead by ground forces. J4 returned (from rearming) and directed ground forces to the body with the RPD; he too was dead. E4 then departed to rearm. J4 then directed troops to the area just south of Bobgarande School where he had come under fire. An air strike was carried out by J4 and the subsequent sweep revealed 1 dead terr. J4 returned to rearm and R4 took over. More firing had started from the same area, which was a thick reed area on a riverbank. J4 then rejoined R4 and led a further strike that resulted in 1 dead and 4 surrendering, all of whom were wounded. J4 returned to rearm. R4 did a further 2 strikes; as a result 2 more dead terrs were found.
Gungwa mountain
FOLLOWING A BREAK AT THORNHILL I returned to ops earlier than planned on 4 May. This was in response to a call from JOC Hurricane at Bindura. SB had received reports of a large ZANLA base just across the border in the vicinity of a high feature known as Gungwa mountain, upon whose summit was one of the border beacons. I was asked to pinpoint the base.
Flying a Cessna, I searched outwards from the mountain but failed to find any base. Only one place remotely resembled the type of temporary camp found inside Rhodesia. This lay in dense jesse bush at the base of Gungwa mountain itself. Because it was not possible to remain overhead for a detailed look, I had to fly all over the place before returning for a second and then a third look. I was not convinced that this was a base but I could not reject it either because too many cattle paths ran in parallel lines within and outside the jesse bush. If in fact it was the site of a CT base, I decided it was for no more than ten CTs residing on a temporary basis.
At Bindura I reported that there were no CT camps near Gungwa and that only the large patch of jesse bush offered the remotest possibility for a mere handful of CTs. I thought no more about the matter believing an OP (observation post) callsign would move in to monitor the site. However, a couple of days later I received instructions to fly to New Sarum and report to OC Flying Wing. On arrival, Wing Commander Bill Jelley told me that I was to fly lead Vampire on 6 May for the biggest air strike to date on the Gungwa mountain base. This was to be followed by every available helicopter making a vertical envelopment with RLI troops. I protested and made it quite clear that I felt that Air Force was being drawn into a huge ‘lemon’. My objections were noted, but SB interrogations of captured CTs had satisfied JOC Hurricane that the jesse bush lying at the base of Gungwa mountain fitted with the intelligence. The strike would go ahead as planned. It was then that I came to realise that the whole fiasco was going to be recorded on film. In fact I saw myself on national television giving the air briefing for the very air strike I had tried to prevent.
I flew in the lead Vampire piloted by Justin Varkevisser. We marked with a full load of 20mm cannon and two 50-gallon Frantans and were followed in rapid succession by two Vampires, six Hunters and three Canberras. Four Provosts came from behind the mountain just ahead of about twelve helicopters. The whole operation went like clockwork on a patch of bush that was devoid of any ZANLA presence.
As expected, I was used as the scapegoat for the wastage of air weapons. Because of this I refused, with Air HQ support, to be involved in a similar situation in late 1974.
