ACROSS THE ZAMBEZI RIVER TO our north, Zambia continued to be openly hostile to Rhodesia. The Portuguese were already passing control of Mozambique to the unprepared leadership of their former enemy who would soon give ZANLA open access to Rhodesia’s entire eastern flank. To the west Botswana was showing increasing signs of willingness to allow ZIPRA access to our entire western flank and, to our south the Government of South Africa seemed to be pressurising Ian Smith by deliberately interfering with the free flow of vital imports. So, all around us the signs were ominous as 1974 drew to its close.
Within Rhodesia the score in CTs killed and captured was mounting rapidly, though there was absolutely no room for complacency and, as already stated, our war supplies were often too low for comfort. It was only a matter of weeks before Mozambique’s ports would be lost to Rhodesia and, being a landlocked country, this left us totally dependent on South African for all our imports and exports. This new situation brought with it very unpleasant changes in South Africa’s political posture, not that the South African Defence Forces or the general public of South African ever wavered in their support to Rhodesia.
Following the collapse of the Portuguese, detente became the tool by which Prime Minister Vorster and a limited number of his party faithful intended to gain favour with Black Africa’s political leaders. Detente was the route by which Vorster hoped to reduce African antagonism toward his party’s apartheid policies. Furthermore, he seemed to have written off the Zambezi River as a natural defence line against communism now that half of its previously useful length was lost. The longstanding relationship between South Africa and Rhodesia, one of unquestioning friendship and co-operation, was changing to one in which Rhodesia had become the vital pawn in Vorster’s detente game.
This situation forces me to run a little ahead in time, because detente would surpass every political danger Rhodesia had ever faced in its fight to retain responsible government. For the likes of me, first signs of serious trouble came in early August 1975 with the sudden withdrawal of the majority of South African Police units. This suggested to us that Vorster was being outmanoeuvred by black governments, yet his obsession with detente continued. If senior military commanders understood what was going on, it was not being passed down the line to operators in the field. The loss of the SAP impacted badly on our own overstretched forces and I guess it must have angered those SA Policemen who served in Rhodesia. Nevertheless there was for us no alternative but to keep our noses to the grindstone.
From the outset men of the South African Police forces that were sent to Rhodesia were totally untrained in bush warfare and this never really improved because South Africa’s move to assist us was heavily motivated by self-interest. Men trained for riot control and other policing duties in South Africa were sent to Rhodesia to gain on-the-job training in counter-insurgency operations. As soon as they became proficient, they were substituted by a new batch of men. Nevertheless, their numbers had been of great assistance and they were sorely missed. The removal of the SAP through acquiescence of politically manipulated Police commanders was one thing, but the South African armed services’ reaction to political pressure seems to have been very different.
Even before the withdrawal of the SAP, SAAF had increased helicopter and crew levels in a scheme known as Operation Polo. The substantial improvement in helicopter numbers was to help offset the loss of over 2,000 South African Police, but again, it suited South Africa to have its aircrews gain ‘on-the-job’ operational experience. No criticism is intended because this was a sensible line to follow and Rhodesians were only too pleased to build on strong bonds that already existed with the SAAF.
Initially an Air Force major headed the Op Polo crews but he made a bit of a mess of things when he forced rank to flying K-Car lead before gaining any Fireforce experience. This caused such a nonsense with the Army that, thereafter, only captains and lieutenants remained to fly Z-Cars until, at a later time, the Op Polo crews on detachment wore Rhodesian Air Force uniforms and ranks.
A SAAF liaison officer was permanently attached to Air HQ. A number of wing commanders (SAAF rank— commandant) and squadron leaders (SAAF rank—major) occupied this post over the years and all of them proved to be excellent men who handled the few problems that arose quickly, quietly and efficiently. All the South Africans enjoyed their participation in operations and found the Rhodesian military living standards, at base and in the field, to be better than those back home. They also enjoyed their attachments to our Air Force for another reason. When in Rhodesia the officers and men received a handsome daily allowance whilst their regular pay accumulated to sizeable sums for collection on return to home bases.
Authentication of pseudo groups
ON 24 AUGUST 1974 I LED an attack on a camp that appeared to be occupied. Although the camp appeared fresh, and was unmistakably CT in pattern and location, it was unusual in that sun reflections blinked off tins and other items of litter. I had not seen this before. The Fireforce troops I called upon reported that the camp had been vacated that morning and that the litter was from Rhodesian ration pack items left lying about by Selous Scouts. Ron Reid-Daly hotly denied that the position had been a Scouts base and made the point that his men were never issued with ratpacks (Rhodesian Army ration packs). Certainly I had not ever seen litter in Selous Scouts pseudo bases, and I saw many of them. From my own observations, litter was associated with Police and TF callsigns operating from high points on ground surveillance work. However, though no one owned up to being responsible for the litter in this camp, much fuss was made of the matter and littering ceased to be a problem.
Although the Selous Scouts were doing extremely well they sometimes ran into difficulties when tribesmen appeared so uncertain of their identity that they became reluctant to co-operate with the pseudo teams. In order to gain the locals’ confidence, which was of paramount importance, Ron occasionally arranged a Fireforce action on the bases his men were using. This was potentially dangerous because, for security reasons, it was necessary to conduct genuine Fireforce actions in which only two officers in the K-Car knew that the men on the ground were Selous Scouts and not CTs.
To ensure that the locals were totally impressed, the pseudo ZANLA group needed to pull out of its camp position only seconds ahead of leading air strikes, and certainly before the arrival overhead of the K-Car. The pseudo ZANLA men, using cover off to one side of their ‘abandoned camp’, would impress the locals by sending up heavy fire, aimed well behind passing aircraft, though tracer rounds were not used by the pseudos and the airborne Army commander deliberately kept his troops well clear of the pseudo CT position. This was a dangerous game and there were some close shaves.
ZIPRA plans upset
SPECIAL BRANCH IN BULAWAYO HAD managed to break into ZIPRA’s network of agents in Matabeleland, thereby discovering the location of many pits that had been prepared to receive large quantities of war materiel from Zambia. ZIPRA was clearly intent on getting internal operations moving to counter all the glory that was going ZANLA’s way. Quite unrelated to this was the discovery through Canberra photographic reconnaissance over Zambia, of a large hole in a remote place north of the Zambezi River between Victoria Falls and the headwaters of Lake Kariba.
In the latter half of 1974 the SAS enjoyed a change from Tete ops by moving into Zambia to investigate ZIPRA’s activities in a large region south of the main road from Livingstone to Lusaka. Amongst other things, their reconnaissance revealed that ZIPRA cadres were involved with intensive manual work at the site of the hole the Air Force had found. The sounds of sawing and hammering led the SAS to the firm conclusion that a major underground arms store was in the making. The Air Force was asked to monitor the site regularly and report on progress. The resultant photographs showed conclusively that the SAS had been correct in their assessment. Now
