The immediate consequences were in many ways the same for American troops at Kasserine Pass: Rommel ordered the Afrika Korps strike force to break through and then swing north toward Le Kef.45
Clobbered at Kasserine
The headquarters group of the 1st Infantry Division’s 26th RCT arrived in Kasserine Pass about 0730 hours on 19 February to take charge of defenses that were already under attack. Fredendall had called Colonel Stark late on 18 February and told him to move to Kasserine Pass immediately and “pull a Stonewall Jackson.” Stark took command from Colonel Moore and found four companies of the 19th Engineer Combat Regiment deployed on the right side of the line while his own 1st Battalion held the left. About 1705 hours, the 3d Battalion, 39th Infantry Regiment, 9th Infantry Division, along with an antitank company, began to move into the left sector in a more-or- less piecemeal fashion. Stark deployed a few tanks from Company I, 13th Armored Regiment, and what was left of the 805th Tank Destroyer Battalion after the Feriana engagement near the entrance to the pass on the right (Company A had rejoined the battalion minus four TDs lost near Sbeitla).46
Kampfgruppe Deutsches Afrika Korps launched a strong frontal attack during the day; casualties were heavy on both sides. Under heavy artillery fire and attacked by an estimated tank battalion, the 805th Tank Destroyer Battalion wildly reported that it had destroyed between twenty-five and thirty armored vehicles while losing eight of its own TDs. The official U.S. Army history’s account suggests that the battalion destroyed no tanks, but
The following day, at about 0400 hours, a small British task force of eleven tanks, a company of motorized infantry, one battery of artillery, and some antitank guns arrived courtesy of the British 26th Armoured Brigade at Thala. During the afternoon, the 894th Tank Destroyer Battalion pulled into the pass. Stark deployed two companies to strengthen the right flank and one company to help the men of the 805th on the left.48
Rommel, however, was pressing his attack with reinforcements of his own—the 10th and 21st Panzer divisions—and his usual determination. By noon, German tanks had penetrated the line held by the engineers. As the afternoon progressed, the American line crumbled. Men fled, abandoning prodigious quantities of equipment. Lieutenant Colonel A. C. Gore, who commanded the British detachment, fought on valiantly until his last tank was destroyed. He then withdrew, accompanied by the five remaining TDs of the 805th.49
On 20 February, BrigGen Paul Robinett, commanding general of Combat Command B, was ordered to take charge of all troops defending Kasserine Pass. He, in turn, would report to the commander of the British 26th Armored Brigade, which was operating just to the north. The command spent that night rounding up and feeding stragglers from retreating units, including the 805th and 894th Tank Destroyer battalions. Both were initially incorporated into the command, but the 805th was in such a poor state—it had over the course of seven days lost eleven men killed, fifty-five wounded, and one hundred and sixty-eight missing or captured—that it could not be made combat-ready for at least a day and was sent north to Thala.50
At 0335 hours on 21 February, II Corps reported that the Germans had taken the heights on both sides of Kasserine Pass. Tanks were beginning to probe the plain on which sat Tebessa, II Corps headquarters, many of the largest American supply dumps, and the critical airfield at Youks-les-Bains.51 Combat Command B advanced during the wee hours of 21 February to Djebel el Hamra in the Bahiret Foussana Valley to block the projected German advance. The Germans attacked the new line at about 1400 with forty tanks backed by motorized infantry and artillery. The tanks of CCB would not be budged and stayed in hull-defilade positions rather than charge into waiting antitank fire. Artillery fire poured into the German ranks. The 894th Tank Destroyer Battalion maneuvered its halftracks to the enemy’s south flank and pounded the advancing Germans. The Americans held. Combat Command B’s Brigadier General Robinett reported that he believed the Germans had begun to retreat back into Kasserine Pass.52
Major General Orlando Ward, CG of 1st Armored Division, on 22 February assumed command of all operations in Kasserine, Thala, and Haidra. That day, the Germans were reported to be burning some of their vehicles, but Rommel nevertheless threw one more jab at CCB; more tough fighting was required to restore the line.
The next day, 1st Armored Division elements advanced against little resistance. Rommel, worried about Monty’s Eighth Army at his back, had decided to end his offensive.53 By 25 February, German forces had withdrawn to the line Faid–Djebel Sidi Aich–Gafsa, and the following day the battered 1st Armored Division went into corps reserve.54 Eisenhower deemed the Kasserine line stabilized as of 26 February.55
The first major American battle with German forces had cost the U.S. Army more than six thousand casualties, including three hundred dead, and two-thirds of the tank strength of the 1st Armored Division.56 Some of the tank destroyer men realized for the first time why the British, saddled with inferior equipment, might feel proud of a successful evacuation.57
Ward concluded in a letter to Armored Force chief LtGen Jacob Devers written a few days later, “I now have a veteran division. Its losses have been great, but I hope before long to have it better than ever, based on past experiences.”58 His words doubtless applied to the tank destroyer units fighting as part of his command.
The troops were quickly losing faith in their equipment. Tank killers nicknamed their M3 the “Purple Heart Box.”59 The vehicle had no more punch than a Sherman and offered much less protection. After the fighting at Feriana and Kasserine, SSgt John Spence, of the 805th, realized that one had to move quickly in the M3, because if the halftrack were hit by a German tank round, “it was like lighting a match.”60 Indeed, the halftrack in general was getting a very bad name. One soldier, when asked by an officer if German aircraft bullets would go through the halftrack, replied, “No, sir. They only come through one wall and then they rattle around.”61
Word had gotten all the way back to TD men training at Camp Hood. When the 899th Tank Destroyer Battalion shipped out for North Africa in January 1943, the men all hoped that they would not have to fight in the M3. They were elated when they were issued the first M10s in North Africa upon their arrival at Casablanca.62
By March 1943, official U.S. Army observers concluded that the 37mm gun was ineffective against German Mark III and Mark IV tanks. Only a side or rear shot had much chance of achieving a kill, and effective German coordination of tanks and infantry made this difficult to do in battle.63 There were now enough M3s in North Africa to replace all of the M6s.64 Company B of the 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion gleefully got rid of its M6s, which it judged “utterly worthless.” Reconnaissance Company got stuck with some of them, however.
On to Victory
Eisenhower reacted to the debacle at Kasserine Pass by reorganizing his command. British General Sir Harold Alexander took control of all ground forces. The British—who viewed the American performance as incompetent—would play the lead role in the next phase of operations. Major General George Patton Jr. assumed command of II Corps and started to beat it into shape. Two fresh British divisions arrived, and the Americans and French rearmed. And the Allies finally deployed enough fighters to contest control of the air. With that, the Allies took the offensive.65
On 13 March, the 776th Tank Destroyer Battalion was attached to the 1st Armored Division, paving the way for the detachment three days later of the 701st.66 A partnership that had seen the toughest times of the North Africa campaign came to an end until renewed in Italy. The newly arrived battalion, equipped with
