group to the south but incorporated the thirty surviving Panthers of the 111th Panzer Brigade (only three of which were battle-ready). The division had twenty of its own Mark Vs and ten Mark IVs, was about 70 percent fit for combat, and had well trained men with good morale, but it lacked its antitank battalion, which was being outfitted with new Jagdpanzer IV tank destroyers. Workshops labored to rehabilitate as many of the panzer brigade’s Panthers as possible and distributed them to division units as they were repaired. The division was ordered to advance toward Rechicourt on 25 September despite the poor terrain and repetition of the line of attack.129
The panzers and grenadiers struck into the teeth of the 4th Armored Division’s defenses on the hills near Juvelize and drove the defenders off Hill 264. Renewed attacks the next day netted Hill 257 and Juvelize as the 4th Armored Division pulled back its forward units to straighten its line.130
The 602d Tank Destroyer Battalion covered the tactical withdrawal. In apparent reference to this action, battalion CO LtCol Pete Kopcsak later recollected: “Barthold (platoon leader, Company B) with his TDs held his ground until enemy infantry were passing him and the 4th Armored Division artillery was shelling him. I talked with [LtCol Creighton] Abrams of the 4th Armored who said he had to pull back as he was losing too many tanks. When I arrived at the battalion CP, Major Conlin said he thought I had been captured. I had waited to see that Barthold’s unit had evacuated safely. Our fighter planes were strafing the Germans on both sides of my vehicle. I saw AA tracer bullets from the Germans firing at those planes. My driver sped down the road while Smith, the radio operator, fired machine-gun bullets to both sides of the road and to our front.”131
On 27 September, the panzergrenadiers occupied a line of concrete fortifications left from World War I— this was the area in which Corporal Hitler had served—and found themselves safe from even heavy artillery fire. The division renewed its attacks on 28 September. The spearheads came close to Rechicourt but bogged down, and one prong suffered heavy casualties.132
The 11th Panzer Division had achieved enough for the Germans to man a thin defensive line between the German First and Nineteenth armies. Fifth Panzer Army viewed its mission as accomplished.133
On 29 September, American air strikes shattered the 11th Panzer Division’s forward elements. A/602d Tank Destroyer Battalion was attached to the 2d Cavalry Group in the vicinity of Arracourt and proceeded to the scene of the German rout. The company’s gunners claimed eight “Tiger” tanks (no Tigers were present), three armored cars, and an unknown number of enemy personnel.134
To the south, the 813th Tank Destroyer Battalion was operating with the 106th Cavalry Group in support of the 79th Infantry Division near Luneville. The cavalry believed it had spotted a force of well-concealed German tanks near Bauzemont, and the cavalry commander suggested that the tank killers investigate. The 1st Platoon of Company C advanced at about 1100 hours and an M10 engaged and knocked out a Mark IV tank. The exchange may have provoked movement, because a second Mark IV and a halftrack pulled into view, both to be dispatched by the TDs. The 3d Platoon arrived, and the eight TDs continued to fire as more vehicles became visible, setting more alight. The Germans’ problems were compounded when Allied fighter-bombers struck their positions.
Nearby, Company A’s 3d Platoon also spotted the Germans and cut loose. Soon, three more Mark IVs, one halftrack, and a small vehicle had been disabled. The Germans tried to withdraw to the northeast at about 1500 hours, but Company A’s 2d Platoon engaged the column and destroyed a Mark V, a Mark IV, a truck, and numerous infantry. The 1st Platoon, meanwhile, shelled and silenced a German artillery battery.
By the time the dust settled, the tank killers had destroyed thirteen Mark IVs, two Panthers, and three halftracks and trucks, and killed or wounded forty-five foot troops. They had lost not a single man or vehicle in exchange.135
By 29 September, the Fifth Panzer Army’s offensive efforts had run out of steam. Hitler called off the operation and ordered most of his surviving armor northward. The Allies by now held a 20:1 advantage in tanks along the Western Front.136
Changes in the Force
Combat experience caused commanders to settle on a major realignment of the Tank Destroyer Force in the ETO. The U.S. 12th Army Group requested that the number of towed battalions be cut to twelve and that ten be reequipped with T5E1 90mm guns. On 29 September, HQS, European Theater, approved the conversion of all twelve towed battalions to 90mm guns. How close the tank killers came to fielding an even more unwieldy weapon! Fortunately, no 90mm towed guns were immediately available.
Of the remaining forty battalions, twenty were to receive the M36 TD and the remainder to retain M10s or M18s at the discretion of the army commanders and within the constraints of supply of the weapons.137
A Gun for Hunting Big Game
Standardized in June 1944, the M36 Jackson was an adaptation of the M10A1 (the gasoline-powered variant), and many were in fact returreted M10A1s. The vehicle mounted the 90mm M3 gun in an open-topped turret equipped with power traverse.
The gun was rated as capable of penetrating three inches of homogenous armor at forty-seven hundred yards. In practice, it could kill most big cats—the Tiger I and Panther—at typical combat ranges. A crew from the 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion made the
Tests conducted by the 703d Tank Destroyer Battalion in early December using captured Mark Vs, however, indicated that the Panther’s front armor could deflect some shots fired from as little as one hundred fifty yards. The battalion concluded that the M36 should still maneuver for side shots even against the Panther, that if that were not possible two TDs should engage the target, and that the 90mm gun would not penetrate the front armor of the Royal Tiger (Tiger II) at any range. The battalion called for better ammunition rather than a bigger gun.
Once again, the only machine gun was a rear-mounted .50-caliber for antiaircraft defense.
The hull was identical to that of the M10, except for minor modifications to provide stowage for the larger ammunition, and the vehicle was equipped with a small auxiliary generator, which had often been requested by M10 crews. The pressing requirement for 90mm antitank weapons at the front convinced the Army to put M36 turrets onto one hundred eighty-seven M4A3 Sherman chassis, which retained the thick armor and hull machine gun. This variant, dubbed the M36B1, further blurred the distinction between the tank and the tank destroyer.
Production of the M36B2 began in early 1945. This series used retired M10 hulls (diesel engines), provided folding flaps of steel to cover the turret top, and incorporated a muzzle brake on the main gun.139
The first M36 Jacksons arrived in the ETO in September. The First and Ninth armies channeled arriving M36s to TD battalions supporting armored divisions, while Third Army used them to convert towed battalions. The 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion (towed) was the first to reequip, beginning 25 September.140 (The 776th Tank Destroyer Battalion—in Naples to prepare for transfer to France—was probably the first outfit in Europe to actually receive the M36 in September, but it did not arrive in the ETO until early October.) The 703d Tank Destroyer Battalion (M10s) began the transition on 30 September and first used the new TDs in combat in October. The 703d almost immediately cut the .50-caliber machine-gun mounts off the backs of the turrets and welded them to the left front corners. By year’s end, only seven battalions had received the M36.141
