Air Force for its own use providing it was always made available to him to fly on regular visits to his farm ‘Gwenora’ near Selukwe.
Having been a fighter pilot himself, Ian Smith always flew his aircraft and favoured Flight Lieutenants Bob d’Hotmann or Ivan Holshausen to fly with him. On two occasions I flew passenger in the back of the aircraft sitting next to the PM’s friendly wife who talked a great deal. Janet never once entered into a non-political discussion and asked many searching questions to test my opinions on Rhodesia’s political affairs. I do not believe she found me wanting.
In addition to Ian Smith’s Baron, the squadron acquired four Islander light-transport aircraft that came into the Air Force inventory in an unexpected way. First one, then another, then two more Islanders arrived unannounced at Salisbury Airport carrying Portuguese families evicted from Mozambique in FRELIMO’s erroneous drive to rid the country of whites. The owners of these aircraft, like all those being evicted from their homes and businesses, had lost all they possessed, so they brought their machines secretly to Rhodesia to sell for money to start new lives.
The Islander was ideal for light communication work and came at a good price. A fair amount of hard work was needed to bring them up to Air Force standards and to regularise equipment and fittings before entry into regular service. Later more Islanders were added to the fleet.
What the Air Force really needed at the time was a replacement aircraft for 4 Squadron’s ageing Provosts and the underpowered Trojans. I was tasked to make an assessment of light civilian aircraft that, if modified for weapons delivery, would meet our needs. We really wanted an aircraft specifically designed for our type of war but, though there were plenty on the international market, none could be sold to Rhodesia because of the UN mandatory sanctions. This gave us no option but to identify a standard ‘civilian’ aircraft that we could buy, preferably from France, for operational upgrade. The French, more interested in commerce than in UN restrictions, had been good to us. In spite of sanctions, France had helped to increase our helicopter fleet from eight Alouettes to more than double that number, even with losses taken into account. How this was done and how we acquired 20mm cannons and other material was not for me to know.
The most suitable of the fixed-wing aircraft available inside the country appeared to me to be the American-designed twin, in-line, push-pull Cessna 337 with retractable undercarriage. Of importance was the fact that this aircraft was built under licence in France. The owner of the only available 337 and Wing Commander Bill Smith handled the machine whilst I looked on from the back seat. I was satisfied that the aircraft possessed the power, lift capacity and speed we needed and, like the Cessna 185, it was well suited to recce.
Orders were immediately placed with the Reims factory in France, then manufacturing Cessna 337s under licence from USA. My greatest pleasure in the initial exercise came from an instruction to decide what aids and comforts must be incorporated into these brand-new machines. Having done this, my list was strongly criticised by some Air HQ officers, mainly technical, who could not justify the added expense of aids and comforts we had been doing without for so long. Not one of the critics had any idea of the difficulties, dangers and discomforts our pilots endured in the field, so it was pleasing that the Air Force Commander, Air Marshal Mick McLaren, ruled in favour of operational pilots.
Although most CTs had exited the country, a few groups remained, some leaderless. Many of these were LTTs who had grouped together, fearing to venture into Mozambique because, for them, it was unknown ground. Measuring the activity level from Air Strike Reports, only four occurred in January (the same number as occurred on the day before the ceasefire) and only one produced any result. This was an over-border Fireforce action initiated by a Selous Scouts recce team, which accounted for seven CTs killed. From the beginning of February to 24 July only seventeen ASRs were recorded, most inside Mozambique with minimal returns.
On 14 June 1975 I was appointed OC FAF 5 at Mtoko because the regular OC, John Digby, was going on overseas leave. In the absence of any offensive action, my time was spent improving the campsite and finishing off building the pub John Digby had started. Gordon Wright, who was OC FAF 1 at the time, assisted by finding a good N’debele thatcher. This man did a great job of thatching the pub roof despite his continuous complaints about the ‘poor quality of Shona grass’.
The ‘Chopper Arms’ was a great success for deployed Air Force personnel and became a happy watering hole for Army, Selous Scouts, Police and surrounding farmers. It was officially opened on three separate occasions.
When I had run out of things to do around the camp, I became agitated by the lack of action and spent much of my spare time on air recce. I submitted this report to Air HQ:
1. I was OC FAF 5 during the period 14 June to 26 July 1975. Prior to this period I had visited Mtoko and learnt that all flying, other than casevac, relay changes and courier flights, had been in response to terrorist activities. No intelligence had been forthcoming to allow aggressive planning to be made and only one terrorist had been killed in the Mtoko area in a chance encounter during 1975. Selous Scouts were not providing any up-to-date intelligence at that stage.
2. In response to my request, A/D Ops and SO Ops agreed that I could use 4 Squadron’s Cessnas for reconnaissance at FAF 5, as the squadron was not using these aircraft. The object of wanting to recce was essentially to try to provide intelligence that would allow pre-emptive rather than reactive planning against any of the few terrorist gangs remaining in the Hurricane area.
3. It was also agreed that 4 Squadron would provide selected pilots for recce training whilst I was at FAF 5. These were to be Sqn Ldr White, Flt Lt Bennie and Air Sub-Lt Boulter. Sqn Ldr White did not deploy to FAF 5 and Air Sub-Lt Boulter was killed (in a flying accident at Thornhill) just before he was due to undertake recce training. Flt Lt Bennie’s training was cut short after the first flight due to Operation Newton. However, he managed to fit in two days of training some days later. Flt Lt Bennie also arranged for Flt Lt Graaf and Air Lt Benecke to undertake short periods of recce training but all three pilots require further instruction.
4. I was current on Trojans and was given a refamil on Cessna by Flt Lt Bennie. During the first four weeks of recce in the Mtoko area I located in excess of 200 ter bases and feeding places. However, the dry conditions made ageing of these points very difficult. Therefore it was only in the last two weeks that I was providing up-to- date information when bases found had not been plotted previously. One of these was considered suitable for air strike in conjunction with the Fireforce, as it was miles from any Army callsign. OC Air Det Hurricane confirmed by signal that I could mark the target with smoke rockets as my weapons categories had lapsed. The Fireforce action was routine but unsuccessful and the base, though in current use, had been vacated by LTTs just prior to FF arrival. They seem to have developed a taste for orgies with the local girls. ASR 04/75 refers.
5. There can be no doubt that 4 Squadron will be in need of good recce pilots when ZANLA returns and cannot afford to await the event. However, I must request that serious thought be given to keeping the few pilots who show any interest and ability in recce on 4 Squadron. Not one of the useful recce pilots I taught 1972- 4 remains on 4 Squadron and I am disheartened by the negative attitudes of the pilots I have instructed.
Clever intelligence work by the Selous Scouts Intelligence Officer deduced that ZANLA’s remaining leaders would be meeting in the vicinity of a particular contact man’s village during the latter part of June. A force of regular troops cordoned off a large area around this village in northern Kandeya Tribal Trust Land. Unfortunately there were too few soldiers to box in the terrorists who gathered, as predicted. Out of about thirty terrorists only six were killed and one was captured. So far as I recall, this was one of the reasons many survivors chose to leave for Mozambique. Those who remained had their minds changed six weeks later.
Upon his return from leave, John Digby resumed command of FAF 5 and I remained there with him to continue teaching recce to 4 Squadron pilots and PRAW crews. It was a difficult and extremely boring task because there were very few CTs around, particularly after a flurry of successful actions involving Cocky Benecke. This will be covered shortly.
