The weather deteriorated rapidly in early October, adding immeasurably to the misery of the fighting men and often immobilizing even the tracked tank destroyers. Nonetheless, on 4 October, Eisenhower and General Sir Harold Alexander—now commanding general of 15th Army Group, incorporating the U.S. Fifth and British Eighth armies—concurred that Allied forces would march into Rome within the month.48
The first large units of Fifth Army closed on the rain-swollen Volturno River on 7 October. The high water and mud forced two postponements of a planned assault crossing. On the far bank, three German divisions waited.49
Finally, the night of 12–13 October, the Allies launched their first major river assault crossing of the war. VI Corps planned to send the 3d Infantry Division on the left and the 34th Infantry Division on the right across the river during the night. The 45th Infantry Division was pushing the Germans out of the upper Volturno River Valley to anchor the corps’ right flank. The Americans engaged in deception operations, such as limiting the volume of artillery fire before the day of the assault, to assure surprise.50
Beginning at midnight, GIs waded across or paddled assault boats to the far shore. Recon Company men from the 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion, carrying radios with which to call in supporting fire, forded the river with the doughs of the 3d Infantry Division. An hour later, artillery opened up all along the front. As the sky brightened, M10s from A/601st commenced direct-fire support from the south bank and destroyed two tanks, an SP gun, and other German targets. Beginning about 1100 hours, waterproofed Shermans from the 751st Tank Battalion splashed across the Volturno, followed an hour later by the first M10s—also waterproofed—from C/601st.51
The 776th Tank Destroyer Battalion provided indirect-fire support to the doughs of the 34th Infantry Division, who crossed the Volturno in a section deemed impassable to armor. The infantry came to a stop in front of unbending German resistance in the brush-covered hills beyond the river. Early on 14 October, four M10s forded the stream and drove the defenders from their key strongpoint with direct fire.52 The M10, as it turned out, could go places heavier Sherman tanks could not.
Sixth Corps gained a foothold above Capua, but German troops could rain observed fire onto all suitable bridging sites and thus greatly slowed the American buildup north of the river. A British crossing below Capua, meanwhile, was checked. A smaller crossing by two British divisions closer to the coast north of Naples provoked vigorous German counterattacks. Indeed, the Germans were able to hold largely in place until 16 October, when they withdrew to the next line of defenses fifteen miles to the north—exactly in accordance with Kesselring’s schedule.53
As visions of a rapid advance on Rome faded for good, Eisenhower proposed to the Combined Chiefs of Staff that his forces mount a small amphibious and airborne operation to turn the German line. The chiefs turned down the idea because requirements for Operation Overlord, the invasion of France, precluded devoting additional resources to the Mediterranean Theater. Eisenhower realized that his men were condemned to a grueling series of costly frontal assaults.54
The Allies called the ground north of the Volturno and south of the Rapido River and Gustav Line the “Winter Position.” The West Point history of the Second World War offers a superb description of what the tank destroyer crews found there: “On Kesselring’s map there were two delay lines in the area, the Barbara and Reinhard. His subordinate corps commanders had added intermediate delay lines of their own. Naturally, German commanders at lower echelons had added outposts and reserve blocking positions, so that to the GI and Tommy, attacking through the area seemed like attacking one big defensive zone. All hill masses were occupied. Positions had been sighted to provide each other covering small arms fire. Engineers had constructed some of the major bunkers of concrete. They had cut others from solid rock with pneumatic drills. Infantrymen had improved less critical positions by rolling large rocks around their foxholes. Because of the treeless mountains, artillery forward observers had overlapping, unobstructed views of the approaches to other mountains in the area. The towns that dotted the valley floors, such as San Pietro, San Vittore, and Cassino, were converted into strongpoints…. The ultimate difficulty was, of course, the German infantryman, whose morale was high and who was glad to be ending his Army’s 2,000-mile retreat from El Alamein, through Tunis and Sicily, to the Gustav Line.”55
For the tank killers of most battalions, the slow march up the Italian mainland became a series of small- scale fire-support missions for the infantry. The 3-inch gun on the M10 was effective in the direct-fire role out to six thousand yards.56 The TD crews encountered mainly well dug-in machine-gun and antitank positions supported by roving self-propelled artillery pieces.57 The Tank Destroyer Command had advocated the use of TDs against fortifications in 1942 but backed off after being accused of over-selling tank destroyers.58
Enemy tanks to kill were rare. In both the attack and the defense, the Germans usually exposed no more than two to four panzers at a time.59 The Germans were using tactics that could have come from the TD field manual: The panzers were deployed in depth where they could move to previously reconnoitered firing positions to engage Allied armor whenever the Allies attacked or achieved a penetration.60
Most personnel and vehicle losses in the TD battalions were the result of landmines, followed by German artillery fire.
Experimentation led to the formation of ad hoc teams that were better able to handle the mix of German defenses. The infantry was vulnerable to strongpoints and tanks, so separate tank battalions were attached to provide close support with their machine guns and 75mm cannon. The M4 Sherman tank cannon, however, lacked sufficient penetrating power to defeat the front armor of the Mark VI Tiger tank or the new Mark V Panthers that would soon be appearing. So tank destroyer units were added to deal with tough armored threats. The usual mix was one TD platoon per tank company, or one TD company per tank battalion.
As early as Operation Avalanche, elements of the 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion had been incorporated into an ad hoc team, with B/751st Tank Battalion actually attached to the TD command.61 By October, the tank killers from the 601st worked routinely with the tankers from the 751st; the reconnaissance company at times provided the infantry element to the team. Infantry commanders were usually new at combined-arms fighting and unfamiliar with the capabilities of the 3-inch gun, however, and typically told the TDs not only at what to shoot but also from where to do so. They tended to think in terms of direct fire, which placed TDs in exposed positions that invited rapid counter-battery fire from the Germans. The TD crews much preferred to shoot indirectly from defiladed positions.62
Indeed, TD battalions that were primarily engaged in close-support roles fired numerous indirect artillery missions, as well. Company A of the 645th, for example, conducted a fire mission on 19 October against a German battery at 13,300 yards under the control of an artillery observer. During November, the battalion fired 8,899 rounds of HE in its artillery role and only 360 rounds of AP. On one occasion, the new CO of the 645th Tank Destroyer Battalion, Maj Edward Austin (a field artillery officer himself), complained that the infantry was using TDs for fire missions that could have been conducted by organic artillery with less risk of counter-battery fire.63 But the big artillery was plenty busy. Up to forty battalions at once were used to saturate German-occupied hills while the doughs moved in to storm the positions with rifles and grenades.64
The TDs worked well with field artillery units, but they were stepchildren. Supported units at times failed to inform all concerned when a TD battalion moved into position and began firing missions. The 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion recorded that its M10s drew friendly counter-battery fire several times.65
The 776th Tank Destroyer Battalion made a specialty of artillery support. On 10 October, the 776th’s firing companies were attached to the field artillery to conduct joint fire missions with the 125th, 151st, and 175th Field Artillery battalions. The men found that the months of summer training in Algeria adapting and perfecting coordination with the artillery paid off handsomely. The battalion adopted a provisional internal organization that divided each company into two six-gun batteries, and each company was normally attached to a light artillery battalion. (Other battalions also used this system at times when conducting indirect fire missions.66) Some reconnaissance and security personnel were cross-trained to help man company-level fire direction centers.67
The 3-inch gun proved to be particularly effective in certain artillery roles. It was best at long-range
