Chapter 7
“As of August 14, the Third Army had advanced farther and faster than any army in history.”
— George Patton Jr.
On 25 July 1944, as LtGen Courtney Hodges’s First Army launched Operation Cobra, LtGen George Patton’s Third Army waited impatiently to the rear to become operational and exploit the hoped-for breakthrough. The beachhead fighting had mostly involved the TD outfits attached to the infantry divisions. Now armored divisions made ready to roll, and it was time to test the TDs in blitzkrieg, American-style.
Lieutenant General Omar Bradley had conceived Cobra as a way to end the bloody hedgerow war with a major breakthrough on a narrow front west of St. Lo. He planned a massive air attack by strategic bombers and fighter-bombers to crack the German line. As eventually formulated by VII Corps, three infantry divisions—the 30th, 9th, and 4th—were to punch a hole in the defenses. The 2d and 3d Armored divisions and 1st Infantry Division (Motorized) were to provide the initial exploitation forces. Eighth Corps—which would attack under First Army control and go to Patton when Third Army stood up—had the 4th and 6th Armored divisions ready, as well as the 8th and 79th Infantry divisions. Behind them, three more Third Army corps were building up.1
The portents had not been favorable. Bad weather forced cancellation of the planned kickoff on 24 July, but the word did not reach most of the Eighth Air Force strategic bombers in time. Most were unable to identify their targets and did not bomb, but one flight dropped its bombs on positions of the 30th Infantry Division when the lead bombardier—who was struggling with a sticky release—inadvertently loosed his load and caused fifteen other B- 17s to follow suit. Twenty-five American soldiers died, and one hundred thirty-one were wounded. A Ninth Air Force B-24 accidentally bombed an American airfield at Chippelle, France, and destroyed two medium bombers and the crews. And one P-47 Thunderbolt struck an ammo dump that, regrettably, belonged to the Allies.2
The omens did not dramatically improve in the early hours of 25 July. More than five hundred fifty fighter- bombers from the IX Tactical Air Command (TAC) dropped more than two hundred tons of bombs and a large amount of napalm. Fifteen hundred B-17 and B-24 heavy bombers from the U.S. Eighth Air Force dropped more than thirty-three hundred tons of bombs, while some three hundred eighty B-26 medium bombers unloaded more than six hundred fifty tons of high explosive and fragmentation bombs. Some seventy-five of the bombers dropped their loads within American lines, and short bombs killed one hundred eleven American soldiers. Among them was LtGen Leslie McNair, godfather to the Tank Destroyer Force, who had come to observe the breakout.
But the unfortunate Panzer Lehr Division, which had replaced some of its armor lost to the guns of the 899th Tank Destroyer Battalion two weeks earlier, absorbed most of the carpet bombing. The war of attrition in the bocage had been hell on the American GI, but it had hurt the Germans badly, too. In all of Normandy (including the British sector), the Germans between 6 June and 9 July lost two thousand officers and eighty-five thousand men and received only five thousand replacements. They had also lost one hundred fifty Mark IVs, eighty-five Panthers, fifteen Tigers, one hundred sixty-seven 75mm assault guns and antitank guns, and almost thirty 88mm guns.3 They were running out of men, and the collapsing Eastern Front demanded every available replacement.4 A mere five thousand men held the line in front of the six divisions of VII Corps, and they were backed by no more than twenty-five thousand others in the area, counting reserve, supply, and headquarters personnel.5
Panzer Lehr was virtually annihilated by the air strikes. Generalleutnant Fritz Bayerlein estimated that 70 percent of his men were killed, wounded, or stunned.6
Where German troops survived the destruction, however, they fought on bravely, and VII Corps’ initial advance was slow. The VII Corps commanding general, MajGen J. Lawton Collins, decided on 26 July to commit his armor and the 1st Infantry Division in the expectation that the extra weight would crack the German defenses.
Combat Command A/2d Armored Division crossed its line of departure at 0945 hours. By 1035, the tankers were through the German defenses. Accompanied by the M10s of the 702d Tank Destroyer Battalion (less Company B), CCA was off to wreak havoc in the German rear.7 The TDs were held in reserve in the columns and had no initial contact with the enemy.8
By 27 July, the breakthrough had become unstoppable. The 3d Armored Division and attached 703d Tank Destroyer Battalion attacked at 0530 hours.9 Combat Command B/2d Armored Division—supported by Company B, 702d Tank Destroyer Battalion—attacked that same day and, because of delays elsewhere, became the corps spearhead. On the fly, the combat command received orders to hook to the coast and cut off the retreat of German forces still holding out to the north. By the next afternoon, the command had established a long, thinly held line of roadblocks that barred the path to the trapped Germans.10
The Germans tried to break free, and a series of violent and isolated battles flamed along CCB’s cordon. About 0900 on 29 July, fifteen panzers and several hundred paratroopers attacked the 78th Field Artillery Battalion—supported by four destroyers from Company B of the 702d—at a crossroads near La Penetiere. The assault collapsed a company-sized infantry screen. The M10s, two artillery batteries, and the antiaircraft section unleashed a fusillade of direct fire, while the third battery provided indirect fire support. Until reinforcements arrived thirty minutes later, these guns were all that prevented a German penetration. The attackers withdrew, leaving nine panzers and one hundred twenty-six men behind.11
The M10s of several TD battalions—including the 644th, 818th, and 893d—sported newly installed “Culin hedgerow devices.”12 Designed by Sergeant Curtis G. Culin of the 102d Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, the contraption (the 3d Armored Group referred to them as “Rube Goldbergs”) was made from steel girders from German beach defenses. It amounted to a set of steel teeth protruding from the nose of the tank and could be mounted on tanks or TDs. The teeth allowed the vehicle to grip and plow through a hedgerow with hardly any loss of speed. A similar device that looked more like a blade was referred to as the “green dozer.” Vehicles outfitted with the Culin device were called “Rhinos.” Tank and TD battalions hurriedly installed the devices during the second half of July in preparation for Operation Cobra, and by the time Cobra began, 60 percent of the tanks involved had been fitted with Culin devices.13 The invention gave American armor a decisive edge in mobility over German panzers during the final phase of the Normandy campaign. In fact, the use of the Rhino in combat was barred until the launch of Cobra in order to maintain tactical surprise.14
On 28 July, Patton took control of VIII Corps (he acted as the deputy 12th Army Group commander under Bradley for three days until Third Army officially became operational). Patton characteristically led with his tanks. The 4th and 6th Armored divisions lunged toward Avranche, the gateway to Brittany and central France, twenty- five miles distant.15 Among the first targets fired on by the 4th Armored Division were men of the 2d Armored Division who had helped open the door. Pointed radio communications quickly resolved the matter.16
The 704th Tank Destroyer Battalion had been formed out of the 4th Armored Division, spent three-quarters of its Stateside training time with the division, and remained attached to the 4th Armored for most of the European campaign.17 M18 crewman Roy Roberson recalled:
The 4th Armored Division, with the 704th attached, plunged out through a dazed enemy. But the knockout was far from complete. Very soon, a German tank opened fire and knocked out five of our halftracks.
Lieutenant Addision took his 2d Platoon with Sgt [Joe] Schedevy’s tank leading and roared forward to engage the enemy. Sergeant Schedevy spotted the Jerry tank first. M18 driver Technician Fifth Grade Beck whipped the tank around into a firing position and gunner Corporal Treet laid the crosshairs on the center of the [German cross] and fired the first direct-fire round for the 704th. It was a good shot and did the job. Before the TD stopped rocking, Treet spotted another Jerry behind a hedgerow. The Jerry fired at our TD and missed. A second round from Treet left the Kraut going up in smoke. Two more enemy tanks, panic-stricken, tried to escape and exposed their positions. Second Platoon tanks fired four more shots and neutralized the enemy….18
