pursuing policies in the nation’s long-term interest.
My dismay about Maastricht reflected my concern about its effects internationally almost as much as the risks it posed to Britain. Although in the Bruges speech in 1988 I spoke about the distinctive strengths of British traditions and institutions, I was equally concerned about the effects on other European countries and on the outside world. Ultimately, of course, it is up to the Germans, French, Italians and others what kind of economic and political relations they want with each other. But anyone who does not sound the alarm on seeing great nations in headlong pursuit of disastrous goals is grossly irresponsible — and indeed a bad European.
It makes no sense for Germany to abandon the Deutschmark; nor for France to settle down permanently to playing second fiddle to its dominant eastern neighbour; nor for Italy to be distracted from the task of domestic political reform by looking to the European Union for solutions; nor for Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland to rely on subsidies from Germany in exchange for abandoning the opportunity to make the best of their lower labour costs; nor for the Scandinavian countries to export their high social costs to other European countries rather than cutting them back. As for the former communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, how can they be expected to live with the high-cost regimes which the monetary and social policies of the Community would place upon them? It is difficult to see them being anything other than distant, poor relations of a Delors-style European Union. For the members of the Union, therefore, such a policy offers economic decline. For its neighbours it offers instability. For the rest of the world it provides a momentum towards protectionism.
For a treaty which threatens so much harm to all concerned, Maastricht has not even had the promised effect of uniting the Conservative Party. Indeed, it split the Conservative Party in Parliament and in the country, undermining confidence in the Government’s sense of direction. Because the strategy of which it was a part rested essentially upon proving to our partners that Britain wished to be ‘at the heart of Europe’, it led directly to the unnecessarily deep recession caused by trying to maintain an unsustainable parity for sterling within the ERM. The humiliating circumstances of our departure added to the political damage to the Conservative Party. And all of the fundamental problems will surface again as we approach the 1996 Inter-Governmental Conference.
I could foresee enough of this in November 1991, even before the full details of Maastricht were known, to understand that I would have to oppose it root and branch. For the reasons I have already outlined, this was bound to be more embarrassing for all concerned if I remained in the House of Commons. Moreover, it seemed likely that the result of the general election, whenever it came, was likely to be a reduction in the large majority we had obtained in 1987. This would make it more difficult for me to speak and vote as I wanted. In any case, although I had taken the same seat on the backbenches that I had occupied some twenty-five years earlier — and I had enjoyed my time as a young backbencher — I now felt ill at ease. The enjoyment of the backbenches comes from being able to speak out freely. This, however, I knew would never again be possible. My every word would be judged in terms of support for or opposition to John Major. I would inhibit him just by my presence, and that in turn would inhibit me. So I decided to stand down as Member of Parliament for Finchley and accept a life peerage.
My mixed emotions about this were compensated by the happiness I felt in Denis’s baronetcy. With the Conservative victory in the April 1992 general election, a result achieved in equal measure as a result of my record, John Major’s admirable grit and the Labour Party’s egregious errors, I felt newly liberated to continue the argument about Europe’s future.
ANOTHER EUROPE
The Bill to implement the Maastricht Treaty was announced in the first Queen’s Speech of the new Parliament. Ten days later, on Friday 15 May, I was due to speak in The Hague. My speech-writing team and I wrestled to include within one framework all the main elements of the alternative to a Maastricht-style Europe. I deliberately intended it as Bruges Mark II. Of course, I could not expect that it would have the same impact; after all, I was no longer a head of government. But for that very reason I hoped that the ideas could be developed more provocatively and would help to alert the more open-minded members of Europe’s political elite to new possibilities.[71]
I began by likening the architecture of the Berlaymont building in Brussels — the home of the European Commission which was due to be demolished — to the political architecture of the European Community, ‘infused with the spirit of yesterday’s future’. Circumstances had so changed since the foundation of the Community that major rethinking was required. Looking back at its origins and development, I distinguished between two different economic traditions — those of liberalism and socialism. The time had now come when Europe had to choose between these two approaches. Maastricht’s federalism was essentially the child of socialist thinking. It involved a degree of centralized control which the wider Europe created by the fall of communism made outdated. In fact, what was involved, I argued, was:
…a central intellectual mistake. [It was] assumed that the model for future government was that of a centralized bureaucracy that would collect information upwards, make decisions at the top, and then issue orders downwards. And what seemed the wisdom of the ages in 1945 was in fact a primitive fallacy. Hierarchical bureaucracy may be a suitable method of organizing a small business that is exposed to fierce external competition — but it is a recipe for stagnation and inefficiency in almost every other context.
…The larger Europe grows, the more diverse must be the forms of cooperation it requires. Instead of a centralized bureaucracy, the model should be a market — not only a market of individuals and companies, but also a market in which the players are governments. Thus governments would compete with each other for foreign investments, top management and high earners through lower taxes and less regulation. Such a market would impose a fiscal discipline on governments because they would not want to drive away expertise and business. It would also help to establish which fiscal and regulatory policies produced the best overall economic results. No wonder socialists don’t like it. To make such a market work, of course, national governments must retain most of their existing powers in social and economic affairs. Since these governments are closer and accountable to their voters, it is doubly desirable that we should keep power at the national level.
On the basis of this analysis, I argued for two specific changes. The first conclusion I drew was that there was no reason why every new European initiative should require the participation of all Community members. If Europe did move into new areas, it must do so under separate treaties which clearly defined the powers which had been surrendered:
We should aim at a multi-track Europe in which
Second, far from giving the European Commission more power, it should have less. In fact, it was not needed in its present form and it should cease to be legislative in any sense; rather it should become an administrative body, not initiating policy but carrying it out.
Still more outrageously, I mentioned the issue which was on everyone’s mind and no one’s agenda in Europe, ‘the German Question’. I expressed admiration for the German achievement and, indeed, agreement with several distinctive German policies, for example on monetary matters and on recognizing Slovenia and Croatia. But I argued that we had to face up to the fact that the power of a reunited Germany was a problem. The Germans themselves realized this; it explained, for instance, why Chancellor Kohl and the German political establishment were so anxious for their country to be ‘anchored’ in Europe and restrained by institutions of federal decision- making. Tying the German Gulliver down within a federal European Community was no answer, however, because Germany’s preponderance within it was so great that federalism itself augmented German power rather than contained it. In place of this vision, we had to return to the politics of the balance of power which would ensure that individual nation states, like Britain and France, would be able to act as a counterweight to Germany if it pursued policies which were against our interests. Meanwhile — and this was perhaps the most important element
